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Preface
The distinction between the mind and body, their relatedness and 
respective properties is perhaps the single most persistent problem 
that faces philosophical contemplation. Various models have been 
proposed in order to overcome this gaping duality: idealism, 
occasionalism, epiphenomenalism, behaviourism, etc.. The model 
proposed within this thesis corresponds to psychophysical parallelism 
- a parallelism judged purely phenomenological - wherein mind and 
body are conceived in terms of two aspects of an unconscious 
transcendental reality. Historically, philosophy has tended to prioritise 
one of the aspects over the other: Hegel and Marx serve to illustrate 
this point. As I will argue throughout this thesis, this transcendental 
reality - within which we will situate spontaneous creativity - is 
essentially double and subsists between the two extremes. The 
consequence of this duplicity is to negate the possibility of any 
reconciliation into an originary Being, but through which the extremes 
communicate and pass information. Furthermore, since reality is 
essentially double, we will be at pains to describe it from two 
perspectives: from the point of view of language and biology, and 
thereby avoid the tendency to prioritise. The ontological, therefore, 
will be described in terms of a virtual or potential being situated in 
neither the heights nor the depths, but staged upon a surface that slips 
in between the two extremes. This has the added consequence of 
grounding ethics in sensibility. However, this is not a reductionist 
programme, but a theory of the whole which functions in the manner of 
a cybernetic entity constituted upon fractal sedimentations.
Introduction
Michel Foucault’s Les Mots et les choses, is badly translated into 
English as The Order o f Things: more accurate would be Words and 
Things. This amended title finds confirmation in Foucault’s analysis of 
R. Margritte: Ceci n’est pas une pipe. This paradoxical title opens upon a 
purely relational space between the thing itself and its name, thereby 
problematising the relation between signified and signifier in the 
manner of a Zen ‘koan.’ As Foucault writes: “Roussel’s experiment is 
located in what could be called the ‘tropological space’ of vocabulary . . 
. It is not where the canonical figures of speech originate, but that 
neutral space within language where the hollowness of the word is 
shown as an insidious void.” 1 This tropological space corresponds to 
the fissure within signification, and where words recover their 
fundamental freedom of metamorphosis. Within the hollowness of 
words we locate the essential duplicity - identity and otherness - 
which corrupts the ideality attributed to  words and things, inscribing 
there the unerasable mark of the paradox. It is out of these originary 
experiences, or tropes, that the World is constructed, and where we 
locate the freedom, the locus of resistance, within that World. There 
exists therefore a number of paradoxes constitutive of what we call 
‘reality.’ Borges affirms “ that the number of fables or metaphors of 
which men’s imagination is capable is limited, but tha t these few 
inventions can be all things for all men, like the Apostle.”1 2 
Furthermore, these metaphors are not invented but given.
Deleuze constructs his philosophy around a number of such paradoxes; 
we will describe four of these which for us constitu te the 
characteristic aspects of his thought. A). The first paradox concerns
1 M. Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, p. 16.
2 J. L. Borges, Other Inquisitions, p. 189.
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two interpretations of the world. As Borges tells us:
Coleridge observes that all men are born Aristotelian or Platonist. The latter know by 
intuition tha t the ideas are realities; the former, tha t they are generalisations; for the 
latter, language is nothing but a system of arbitrary symbols; for the former, it is the 
map of the universe. The Platonist knows that the universe is somehow a cosmos, an 
order, which, fo r the Aristotelian, may be an error or a figm ent of our partial 
knowledge. Across the latitudes and the ages, the two immortal antagonists change their 
name and language: one is Parmenides, Plato, Spinoza, Kant, Francis Bradley; the other 
is Heraclitus, Aristotle, Locke, Hume, William James.3
These two theses correspond to two fundamental ways of perceiving 
reality: Platonic realism and Aristotelian nominalism; the Forms and 
the categories; subject and object; intuition and intellectualism; 
idealism and materialism; magic and science; the universal and the 
particular; genus and species; the general and the individual. In actual 
fact, these extremes are coexistent and correspond to the two aspects 
from which the event is grasped; they are separable in abstract thought 
alone. A philosophy whose aim is to avoid both subjective and objective 
presupposition, slips in between Socratic height and Heraclitan depth 
and installs therein a pacifying surface. This ’meddling' is one of the 
most essential features that characterises Deleuzean philosophy: a 
sustained e ffo rt to expose the elevationism and reductionism that 
constitutes a history of philosophy. What is inaugurated in its place is 
difference and repetition: difference in itse lf as foundation and 
repetition for itself as ground. Deleuzean philosophy thereby conceives 
the transcendent in terms of the disparate and sufficient reason in 
terms of the eternal return of the same.
B). By describing the transcendental in terms of a disparate field 
populated by singularities, we conceive origination as the primordial 
Nothingness of the creatio ex nihilo. This nothingness must not be 
understood as an emptiness in the sense of Hegelian non-being, but
3 Ibid, p. 156.
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rather as a virtual potentiality out of which every substantial thing is 
engendered. Nihilism - the loss of faith in our highest values - means 
interpreting our value systems in terms of their transcendental 
origins, seeing nothing immutable in their arbitrary nature, and out of 
which the individual may derive an inventive motivation in order to 
reevaluate life through an act of self-creation. Nihilism means to 
eternally return to the transcendental source, to continually reevaluate 
anew, from one moment to the next. Such a goal implies an inhumanity, 
at least from the point of view of the circumspect consciousness. But 
to substitute the notion of the unconscious is itself problematic, since 
a certain awareness and optimality corresponds to this field. Rather, 
we will define it as aleatory - this notion is not as novel as it at first 
appears. Borges tells us in Pascal's Sphere that from Xenophanes to 
Parmenides, Empedocles, and Ptolemy, to  Alain de Lille, to Copernicus, 
Bruno, Campanella, and Bacon, to Donne, Milton, and Pascal, to mention 
only a few of the best known, have all conceived the universe, and God, 
in terms of "an infinite sphere, the centre of which is everywhere, the 
circumference nowhere."4 Today we may say that God is the aleatory 
point within an ever expanding cosmic sphere. It is this notion of an 
aleatory point that solves the paradox of the uncreated creator; never 
where it is and always where it isn't, traversing the entire system in 
an instant. Omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient. This notion of the 
aleatory constitutes the essential theme in Deleuzean philosophy, and 
describes what is there meant by non-anthropomorphic genesis. The 
aleatory point therefore must be understood as representing a certain 
harmony, better s till a resonance, amongst the many disparate 
elements that constitute a given system. But this resonance is not the 
faculty of thought which is said to harmonise all the other faculties,
4 Ibid, p. 9.
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but rather subsists below the conscious threshold. From the point of 
view of language, it corresponds to the idea; from the point of view of 
the body, it corresponds to the organism. But this point itself is neither 
idea nor body, rather it represents the virtual order out of which ideas 
and bodies are engendered. This point is a dynamic stability: not stable 
but metastable, since a change in any part of the system will have 
repercussions throughout the system as a whole.
C). The third metaphor incorporates the paradox of infinite regression 
as articulated by Zeno of Elea: that is, the race between Achilles the 
Nimble-Footed and the tortoise. The tortoise is given a start 
corresponding to its disadvantage. The race begins and Achilles makes 
up the distance, but by which time the tortoise has moved a little 
further; again Achilles makes up that distance, but again the tortoise 
has moved on a fraction further; and again . . . and again . . . regressus in 
infinitum. This repeated halving of the distance between two points is 
what Borges elsewhere calls the “ Greek labyrinth which is a single 
straight line.”5 Achilles is unable to overtake to tortoise, since he is 
destined only to recover the distance covered by the tortoise. Achilles 
runs ten times faster than the tortoise, therefore the series is 
represented by “ 10+1+1/10+1/100+1/1,000+1/10,000+ . . .”6 Zeno uses 
this paradox to deny movement. This paradox is again taken up by 
Aristotle who uses it to deny the reality of Platonic Forms: Man is the 
phenomenal representation of a Form; but this Form must also 
correspond to a higher Form of which it is a representation; and this 
second Form in turn must correspond to a third Form . . .  ad infinitum. 
St. Thomas Aquinas rediscovers the paradox and uses it to prove the 
existence of God: everything has a cause, every cause must have a
5 J. L. Borges, Labyrinths, p. 117.
6 J. L. Borges, Other Inquisitions, p. 110.
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previous cause, and these causes a previous cause, and these causes . . . 
The universe is conceived in terms of a infinite series of linear causes 
extending both backwards and forwards in time. But the cosmos exists 
as something more than a vanishing linear series: it exists as a whole. 
In order to make sense of this existence the conjunctive synthesis 
representing the non-contingent first cause is employed. Once again the 
paradox is rediscovered, Borges tells us:
Hermann Lotze uses the regressus as a way not to  understand that an alteration of object 
A can produce an alteration of object B. He reasons that if A and B are independent, then 
to postulate an influence of A on B is to  postulate a third element C, which to  operate on B 
will require a fourth element D, which will not be able to  operate without F . . . Toelude 
that multiplication of chimeras, he concludes that there is one single object in the world: 
an infinite and absolute substance, comparable to  the God of Spinoza. The transferable 
causes are reduced to  immanent ones; events, to  manifestations or forms of the cosmic 
substance.7
The essence of the world is no longer conceived in terms of a relation 
between subject and object, structure and function, language and 
bodies, separated by an abyss which only a transcendent value could 
come to fill, but rather in terms of a plane of immanence whose 
criterion comes from within. It is at this point that Deleuze picks up 
the baton, employing this paradox in the service of liberating desire 
from the repressive structures imposed upon it by transcendent values.
D). The fourth metaphor concerns time. In his essay: New Refutation of 
Time, Borges takes up the idealist position in order to refute, within 
the limits of the idealist doctrine, the traditional conception of time. 
To this task he applies the writings of both Berkeley and Hume. As he 
tells us: “ Berkeley denied that there was an object behind sense 
impressions. David Hume denied that there was a subject behind the 
perception of changes. Berkeley denied matter; Hume denied the spirit. 
Berkeley did not wish to add the metaphysical notion of matter to the
7 Ibid, p. 112.
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succession of impressions, while Hume did not wish to add the 
metaphysical notion of a self to the succession of mental states.” 8 The 
former refutes the existence of the object, and therefore absolute 
space, while the latter, taking the idealist argument of the former a 
logical step further, refutes the existence of the subject, and therefore 
absolute identity. However, both presuppose temporal succession. To 
this Borges adds the denial of a universal and absolute time wherein all 
phenomena would be serially connected, substituting it with an infinity 
of coexistent times. “ For Berkeley, time is ‘the succession of ideas . . . 
which flows uniformly and is participated by all beings’ ( The Principles 
o f Human Knowledge, 98); for Hume it is ‘composed of indivisible 
moments’ (A Treatise o f Human Nature, I, 2, 2). Nevertheless, having 
denied matter and spirit, which are continuities, and having denied 
space also, I do not know with what right we shall retain the continuity 
that is time.”9 Borges thereby reduces time to an absolute instant that 
is neither a succession of presents nor a unity of past moments. 
Deleuze names this time - which is neither present nor past, objective 
nor subjective - Aion, and attributes it to the futural dimension of 
metamorphosis, since it continually forks. To Aionic time there 
corresponds the paradox of a pure becoming; a movement that 
simultaneously goes from both past to future and future to past. As 
Deleuze writes: “This is the simultaneity of a becoming whose 
characteristic is to elude the present. Insofar as it eludes the present, 
becoming does not tolerate the separation or the distinction of before 
and after, or of past and future. It pertains to the essence of becoming 
to move and to pull in both directions at once.” 10
8 Ibid, p. 183.
9 Ibid, p. 183.
10 G. Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 1.
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These four themes find their analogues in the developing sciences of 
evolutionary biology and quantum mechanics, which affirm the primacy 
of participation over observation, of the event over the phenomenon, of 
the anegoic over the egoic. The structure of this primary domain 
exhibits a fractal pattern: that is, below the fin ite forms of 
phenomenology subsists infinity. The finite coastline of Britain, 
magnified again and again ad infinitum, never arrives at a straight line 
that would represent the boundary that defines the country, and thereby 
render it absolutely measurable. Rather, at every level of magnification 
there is irregularity, or rather a self-similar pattern as exemplified by 
the ‘Koch Curve’ - there is no such thing as a straight line, only an 
infinity of repeating levels that are irreducible to number. For example: 
the root system of a tree bears a striking resemblance to the structure 
of the human nervous system, which in turn exhibits a remarkable 
likeness to satellite photographs of river deltas. Large-scale and 
small-scale mirror one another to an uncanny degree, which leads some 
to hypothesise that the manifestation of Nature represents the 
iteration of a simple mathematical rule. Likewise, the structure of this 
present thesis takes on a certain fractal pattern, reflecting the duality 
between form and content on various levels of analysis. At each level - 
thesis, chapter, theme - the duality presented is not synthesised into a 
higher resolution under the authority of a transcendent value, but 
rather is founded and its genesis explained in terms of an immanence 
that leaves the duality in place, seeing in it an originary encounter 
between two irreducible dimensions. Philosophy therefore begins with 
paradox. As a whole, the thesis is preoccupied with the mind-body 
problem as articulated by Deleuze’s middle period writings; namely The 
Logic o f Sense and Difference and Repetition. Chapter one articulates a 
transcendental difference and configurational repetition beyond
7
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representation, thereby preparing the ground for a rereading of 
phenomenology in terms of eventology tha t problematises the 
formation of efficacious agency - on both the individual and social 
levels - and whose genesis must now be sought within the inhuman and 
strategic domain of power relations; chapter two analyses the event 
from the point of view of language and Husserlean phenomenology; 
chapter three from the point of view of the body and biology; while 
chapter four engages with a theory of ethics from the point of view of 
a material cogito grounded in the radical imaginary of a real desire 
that is productive; but a productivity that precedes the language 
paradigm and opens onto a polymorphous life beyond the Romantic ideal 




In this chapter we will be looking at the way in which Deleuze treats 
both Plato and Nietzsche, locating in one that which must be overturned 
by what is found in the other. It could be said, in a certain limited
sense, that these two figure correspond to the beginning and end of
philosophy as doxa. Plato, who inaugurated the moral presuppositions 
within what was to follow as the philosophy of the Western world, and 
Nietzsche, the first to ruthlessly undermine those presuppositions by 
substituting in their place the pure becoming of the ecstatic artist as 
philosopher-creator. Ultimately, what is at issue within this 
controversy is the status of difference and the manner in which it is
treated by both Plato and Nietzsche, as we find in the following
quotation taken from Deleuze:
The primacy of identity, however conceived, defines the  world of representation. But 
modern thought is born of the failure of representation, the loss of identities, and o f the 
discovery of all the forces tha t act under the representation of the identical. The modern 
world is one of simulacra. Man did not survive God, nor did the identity of the subject 
survive that of substance . . .  We propose to  think difference in itself independently o f the 
forms of representation which reduce it to  the Same, and the relation of different to  
different independently o f those forms which make them pass through the negative. (DR 
x ix )
Thus, our task lies clearly before us. However, the possibility of its 
accomplishment depends on whether difference in itself can indeed be 
thought independently of representation. In the course of this thesis we 
will attempt to track down this philosophical superlative - or ideal - 
within the domain of ontology. Here it will suffice us to articulate the 
role that representation plays in the two figures mentioned above. The 
chapter will be divided into five inter-related sections: 1. Plato; 2. 
Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's precursor; 3. will to power as form (value) 
giving force; 4. eternal return and repetition; 5. carnival, art and
Representation
creativity.
1. Let us begin by means of a brief detour inquiring after the manner in 
which Deleuze conceives the role that representation plays and the 
limitations it imposes upon difference. It has four principal aspects 
which correspond to thought, sensibility, the Idea and being. This four­
fold yoke constitutes the medium of representation as the site of 
transcendental illusion: tha t is, identity in the form  of the 
undetermined concept; resemblance in the determined object of the 
concept itself; opposition in the relation between determinations 
within concepts; and analogy in the relation between determinable 
concepts. Let us examine these four aspects in closer detail,
a). The firs t illusion concerns the manner in which common sense 
postulates generalities while inaugurating an identical thinking 
subject who would simultaneously certify the identity of concepts in 
general. As Deleuze explains:
In effect, thought is covered over by an ‘image’ made up of postulates which distort both 
its operation and its  genesis. These postulates culminate in the position o f an identical 
thinking subject, which functions as a principle of the identity for concepts in general .
. . The thinking subject brings to  the concept its subjective concomitants: memory, 
recognition and self-consciousness. Nevertheless, it is the moral vision o f the world 
which is thereby extended and represented in this subjective identity affirmed as a 
common sense [Cogitatio natura universalis]. (DR 265 -6 )
The postulates correspond to the primary units o f knowledge 
(individual facts) which are imposed upon the purely nomadic 
functioning of thought, thereby establishing a ground from which 
reasoning can arise. Furthermore, all these units converge upon a 
juncture which constitutes the self-identity of the thinking subject. 
This self-identity of the cogito is reflected in concepts, which in turn 
guarantees the ir identity. Thus, like Nietzsche, Deleuze proposes we
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nurture an evil-will that would shatter the conjunctions constitutive 
of common sense, elude a blind subservience to the prerogatives of the 
moral precepts, and thus allow thought to function in its extreme 
singularity. In that case, thought would be freed from its allegiance to 
a doxa that would predetermine the course of its wanderings, thereby 
making it adequate to think difference differentially.
b) . In order for representation to suppress difference in itself global 
similarities must be perceived in sensibility, thereby allowing the 
identity of the concept to be applied to the realm of diversity - this 
corresponds to the second site of transcendental illusion: resemblance. 
As Deleuze tells us:
difference necessarily tends to  be cancelled in the quality which covers it, while at the 
same time inequality tends to  be equalised within the extension in which it is distributed. 
The theme of quantitative equality or equalisation doubles that of qualitative resemblance 
and assimilation. (DR 266)
Good sense recognises these similarities, extracting from the unequal 
and the different that which is equal and similar. Thus, common sense 
and good sense form two complementary aspects - quantitative 
equalisation and qualitative resemblance - by which intensive 
difference is subordinated within perception. “ Difference is intensive, 
indistinguishable from depth in the form of an non-extensive and non­
qualified spatium, the matrix of the unequal and the different. Intensity 
is not the sensible but the being o f the sensible, where different 
relates to different” (Ibid).
c) . The third illusion concerns the way in which the negative 
suppresses difference in the form of opposition. Within the domain of 
representation, for a thing to be conceived as different it must in the 
first instance be presented negatively as that which is no longer the 
Same. From this we derive the law of contradiction, of being and non­
Representation
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being, wherein the dialectical sovereignty of the Same allows 
difference to exist, but only in a form that is mediated by the negative. 
For Deleuze, opposition is a derivative produced by understanding 
problems in terms of conscious questions. As he tells us:
Problems-ldeas are by nature unconscious: they are extra-propositional and sub­
representative, and do not resemble the propositions which represent the affirmations to  
which they give rise. If we attem pt to  reconstitute problems in the image of or as 
resembling conscious propositions, then the illusion takes shape, the shadow awakens and 
appears to  acquire a life of its own. (DR 267)
That is, the unconscious is conceived by Deleuze in terms of a domain 
of differentiated positivities, wherein the positivity of each and every 
singularity is affirmed. Thus, opposition is an epiphenomenon that is 
produced when we interpret problems-ldeas in terms of the theoretical 
antinomies of pure reason.
d). The fourth illusion concerns the subjection of difference to the 
categories, or rather, to analogy. Being expresses itself in a number of 
determinate ways (i.e., space and time), organises the distribution of 
things, while maintaining an undifferentiated composure. Difference is 
therefore suppressed at this highest level of the identical by the 
imposition of categories as determinable a priori concepts. As Deleuze 
writes:
Representation
the identity of the concept does not yet give us a concrete rule of determination, since it 
appears only as the identity of an indeterminate concept; Being . . .  The ultimate concepts 
. . .  must therefore be posited as determinable. They are recognised by the fact that each 
maintains an internal relation to  being. In th is  sense, these concepts are analogues, or 
Being is analogous in relation to  them and acquires simultaneously the identity of a 
distributive common sense and that of an ordinal good sense. (DR 269)
These ultimate concepts are the categories which Being distributes and 
orders and from which specific concepts may be derived. Thus, the task 
here is to think acategorically.
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However, it must be emphasised that in Plato the constraints imposed 
upon difference by representation are still relatively loose, in 
comparison to the philosophies of say Leibniz and Hegel who develop 
the subordination of difference in itself to the degree of infinite 
representation - that is, the infinitely small and the infinitely large 
respectively. As Deleuze writes:
Representation
Finite representation is tha t of a form which contains a matter, but a secondary matter 
in so far as it is defined by contraries. We have seen tha t it represented difference by 
mediating it, by subordinating it to  identity as the  genus, and by ensuring tha t 
subordination by means of analogy among the genera themselves, by means of the logical 
opposition of determinations and the resemblance of properly material contents. It is not 
the same w ith infin ite representation, since th is includes the Whole or ground as 
primary m atte r and the  essence as subject, absolute form  or Self. In fin ite  
representation relates at once both the essence and the ground, and the difference 
between the two, to  a foundation or sufficient reason. Mediation itself has become 
foundation. However, in the one case the ground is the infin ite continuity of the 
properties o f the universal which is itse lf contained in fin ite  particular Selves 
considered as essences. In the other case, particulars are only properties or figures 
which are developed in the infinite universal ground, but refer to  essences as the true 
determinations of a pure Self, or rather a 'Self' enveloped by this ground. In both cases, 
infinite representation is the object of a double discourse: that of properties and that of 
essences. (DR 49)
It is Deleuze's wish to articulate a transcendental empiricism that 
would serve as the precondition for a philosophy of representation, 
while subjecting the notions of the Identical and the Same to a 
protracted critique, and thereby performing nothing less than a 
philosophical inversion. From Plato to the post-Kantians, philosophy 
has defined the movement of thought as one which goes from the 
hypothetical to the apodictic. Deleuze suggests that thought’s true 
directionality is from the problematic to the question. As Bergson in 
Creative Evolution tells us:
Plato was the first to  set up the theory that to  know the real consists in finding its Idea, 
that is to  say, in forcing it into a preexisting frame already at our disposal - as if we 
implicitly possessed universal knowledge. But th is belief is natural to  the human 
intellect, always engaged as it is in determining under what former heading it shall
13
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catalogue any new object; and it may be said that, in a sense, we are all born Platonists.1
Likewise, Deleuze believes th a t essentia lly existence is 
incommensurable with the Idea - that is, everything begins with 
paradox. In order to interrogate the basis of Deleuze’s affirmation we 
will look at the manner in which Deleuze treats Plato on three major 
themes: A). Plato's method of division which is subject to the four 
transcendental illusions; B). The status accorded simulacra; C). The 
model of thought propounded by Plato.
A. The consideration of the four illusions will take the order of that 
articulated above, i). Platonic division, according to Deleuze, is not a 
method dedicated to the division of a "determinate genus into definite 
species" (DR 59). Rather, division or the dialectic of difference 
represents a method of selection wherein the true thing is not 
identified within a concept o f representation, but rather is 
authenticated over and against the false pretender by means of invoking 
the non-representational Idea.1 2 For this reason the dialogues can only 
invoke the distinction between the true and false participates of an 
Idea that is itself essentially ungraspable or non-representable. From 
this proceeds the distribution of lots between those judged true and 
those false. The characteristic of this method is the synthesis of 
difference within the cyclical movement of myth. By functioning as 
foundation, myth permits for a process of selection wherein the 
claimants may be judged as to the degree of their participation in the 
Idea sought. In this manner 'pure lines of descent' are established. From 
this we see that Platonism corresponds to a philosophy of heights and 
depths - tha t is, pure lines of descent that disseminate degrees of
1 H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, MaCmillan, 1911, p. 51.
2 An exemplary illustration of the non-representability of the Idea constitutes the persistent theme in 
R Musil’s novel: The Man Without Qualities.
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resemblances between claimants in hierarchical order, from the pure to 
the impure, the authentic to the inauthentic. However, resemblance 
must not be understood as an extrinsic difference between two things, 
but rather as a difference between the manifest thing (appearance) and 
its intrinsic Idea. Hence, " [ i] t  is a question of making a difference, thus 
of operating in the depths of the immediate, a dialectic of the 
immediate" (DR 60). More importantly, this notion of ‘making a 
difference’ is a question of determining a non-conceptual difference of 
unilateral distinction. Let us distinguish between two levels: a 
dissolved indeterminate abyssal ground, and a sky populated with 
determinate yet distinct things. Difference is not constituted between 
these two levels, but rather it is made when a determinate thing 
distinguishes itself from something that does not distinguish itself 
from it. That is, it reveals itself in its uniqueness: this is the moment 
of presence and precision, or rather immediacy. When the ground rises 
to the surface, form becomes an abstract line traced upon the 
reflecting surface of a "mirror in which both the determinate and the 
indeterminate combine in a single determination which 'makes' the 
difference" (DR 28). No longer an abyssal duality between chaos and 
order, but an always and already interweaving of the two. Thus, by 
means of establishing unilateral distinction, this method of division 
leaps from one singularity to another in order to found a philosophy of 
difference and identity. But a philosophy wherein the aim is not to seek 
for contraries within a single genus, but rather to s ift through the good 
and bad claimants which partake in a single Idea; always in a mixed 
form as an indefinite representing m ultip lic ity. The aspiration 
therefore of Platonism lies in its desire to uncover the identity of the 
Idea which remains essentially unrepresentable in things. However, 
difference in Platonism is ultimately 'pacified' under the yoke of
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representation to the extent that it is subordinated under the 
hyperthetical identity of the Idea: the Good, the Just and the Beautiful.3 
i i). The manner in which Plato establishes the method of division is by 
means of a recourse to the cyclical movement of 'myth' in general. But 
the content o f myth is thought, or more correctly, it is a thought of a 
thought of a thought, or as in the Timaeus,4 a story of a story of a 
story, that supposedly emanates from the creative Word of God. 
Claimants are measured against the model of the Idea and their 
legitimacy judged according to the degree of resemblance, to the Idea, 
possessed by each of the claimants - this corresponds the procedure in 
the Phaedrus and The Statesman. However, any similarity is purely 
formal, in tha t it is based upon a perceived 'resemblance'. The 
circularity, or the eternal repetition as the movement of myth reveals 
itself as the basis of a selective test which communicates the 
foundation to the procedure of division. However, this recourse to myth 
betrays a certain impotence on the part of Platonism - that is, his 
inability to directly grasp the Forms as pure modalities of thought. He 
therefore depends upon a story (myth) in order to authenticate his 
claims as to what qualifies as the Good, the Just and the Beautiful, 
etc.. Therefore, myth as foundation is what supplies the method of 
division with the mediation it appears to lack, while simultaneously 
establishing the test of participation by relating difference (the 
claimant) to the One (the Idea). But myth alone is not adequate to this 
task of authentication, since it both lacks a philosophical rigour and 
can not provide an indubitable logos: myth is ultimately a story that
3 The notion of multiplicity in Plato is not extended to the limit, but rather, remains constrained to a 
dialectic between the many and the one, in which the many are organised , systematised and unified 
by the power of the one. For Deleuze, multiplicity should be understood in terms of the ‘many as such’ 
which has no need of systematising.
4 Derrida has shown us this function of story and myth in his exemplary analysis of Plato’s Timaeus, in 
his essay titled Khora, in On the Name.
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lacks apodictic certainty. So in what does the purpose of myth consist? 
In the absence of an indubitable logos we can only have recourse to the 
sensible, that is, to the image as sensory world from which we deduce 
'the most plausible' explanation. Myth is a plausible explanation which 
functions as a justification fo r Plato's establishment of the 'lines of 
descent' which flow from the archaic God down into the depths of the 
simulacrum. In this sense the Forms reveal themselves as attributes of 
God which undergo a process of degradation the further they descend 
into matter. As Deleuze tells us:
[D iv is ion lacks probative force; i t  has to  be relayed by a m yth  which provides an 
imaginary equivalent of mediation . . .  If it is true that, within Platonism in general, 
myth and the dialectic are d is tinc t forces, th is distinction no longer matters once 
dialectic discovers its true m ethod in division. Division overcomes th is duality and 
integrates myth into the dialectic; i t  makes myth an element of the  dialectic itself. The 
structure of this myth in Plato is clear: it is a circle, w ith  tw o  dynamic functions - 
namely, turning and returning, d istribu ting and allocation: the  allocation o f lots is 
carried out by the turning wheel o f an eternally recurring metempsychosis (DR 61).
Myth, therefore, is not a means of producing syntheses, but rather of 
selecting singularities; this is the whole function of the method of 
division which employs myth and dialectic for its purposes, 
i i i). What is the relation between the foundation and the ground? The 
function of myth is to provide a authenticating foundation for the 
Forms, which in turn authenticate the grounding test of participation. 
By means of the power of resemblance, myth founds the grounding test 
wherein claimants are differentiated into a hierarchy according to the 
degrees of their participation in the particular Idea. "The ground is the 
test which permits claimants to  participate in greater or lesser degree 
in the object of the claim. In this sense the ground measures and makes 
the difference" (DR 62). This test itself consists in the play of 
'opposition' between those claimants who truly participate and those 
who are the false pretenders: the simulacra. The false pretenders are
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those demonic forces who lacking all similarity ape participation by 
concealing their true essence behind the mask of resemblance: the 
trickery of appearance is achieved through simulation. Therefore, the 
purpose of the grounding test is primarily to facilitate the definition 
of the limits of a given Idea, in order to measure the degree of 
participation as well as to identify those claimants who fall outside 
the defined boundaries: limitation and contradiction. "To participate 
means to have a part in, to have after, to have a second place. What 
possesses in first place is the ground itself" (DR 62). That is, the 
Forms possess in first place, whereas man can only to a second degree 
possess the quality of the Forms: the Form is the Good, while man can 
merely aspire to be good. And the second degree of participation slips 
into a third, a fourth, etc., degrading further and further until a mere 
simulacrum of the Form is displayed. Thus, "[t]he function of the ground 
is then to allow participation, to give in second place . . .  In this sense 
the ground measures and makes the difference" (Ibid). The ground 
therefore is what allows the claimants their claim.
We must . . . distinguish between Justice, which is the ground; the quality of justice, 
which is the object of the claim possessed by that which grounds; and the just, who are 
the claimants who participate unequally in the object . . . The grounding principle is 
imparticipable but nevertheless provides something to  be participated in, which it gives 
to the participant, who is the possessor in second place, the claimant who has been able 
to pass the grounding test. (Ibid)
Obviously, those who do not pass the grounding test are excluded from 
participating in the elective Greek polis.
iv). Lastly, if the selective procedure of division is to be fulfilled, the 
grounding test which is itse lf founded on myth requires the 
intervention on the part of the Apollonian oracle: the oracle is 
addressed with a question, to which it responds with a problem. It is in 
the structure of this problem-question, as 'analogy of judgment', tha t
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the dialectic as ironic trial progresses. "Irony consists in treating 
things and beings as so many responses to hidden questions, so many 
cases for problems yet to be resolved" (DR 63). The Deleuzean 
interpretation of this specific aspect of Platonism could be considered 
controversial in its dismissal o f the traditional accounts. This aspect 
concerns the role that both the question and problem play in the 
Platonic dialectic. In Hegel this role is played by the negative, but in 
Plato, Deleuze tells us, this is certainly not the case. On the one hand, 
in Hegel the negative designates a non-being in the sense of a 
nothingness, while Being designates a full positivity. In Plato, on the 
other hand, non-being designates something entirely other than the 
negative, and which, in Deleuzean philosophy, is interpreted in terms of 
a problematic structure, or as the d iffe ren tia l m u ltip lic ity  
constitutive of the Idea itself. Deleuze extracts this conclusion from 
Plato's Sophist, however the text itself contains so many ambiguities 
that the controversy is far from being finalised. Nevertheless, for 
Deleuze:
Neither the problem nor the question is a subjective determination marking a moment of 
insufficiency in knowledge. Problematic structure  is part of objects themselves, 
allowing them to  be grasped as signs, ju s t as the questioning or problematising instant is 
a part of knowledge allowing its positiv ity and its specificity to  be grasped in an act of 
learning. More profoundly still, Being (what Plato calls the Idea) 'corresponds' to  the 
essence of the problem or the question as such. It is as though there were an 'opening', a 
'gap', an ontological 'fold' which relates being and the question to  one another. In this 
relation, being is difference itself. Being is also non-being, but non-being is not the 
being of the negative; rather, it is the being of the problematic . . .  in which affirmation, 
as multiple affirmation, finds the principle of its  genesis. (DR 63-4)
Therefore, non-being in Plato is not the same as the Hegelian negative, 
but rather, the differential element which the question primarily 
addresses. The positivity of this structure (problem-question) is 
distinguished from the role that the negative plays in the dialectic -
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that is, the negative or contradiction which interprets non-being as a 
nothingness and being as a full positivity. In fact the negative is only 
"the shadow of the difference alongside the affirmation produced" (DR 
64). The Idea is an irresolvable differential multiplicity; Nietzsche 
said much the same when he claimed that truth is a metaphor. Analogy 
functions in exactly the same way: identifying things with reference to 
similar things, thereby imposing upon univocal being a pre-given 
category. It is impossible to judge from the standpoint of Truth 
because tru th  is problematic, therefore one can only identify 
resemblances and classify it by means of analogies. Thus difference in 
itself remains subordinated to the presupposed Idea. Essentially, this 
implies that the Platonic method of division leaps from one singularity 
the another, even though the singularities themselves are subjugated to 
the law of the Same.
B. For Plato, the Idea does not correspond to the identity of the concept 
in general, but rather to the non-representable representative of the 
thing itself: essence. However, where Platonism focuses all its 
dialectical power for the purpose of constructing a philosophy of 
difference, Deleuze locates its crucial po int of weakness, and 
ultimately the point at which the possibility o f its overturning would 
be realised. As we have seen, the purpose of the grounding test, which 
proceeds by means of dialectical interrogation, is the establishment of 
lines of descent that authorise the differentiation between the true 
claimants and their false rivals. The ground is what sanctions the 
distinction between the true and the false by relating difference to the 
Same. However, Plato does not think difference in itself. Thus, 
"[ojverturning Platonism, then, means denying the primacy of the 
original over copy, of model over image; glorifying the reign of 
simulacra and reflections" (DR 66). In th is manner a universal
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ungrounding is inaugurated. Difference in itself does not lie between 
the model and its copy, between chaos and form, but rather as Deleuze 
tells us:
Things are simulacra themselves, simulacra are the superior forms, and the d ifficulty 
facing everything is to  become its own simulacrum, to  attain the status of the sign in the 
coherence of eternal return. Plato opposed eternal return to  chaos as though chaos were a 
contradictory state which must be subject to  order or law from outside. (DR 67-8)
In order to establish the identity of the Idea as first principle, Plato 
needed to conceive the eternal return in terms of a mythic thought that 
would provide an immutable foundation, whereas what Nietzsche 
understood by eternal return was more akin to chaosmosis. As Deleuze 
warns us: “Chaos is not an inert or stationary state, nor is it a chance 
mixture. Chaos makes chaotic and undoes every consistency in the 
infinite. The problem of philosophy is to acquire a consistency without 
losing the infinite into which thought plunges (in this respect chaos 
has as much a mental as a physical existence)” (WIP 42). Thus, in 
Nietzsche the foundation is not identified with an eternally recurring 
cycle, but rather with the chaotic flux of irreducible difference, or will 
to power as the eternally displaced form giving force. Deleuze, like 
Plato, articulates difference in terms of an affirmation of singularity, 
but a singularity that escapes the subordination to the Idea and which 
makes a difference. The Idea itself is constituted out of intensive 
difference: its unity is merely an appearance. Thus the distinction 
between reality and appearance collapses. Difference therefore 
constitutes a moment of immediacy wherein the production of 
determination is realised. Difference is realised in those signs that are 
immediately affirmed, and which have not yet entered into the
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signifying process: a pure sign.5 These pure signs are the simulacrum. 
The Forms, as the elementary concepts of representation, are defined 
as the conditions of possible experience. By subordinating both the 
object and the subject to this model, the conditions of real experience 
are limited to the possibilities of representation. "The net is so loose 
that the largest fish pass through" (DR 68). Thus, the overturning of 
Platonism implies abandoning the tyranny of the non-representable 
Idea, decentering the great circle of the Forms, and putting in play an 
essential divergence amongst the vertical lines of descent. It is by 
means of such divergences and decenterings that everything is revealed 
as simulacra; as the phantasm emergent from an ungrounded chaos 
whose movement is that of its own repetition: the repetition of 
displaced difference without model or copy.
In the Parmenides the theory of Ideas is subjected to a series of 
rigorous criticisms which affirm that the arguments establishing the 
reality of the Forms also demonstrate that there must be Forms of man, 
fire, water, hair, mud, and dirt etc.. That is, there must insist a Form 
corresponding to every general term in language, and therefore to every 
class of thing. As Deleuze tells us commenting on this criticism:
In Plato, an obscure debate was raging in the depth of things, in the depth of the earth, 
between that which undergoes the action of the Idea and th a t which eludes this action 
(copies and simulacra) . . . however this something is never sufficiently hidden, driven 
back, pushed deeply into the depth of the body, or drowned in the ocean. (LS 7)
How can the notion of dirt be limited to an ideal Form? It cannot. 
However, the possibility of overturning Platonism does not merely 
depend on the double ejection of essences and appearances for its 
realisation. The motivation behind such a gesture would leave
5 However, J. Kristeva has consistently argued, in Revolution in Poetic Language, that the semiotic is 
always contaminated by the symbolic. We will return to the status of these ‘pure signs' in the following 
chapter in relation to nonsense words.
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Platonism intact, since the notion of Truth would continue to exert its 
authority through a different methodology, e.g., logical positivism. 
Rather, we must subject Platonism to a Nietzschean genealogical 
analysis in order to uncover the differential elements upon which truth 
is constituted and which form the foundation of its unity, its 
prejudices and desires, its aims and morals. In short, everything which, 
deductively speaking, plays the role of premise and first principle.
This task to overcome first principles in Platonism prompts Deleuze to 
ask:
Is there not a possessor of the third or fourth rank, and onto an infin ity of degradation 
culminating in the one who possesses no more than a simulacrum, a mirage - the one who 
is himself a mirage and simulacrum? (LS 255)
The possessor of this degraded rank Deleuze locates in the Sophist, 
where the ironic method of Plato, more than in any other text, is taken 
to its limit through a persistent tracking down of the false in order to 
uncover the simulacrum. Ironically it is within this dialogue that 
Platonism accomplishes its own overcoming; or at least indicates 
where the fulcrum of overturning may be found.
Plato's motivation, then, is to deduce from the theory of Ideas a 
teleology that would order and hierarchize the disparities constitutive 
of social life, thereby imposing a limit on the pure becomings of the 
simulacrum and founding a philosophy of representation where identity 
would triumph over difference. As Deleuze writes:
If we really want to  say tha t philosophy originates with the Greeks, it is because the 
city, unlike the empire or state, invents the agon as a rule of a society of 'friends,' of the 
community of free men as rivals (citizens) . . . Hence the necessity fo r Plato to  put 
things in order and create authorities for judging the validity of . . . claims: the Idea as 
philosophical concepts. (WIP 9)
From Deleuze's reading of Plato three distinctions emerge: the angelic- 
idea; the man-copy; and the demonic-simulacrum. The copy's
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resemblance to the model is defined In terms of an intrinsic relation to 
the Idea, whereas the simulacrum is defined by an extrinsic relation to 
the object, since it is constituted upon an internalised difference that 
evades limit and measurement. However, " [ i]f the simulacrum still has 
a model, it is another model, a model of the Other" (LS 258). Since 
simulacra internalise an originary disparity they cannot be understood 
in terms of degraded copies. What the overturning of Platonism means 
is to allow the repressed power of the simulacra to rise to the surface, 
to tear down the edifice of hierarchy and reduce the divine law of 
identity to the status of the 'produced'. Identity is understood by 
Deleuze as mere 'simulation'; the phantasm that "establishes the world 
of nomadic distributions and crowned anarchies" (LS 263). Simulation 
designates the power of producing a mask, where behind each mask 
there is always another mask.
Since the model is intrinsic, the participation of the copy in the 
identity of the model is purely internal, whereas the simulacrum which 
internalises an original disparity cannot be said to partake of the 
model according to the rule of the Same and the form of the similar. 
However, resemblance is attributable to the simulacra, but in the sense 
of a perceived resemblance in the eye of the beholder: an extrinsic 
relation between things that resemble. Similarity is merely an effect 
of a subterranean chaosmos; the Idea as product of an original 
disparity. Through his reading, Deleuze rotates the vertical lines of
descent 90 degree, flattening the hierarchies along a horizontal 
surface, and thereby inserting history and time into the model of the 
eternal Forms. Everything now occurs on the surface and at the limit of 
bodies; it is the time of becoming Other through a veritable liberation 
of the repressed power of the simulacra. By ‘becoming’ we understand a
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pure becoming that eludes the present through a double affirmation, 
that is, the simultaneous affirmation of both directions - past and 
future within an infinitive. This essentially paradoxical construction 
constitutes a pure event.
C. This conclusion leads us on to Deleuze's third theme; that of 
appraising Plato's image of thought which has three essential 
characteristics: the sentiendum, the memorandum, and the cogitandum. 
The first characteristic concerns 'contradictory perceptions'. In The 
Republic,6 Plato distinguishes between two aspects of perception: on 
the one hand, things which do not disturb thought and, on the other 
hand, those which do disturb thought and lead to thinking. The firs t 
class of things are objects of recognition, which fill thought only with 
re-presented objects that do not disturb its tranquil surface and self- 
identity: ‘fetch me a chair!’ The second class of things are objects that 
are not recognised: these produce disturbances and contradictions 
within thought itself, causing it to question its own status and thereby 
think, ‘What is this? A box to sit on!’ However, Socrates' interlocutor - 
he who puts forward the thesis of non-recognition - presupposes, 
according to Deleuze, a good sense or directionality of thought that 
preserves the ideal form of recognition, since its object is always the 
preestablished Idea: "that philia which predetermines at once both the 
image of thought and the concept of philosophy" (DR 139). All truths 
that are established through the directionality of a good sense are 
hypothetical, and belong to the mythic form of knowledge that does not 
think the violence of difference in itself as well as the immediacy of 
necessity. Therefore, the contradictory perceptions to which Plato 
refers are merely the coexistence of contraries (the negative) in an 
unlimited becoming in which recognition operates purely to  limit such
6 Plato, The Republic, Book VII, 523b.
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a becoming by relating the different to the same. This formulation, for 
Deleuze, confuses the being of the sensible with a sensible being. Ideas, 
for Deleuze, essentially designate possibilities within the model of 
recognition; they do not define immediacies that would allow for the 
emergence of the new from a given problematic potentiality: the latter 
Deleuze characterises as the real conditions of experience which are 
perpetually destabilising the object of recognition.
Thought is primarily trespass and violence, the enemy, and nothing presupposes 
philosophy: everything begins with misosophy . . . The conditions of a true critique and a 
true creation are the same: the destruction o f an image of thought which presupposes 
itself and the genesis of the act of thinking in thought itself. (DR 1 39)
The encounter in which the object is not recognised can only be defined 
in terms of sensibility. This pure encounter is open only to the faculty 
of sensibility, the sentiendum, whereas in recognition the object 
encountered is referred to and guaranteed by other faculties including 
that of sensibility. As we have seen this consensus amongst the 
faculties is what Deleuze calls common sense. The pre-recognitive 
object of encounter is a sign which arises purely out of sensibility. "It 
is not a sensible being but the being o f the sensible. It is not the given 
but that by which the given is given" (DR 140). At its own limit, 
sensibility is imperceptible from the perspective of recognition since, 
it can only be sensed. This pre-re-presentative and pre-re-cognitive 
exercise of sensibility is transcendental from the point of view of law, 
order and consensus, and corresponds to the immediacy of that which 
can only be sensed. This transcendental exercise of the faculty of 
sensibility defines the primary characteristic of what it is to think.
The second characteristic of thought concerns a distinction between 
memory and the reminiscence of that which has been forgotten. Plato 




perceived object while simultaneously giving it the power of being 
grasped independently from the distinct perception in which it inheres. 
Thus, this ghost of reminiscence is never fully perceived, yet at the 
same time is recognised.
But this means, however, everything is betrayed: first, the nature o f the encounter in so 
far as th is does not merely propose a particularly d ifficu lt tes t for recognition, an 
envelopment that is particularly d ifficult to  unfold, but instead opposes all possible 
recognition; second, the nature of the transcendental memory and o f that which can only 
be recalled. For this second instance is only conceived in the form of similitude in the 
reminiscence, to  the point where the same objection arises: reminiscence confuses the 
being of the past with a past being, and since it is unable to  assign an empirical moment 
at which this past was present, it invokes an original or mythical present. (DR 142)
Empirical memory grasps those things which were originally 
experienced, and once forgotten are lost forever, since it cannot be 
grasped a second time. Transcendental memory concerns the being of 
the past which can only be recalled and which, thereby, addresses the 
always and already element of forgetting within memory itself.7
Forgetting is no longer a contingent incapacity separating us from a memory which is 
itself contingent: it exists within essential memory as though it were the 'nth ' power of 
memory with regard to  its own limit or to  th a t which can only be recalled. It was the 
same w ith sensibility: the contingently imperceptible, tha t which is too small or too far 
for the empirical exercise of our senses, stands opposed to  an essentially imperceptible 
which is indistinguishable from that which can be sensed only from the point of view of a 
transcendental exercise. Thus sensibility, forced by the encounter to  sense the 
sentiendum, forces memory in its turn to remember the memorandum, that which can 
only be recalled. (DR 140-1)
In its turn, the memorandum allows us to grasp that which can only be 
thought: the cogitandum. This third characteristic of Plato's model of 
thought is determined in terms of separate contraries which forces 
thought to  think pure identities; the identity of each contrary. 
"According to Plato, therefore, the essence is defined by the form of 
real identity . . . Everything culminates in the great principle: that there
7 Deleuze's Proust and Signs is an extended meditation on the character of reminiscence as non­
originary origin.
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is - before all else, and despite of everything - an affinity or a 
filiation . . .  of thought with the true" (DR 142). However, for Deleuze 
this third characteristic, the cogitandum, must not be confused with 
the intelligible, but rather defined in terms of the being o f the 
intelligible; the limit which the intelligible may reach if it breaks free 
from directedness of good sense and the form of common sense. Herein 
the cogitandum attains its 'nth' power within an essential discordance 
between all the faculties, each faculty receiving the violence that each 
one communicates to each other and wherein each confronts it own 
limit. Within this disjunctive functioning of the faculties the model as 
doxa collapses.
Therefore, in terms of the requirements of a transcendental empiricism 
- which advocates a dissonant, disjointed, and dissolute exercise of 
each faculty, reducing it into its own unique singularity, and thereby 
pushing that faculty to its limit - we find the Platonic determination 
unsatisfactory. The transcendent exercise of the faculties of 
sensibility, memory, imagination and thought introduces a form of time 
wherein the unity of the "I" is fractured. In the place of unities Deleuze 
substitutes 'aleatory points' or centres that envelop differentials 
(intensities) rather than testify to an original identity. Furthermore, 
these centres are always Other in essence. It is always through 
intensity that thought arrives. That which forces us to think (intensity) 
and the thought (intensity raised to the level of thought) are one. 
Sensibility (chaos) and the intelligible (form) are no longer conceived 
in terms of an essential disparity, but rather, come together in a joint 
functioning wherein the experimental abstract line is traced through a 
surface field of potentiality and where form is emergent from this 
tracing. Form does not orchestrate the drawing of the line, instead it is 
an effect of the communication between the disjointed faculties. In
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consequence, we should determine Ideas in terms of potentialities 
which are constituted by a field of intensities or differences in 
intensity, or rather as those instances which go from sensibility to 
thought and from thought to sensibility - like lines of communication 
between two different levels. Hence, the whole purpose of the 
transcendental exercise is to free thought from the limits of 
representation, and allow thought to grasp the imperceptible; that is, 
the being of the sensible, the being of the memory, and the being of 
thought, and not as representation would have it, the sensible being, 
the present memory, and the identity of thought.
One last point needs clarification. In Plato's image of thought, error is 
conceived in terms of misadventure or the false recognition of an 
object by a thinker who possesses a good will and whose thought is 
good natured. This dogmatic image constrains thought to retrace well 
worn and institutionalised paths to the ’true'. Error is thought lead 
astray; a wrong turn selected by thought on its retrograde movement 
which leads to the contemplation of the Forms. In Plato, therefore, true 
recognition is a positive model and error is negative model. In order to 
release thinking  from the constraints of recognition, Deleuze 
substitutes stupidity for the Platonic model of error. The former must 
not be understood merely in terms of a corporeal malfunction (i.e., 
imbecility), but rather as the very structure of thought itself. For this 
reason, Deleuze tells us: ” [s]tupidity . . .  is not animality . . . [rather] 
stupidity . . . [is] a specifically human form of bestiality" (DR 150). 
Deleuze makes stupidity the object of a properly transcendental 
question in tha t it concerns immanent disparity, divergence and 
disjointedness: that is, thought traces all the dissonant pathways of an 
evil deformity o f unrecognisable objects and thereby raises itself to 
the power of thinking. Herein, we locate a violent reconciliation
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between an aleatory individual (prior to any I or self), the ground and 
thought.
Representation
At this point, the intensive factors of individuation take themselves as objects in such as 
manner as to  constitu te  the highest element o f a transcendent sensibility, the 
sentiendum; and from faculty to  faculty, the ground is borne within thought - still as the 
unthought and unthinking, but this unthought has become the necessary empirical form 
in which, in the fractured I . . . thought at last thinks the cogitandum; in other words, 
the transcendent element which can only be thought. (DR152-3)
This leads us into the element of learning which must not be confused 
with knowledge. Thus, for Deleuze, the movement of thought is from 
stupidity to learning as a true act of thinking, rather than, as in the 
case of Platonism, thought goes from error to knowledge. That is, from 
the problematic to the question, rather than from the hypothetical to 
the apodictic. Learning therefore is the transcendental condition that 
allows time to be introduced into thought itself. However, Plato, who 
introduced time into thought through reminiscence, subjected it to the 
mythical form of a metapsychosis. But not so with Deleuze, who does 
not understand this time in terms of Kantian linearity, but rather, as a 
non-linear time of pure thought (time takes thought).
Platonic time introduces difference, apprenticeship and heterogeneity in to  thought only 
in order to  subject them again to  the mythical form of resemblance and identity, and 
therefore to  the image of thought itself. As a result, the whole Platonic theory of 
apprenticeship functions as a repentance, crushed by the emerging dogmatic image yet 
bringing forth a groundlessness that it remains incapable of exploring . . . [LJearning is 
the true transcendental structure which unites difference to  difference, dissimilarity to  
dissimilarity, w ithout mediating between them; and introduces time in to  th o u g h t. . .  in 
the pure form of an empty time in general. (DR 166-7)
Deleuze's efforts therefore at overturning Platonism concentrate on 
revealing the irrepressible functioning of the simulacrum within the 
heart of the Platonic text itself. The aim of Deleuzean philosophy does 
not aspire toward the identical and the true behind the mask of 
appearance, but rather reveals an irreducible disparity and becoming
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constitutive of being. By showing pure becoming to be pre- 
representational, the simulacrum is demonstrated to elude the action 
of the Idea. In Plato, thought is orientated toward ascension, toward 
the philosophy of heights in which the mind can ascend on wings of 
Reason from the cave of shadows (depths) and redeem itself within the 
sun of Truth. Nietzsche distrusted this orientation of thought, and 
affirmed the belief that philosophy could not find its accomplishment 
therein, but only its degeneration. Rather than ascend Nietzsche sought 
to remain on the surface. He thereby rejected both the Socratic heights 
and the pre-Socratic orientation toward the depths as autochthonous. 
These two extreme orientations, of height and depth, where 
unsatisfactory for Nietzsche who understood the importance of 
superficiality, of being superficial through profundity. For both 
Nietzsche and Deleuze the depths climb to the surface while the 
heights descend into the laterality of the surface Event. This lateral 
orientation corresponds to that of the Stoics whose cynicism toward 
Plato is well documented (Diogenes the Cynic).
This point would benefit from an explanation of the Deleuze’s 
appropriation of Stoic philosophy that he receives via Diogenes 
Lucretius.8 Pure events possess a simultaneity of becoming which 
eludes the present through a double affirmation, tha t is, the 
affirmation of both directions at once. On the one hand we have limited 
things, while on the other we have unlimited becoming; a becoming 
which escapes the action of the Idea, contests both models and copies 
and is, therefore, the matter of the simulacrum. This paradox of pure 
becoming has the consequence of contesting personal identity. It is this 
lack of identity which constitutes the objective structure of the event.
8 D. Lucretius in his Do Rerum Natura argues that the products of Nature are essentially diverse, and 
the task tor philosophy, therefore, it to think the diverse as diverse. In this respect, he claims, all 
previous philosophies have failed.
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Pure becoming not only introduces history into the lateral 
interpretation of being - this was one of the major themes affirmed by 
the Renaissance and its overturning of theological notion of eternality 
- but also affirms the bi-directionality implicit in a time not 
constrained to the mere linear and historical perspective. Good sense 
affirms the directionality of thought, common sense fixes identities, 
thereby it is shown that the simulacrum obeys neither. As Deleuze tells 
us:
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the proper. . .  name is guaranteed by the permanence of savoir. The latter is embodies in 
general names designating pauses and rests, in substantives and adjectives, with which 
the proper name maintains a constant connection. Thus the personal self requires God and 
the world in general. (LS 3).
The Stoics distinguished between bodies and their effects. Firstly, 
bodies with their quantities and qualities, actions and passions, which 
enter into mixtures forming 'states of affairs.' But not in the sense of 
cause and effect, since all bodies are causes unto each other and for 
each other. At the limit of this ensemble all bodies are absorbed into a 
unity which the Stoics called Destiny. That is, a determinism that 
relates to the time of the present. Secondly, this mixture of bodies 
causes effects which are not themselves bodies, but rather, incorporeal 
entities which play on the surface or at the limit of bodies. The time of 
these entities-events is the unlimited Aion. As Deleuze says:
They are not physical qualities and properties, but rather, logical or dialectical 
attributes . . .  They are not substantives or adjectives but verbs. They are neither agents 
nor patients, but the results of actions and passions. They are not living presents but 
infinitives: the  unlim ited Aion . . . Thus tim e  m ust be grasped tw ice, in two 
complementary though mutually exclusive fashions. (LS 5)
Thus, there is the time of the present where action and passion 
develop, and the impassive time of the pure becoming: Aion. These are 
two entirely different beings, or more correctly, states of affairs can
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be said to have being but events have extra-being. From this we may 
surmise that the Stoics inaugurated a new dualism which constitutes a 
reversal of Platonism. Deleuze again:
If bodies w ith their states, quantities and qualities, assume all the characteristics of 
substance and cause, conversely, the characteristics of the Idea are regulated to  the other 
side, that is to  this impassive extra-being which is sterile . . . the ideational or the 
incorporeal can no longer be anything other than an effect. (LS 7)
The consequences of this operation raises unlimited becoming from the 
depths of bodies, where Plato attempted to bury them, to the surface 
where the effects of mixtures of bodies insinuate themselves, forming 
the entire Idea and robbing the latter of its "causal and spiritual 
efficacy." Now the Idea is grasped purely in terms of effect. Within the 
corporeal domain of the causal relatedness the reversal cannot be 
actualised (to cut-to be cut), whereas within the realm of the 
incorporeal effects form among themselves quasi-causes which are 
always reversible (the wound-the scar). All these reversals testify to a 
continuity which replaces depth with surface effect, and where all 
events take place in one and the same Event. Hence, Plato's ironic 
method of heights and depths, of lines of descent, of the pure and 
impure, are lateralised and incorporated within the bi-directionality of 
a pure becoming through the Stoic operation, corresponding to the art 
of paradox. The paradox itself cannot be grasped in terms of identity 
and truth, since it remains essentially irreducible, the starting point 
for all philosophising: misophy. Therefore, as Deleuze tells us; "the 
paradox is thus essentially a ’sorites,' that is a series of interrogative 
propositions which, following becoming, proceed through successive 
additions and retrenchments. Everything happens at the boundary 
between things and propositions" (LS 8).
Through this operation Ideas are converted into events, stripped of
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their Platonic Essence or Identity and interpreted in terms of 
incorporeal 'effects’ emergent from corporeal mixtures. Moreover, no 
measure can be found in either the depths or the heights that would 
order or limit the mixtures between bodies; mixtures are only as good 
or bad as the bodies which pervade each other. Everything is 
permissible within the sphere of mixtures to the extent that all 
choices are selected locally: this defines the law of immanence. 
Morality, as an immutable and global decree, is therefore subverted. A 
whole new orientation of thought has been inaugurated; problems and 
solutions, questions and answers take on a whole new meaning.
2. Let us turn now to Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche and the character 
of the latter’s thought which which we will present as incorporating 
three essential aspects: A) The interpretation of truth in terms of 
value and its relation to the outside. B) By means of the ontological 
notions of will to  power and eternal recurrence thought is 
characterised in terms of intensity: that is, it is shown to have its 
roots in sensibility. C) Philosophy as an affirmation of life is 
understood in terms of an a rtis tic  process which is not pessimistic but 
essentially humorous. But firstly let us situate Nietzsche in relation to 
his precursor, namely Schopenhauer. The latter’s philosophy is divisible 
into four main categories that correspond to the four books of The 
World as Will and Idea: the idea subordinate to the principle of 
sufficient reason; the universal Will; the Idea as aesthetic object; and 
pessimism. We will briefly elucidate these four themes respectively. 
Schopenhauer’s dualistic model of the world was the framework upon 
which Nietzsche based his philosophical reflections in The Birth o f 
Tragedy. The basic idea for this model was taken from Kant, but 
reworked in terms of the Will. In Kant the opposition is presented in
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terms of a duality between the noumenal (transcendent) and the 
phenomenal (empirical): the former corresponds to that beyond the 
grasp of the individual and constitutes the foundation of being; the 
latter corresponds to the subjectivity of the individual, its 
architechtonic structure and the manner in which the world appears to 
that individual. If we liken the phenomenal to an egg, the noumenal 
would correspond to the chicken that layed it. The embryo within the 
egg can have no knowledge of the existence of the chicken outside of 
the shell in which it develops. The cosmos is like an evolving embryo; it 
can grasp nothing about what existed before the ‘big bang’, or what may 
lie beyond the boundaries of its own time-space curve. But since we are 
in the habit of thinking in terms of causality, a first cause will 
eventually be hypothesised. Moreover, a first cause which can only be 
defined paradoxically: as the non-caused cause (God). Thus, the 
noumenal chicken can represent merely a speculation in the mind of a 
developing embryo. Schopenhauer rejects the purely speculative 
character of the noumenal and substitutes it with the will as immanent 
principle.
In Schopenhauer, Kant’s duality is reworked in terms of will and idea. 
“The world is my idea.”9 That is, the idea of world consists in a 
representation solely in the mind of the individual who perceives it. As 
an object of representation in the mind of the perceiver, the idea is a 
composite of two complementary aspects: an object that obeys the 
forms of space, time and causality, and a undivided subject structured 
in accordance with the a priori forms of intuition presupposed in all 
experience. “ But as in general the object exists only for the subject, as 
its idea, so every special class of ideas exists only for an equally 
special quality in the subject, which is called the facu lty of
9 A. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, p. 3.
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perception.” 10 1 The ideas therefore are in a certain sense innate. 
Perception itself consists in both the raw data that is received through 
the five senses, and the ideas as products of an operation of the 
understanding upon this data. “What the eye, the ear, or the hand feels, 
is not perception; it is merely data. Only when the understanding passes 
from the effect to the cause does the world lie before us as perception 
extended in space, varying in respect to form, persistent through all 
time in respect of matter . . ,” 11 Therefore, the three forms of space, 
time and causality constitute the principle of sufficient reason under 
which all empirical ideas are subordinate.
But perception can tell us nothing of the real inner nature of things 
themselves. Schopenhauer therefore affirms a universal will as 
immanent principle. This primary will is essentially unitary and 
therefore capable of bridging the duality between object and subject. 
For that reason, it must not be conceived in terms of intentionality, 
which is purely subjective, but rather, as Schopenhauer tells us:
Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body . . . 
The act of will and the movement of the body are not two different things objectively
known, which the bond of causality unites. . .  but they are one and the same.12 13
The immediate knowledge that we have of our own body makes that 
knowledge an idea unlike any other, since “ it appears in consciousness 
in quite another way toto genera different from idea, and this we 
denote by the word w i l l . .  Hence, knowledge concerning our body is 
given in two distinct forms: immediately as voluntary movement, and in 
perception as idea. The will is not subordinate to  the principle of
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11 Ibid, p. 9.
12 Ibid, p. 32.
13 Ibid, p. 35.
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sufficient reason as ground, but rather shows itself in this respect as 
the groundless foundation of every objectified and differentiated thing. 
The unity of the will is represented in the unity of my body: the manner 
in which it assimilates a multiplicity of disparate elements. Moreover, 
in its capacity for dominating assimilation the will shows itself as 
essentially affirmative. This affirmative or motivated action underlies 
all phenomena and must not be confused with force. Will is dynamic and 
related to inner nature; force is kinetic and related to manifest 
phenomena. As Schopenhauer tells us: “ If . . .  we subsume the concept of 
will under that of force, as has till now been done, we are renouncing 
the only immediate knowledge of the inner nature of the world that we 
have, in allowing it to be engulfed in a concept which is abstracted 
from the phenomenon, and with which we can therefore never transcend 
the phenomenon.” 14 Force is objectified will. Hence, tha t which had 
eluded Kant, namely the noumenon, can for Schopenhauer be grasped as 
an object of knowledge given in the immediate experience of the body 
as manifestation of will. Will is not exclusively human. From the 
analogy of my own body it follows that all objects must be conceived in 
terms of manifestations of will: animals, vegetables and even matter 
are expressions of it. Will therefore corresponds to the universal 
inhuman.
Aesthetic perception, according to Schopenhauer, consists in a 
disinterested experience purged of all egotistic and individualistic 
will-ful desiring: the highest form of aesthetic perception is music. 
Through it the individual is transplanted into the domain of the 
abstract universal, where things are grasped in the ir perfected 
wholeness as eternal Ideas. Aesthetics therefore corresponds to a 
transcendental operation that reveals the hierarchy of Ideas through
14 Ibid, p. 44.
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which the will manifests itse lf in nature. “ In these grades” , 
Schopenhauer claims,
we recognised the Platonic Ideas, in so far as these grades are the same as the definite 
species, or the original unchanging forms and qualities of all natural bodies, both organic 
and inorganic, and also the universal forces which reveal themselves according to  
natural laws. These Ideas, then, express themselves, one and all, in the innumerable 
individuals and entities, and are related to  these as are archetypes to  their copies.' 5
Since the Platonic Ideas elude the action of the principle of sufficient 
reason, they possess neither plurality nor change - that is to say, they 
are eternal universals. For this reason they can become objects of 
knowledge only to the extent that individuality is suspended. “ As 
individuals we have no other knowledge but that which is subject to the 
principle of sufficient reason, and this form excludes knowledge of the 
Ideas.” 15 6 As we have seen, the body is an objectification of will; our 
knowledge originates from the input of sense data; knowledge therefore 
is subordinated to the will. In order to grasp the eternal Ideas, the 
relation between knowledge and will must be reversed; that is to say, 
from the effects of knowledge we derive the causes of will. Aesthetic 
contemplation corresponds to the operation wherein the reversal is 
actualised. Philosophy and science merely employ the ideas and 
concepts which they derive from empirical experience that is 
subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason. They therefore fail 
where the artist succeeds - that is, in the attainment of the underlying 
universal graspable only in the immediacy of aesthetic contemplation. 
Within the rapturous contemplation of the natural object the artist, 
Schopenhauer tells us;
ceases to  consider the where, the when, the why, and the whither o f things, and looks 
simply and solely at the what. He does not allow abstract thought, the concepts of reason,
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to take possession o f his consciousness, but, instead, gives the whole power of his mind 
to perception, immerses himself entirely in this, and lets his whole consciousness be 
filled with the quiet contemplation of the natural object actually present . . .  He loses 
himself in this object . . .  he forgets his very individuality, his will, and continues to  
exist only as the pure subject, the clear mirror of the object, so tha t it is as if the 
object alone were there without anyone to  perceive it, and he can no longer separate the 
perceiver from the perception . . .  If the object has to  such an extent passed out of all 
relation to something outside it, and the subject out of all relation to  the will, then what 
is known is no longer the individual thing as such, but the Idea, the eternal form, the 
immediate objectiv ity of the will at this grade. The person rapt in this perception is 
thereby no longer individual . . . but he is a pure, willess, painless, timeless subject of
knowledge. 17
Since both the object and the subject are manifestation of will, they 
find the point of their unity therein. Thus, the Ideas alone possess 
actual being, while the nature of genius consists in the contemplation 
of these Ideas.
But aesthetic contemplation, for Schopenhauer, is only a temporary 
release from man’s subordination to the will. “The affirmation o f the 
wi l l  is the continuous willing itself.” 18 That is, Schopenhauer defines 
will in terms of desire as lack, or rather as “ the satisfaction of the 
needs which are inseparable from the life of the body” 19 and from 
which we may attain only momentary satisfaction. Nothing can fully 
appease the will to life: perpetually consuming and destroying that 
which it desires, it shows itself as essentially cruel and unjust. Add to 
this outlook atheism and irredemption and we have what Schopenhauer 
understood by pessimism. Since the thing-in-itself is itself desire, 
suffering is an essential and irreconcilable component of existence. 
Influenced by Buddhist doctrine, Schopenhauer therefore asserts that 
the only adequate response to such all pervading suffering is to cease 
desiring.
17 Ibid, p. 102.
18 Ibid, p. 206.
19 Ibid, p. 206.
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Nietzsche breaks with Schopenhauer on two fundamental points. 
Firstly, he rejects the conception of a transcendental domain defined in 
terms of an abstract universal beyond the individual, and substitutes it 
with the notion of will to power which is neither form nor formless, 
but rather the pure unformed world of pre-individual and impersonal 
singularities constitutive of the process of individuation itself. As 
Deleuze tells us:
Representation
The great discovery o f N ietzsche's philosophy, which marks his break with 
Schopenhauer and goes under the name of the will to  power or the Dionysian world, is the 
following: no doubt the I and the Self must be replaced by an undifferentiated abyss, but 
this abyss is neither an impersonal nor an abstract Universal beyond individuation. On 
the contrary, it is the I and the self which are the abstract universals. They must be 
replaced, but in and by individuation, in the direction of the individuating factors which 
consume them and which constitute the fluid world of Dionysus. What cannot be replaced 
is individuation itself. Beyond the self and the I we find not the impersonal but the 
individual and its  factors, individuation and its  fields, individuality and its pre­
individual singularities. For the pre-individual is still singular, ju s t as th e  ante-self 
and the ante-1 are still individual. (DR 258)
Thus absolute ground and absolute subject are erased from Nietzsche's 
later philosophy. Secondly, Nietzsche further rejects the interpretation 
of life in terms of an irredeemable suffering. Human all too Human 
marks the phase where he began to conceive tragedy not as a pessimism 
of ‘weakness’, but rather as a tonic to life - that is to say, as a 
tragedy of ‘strength’ wherein the whole of existence is affirmed, even 
the greatest of suffering. Both good and bad are Stoically and 
indifferently embraced. It is from these two points of departure that 
we may begin our analysis of Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche.
3. Nietzsche's distinction between the creation of new values and the 
recognition of established values should not be understood in an 
historically relative manner, as though that which is established was 
once new, and where the new always becomes established over a period
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of time and requires overturning. Rather, revaluation defines a 
perpetual process of evaluating in the light of the death of God and the 
dissolution of Self. It implies a difference which has the power to 
continually begin over again, remaining forever new in an eternal return 
of the unrecognisable and dissimilar. That is to say, there are no 
immutable values, only contextualisations and specificities out of 
which values are extracted. Thus, a distinction is drawn between the 
creation of new values and the recognition of established values, the 
former which inspires in thought an evil will and strips it of its innate 
knowledge. As Deleuze tells us:
The new, with its power of beginning and beginning again, remains forever new, just as 
the established was always established from the outset, even if a certain amount of 
empirical time was necessary for this to  be recognised. What becomes established with 
the new is precisely not the new. For the new - in other words, difference - calls forth 
forces in thought which are not the forces of recognition, today or tomorrow, but the 
powers of a completely other model, from an unrecognised and unrecognisable terra 
incognita. (DR 136)
The object of recognition is never the new; the new can only be 
different from the form of recognition and dissimilar to the Same. The 
new is that which strips thought of its 'innateness' and frees it from 
the yoke of the principle of sufficient reason to which it was tethered. 
But more importantly, the new eludes the action of the Same in the 
recognised Idea grasped as truth. That is to say, Nietzsche aims to 
liberate thought from the transcendental illusion to which 
Schopenhauer subordinated it. On the one hand, in Schopenhauer the Idea 
ultimately remains an object of recognition authenticated by means of 
a pact between a good will and a common sense, since in its Platonic 
form it is conceived in terms of immutability. On the other hand, 
Nietzsche’s notion of will to power is alleged to elude this 
transcendental model of thought based upon identity and recognition in
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the Idea, and thereby infuse into thought the novel: this is what Deleuze 
calls thinking. Thus, will to power inaugurates a veritable becoming 
evil in a fulfilment of Pascal's prophecy and challenge.20 It is in this 
light that Nietzsche criticised tru th as;
a more modest being from which no disorder and nothing extraordinary is to  be feared: a 
self-contented and happy creature which is continually assuring all the powers that be 
that no one needs to  be the least concerned on its account; for it is, after all, only 'pure 
knowledge.'21
The will to truth must be called into question, since it is willed not in 
the name of what the world is but in the name of what it is not. Truth 
is an ideal that corresponds to an inverted image of the world. It was 
Nietzsche's belief that the world is essentially false, thus he who 
wills truth does so in the name o f a world which does not deceive. As 
an end in itself, the will to truth opposes knowledge to life. Knowledge 
expresses a type of life (reactive) which contradicts real life by giving 
the latter laws which separate i t  from what it can do. Knowledge is 
merely a symptom of life. As Deleuze tells us:
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When knowledge becomes a legislator, the most important thing to  be subjected is 
thought. Knowledge is thought itself, b u t thought subject to  reason and to  all that is 
expressed in reason. The instinct for knowledge is therefore thought, but thought in its 
relation to  the reactive forces which seize and conquer it. For rational knowledge sets the 
same limits to  life as reasonable life sets to  thought. (NP 100-1 )22
Rational knowledge presupposes the four-fold yoke of representation, 
whereas the affirmation of life itself goes beyond the limits by which 
knowledge measures it (life). That is to say, to release a thought which
2° This reference is to a note by Nietzsche in The Will lo Power, Book 1, §83, where he says: 
'"Without the Christian faith, ’ Pascal thought, ‘you, no less than nature and history, will become for 
yourselves un monstre et un chaos. ’This prophecy we have fulfilled."
21 F. Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, §137.
22 On this notion of the limit Blanchot has some extremely interesting things to say which Deleuze 
appears to echo: The limit-experience is the response that man encounters when he has decided to 
put himself radically in question." The Infinite Conversation, p. 203.
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would go to the limits of life; a thought which would be active and 
creative; a thought that would release new possibilities for life. 
Nietzsche does not affirm a natural affinity between thought and truth, 
but rather expresses an alliance between thought and life. Therefore, 
not truth but value as an emergent property corresponds to the 
essential component in thought: its value for life. As an emergent 
property, value arises out of an intertwining between two irreducible 
forces - that is to say, an encounter between material contextualities 
and subjective specificities: value as event. We will have more to say 
on this idea in the following chapter.
In all the expressions of reactive force, activity is misrepresented or 
judged from the standpoint of utility. "We can guess the source of 
'utility': it is the source of all passive concepts in general . . . the taste 
for replacing real relations between forces by an abstract relation 
which is supposed to express them all, as a measure" (NP 74). A 
veritable conceptualising and universalising of singular and particular 
forces. Nietzsche’s method therefore involves relating a concept to 
will to power in order that it may be grasped as a symptom of a 
process to which it owes it emergence: this method characterises the 
genealogy. Since will only desires to affirm difference, what is 
affirmed in every act of willing is singularity - not unlike the 
singularities that the 'lines of descent' affirm in Platonism. However, 
in Nietzsche these singularities themselves are further liberated from 
the yoke of recognition and the law of the Same to which Plato held 
them captive.
For Nietzsche, truth can exist only in terms of value, and ultimately in 
terms of the value of values - that is to say, as a process of evaluation 
out of which value arises. "Evaluation is defined as the differential 
element of corresponding values, an element which is both critical and
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creative" (NP 1). It is critica l^  in that it imposes its difference, 
thereby undermining the establishment and its system of values 
(anarchistic); and creative in its capacity to produce the 'new' out of 
the past (artistic). In this sense evaluations are said to be styles of 
being (ontology), but beings which lack an immutable centre since they 
are constituted upon an irreducible relation between forces. Or rather, 
if being has essence, it has only to the extent of the irreducible 
difference constitutive of being itself. This difference at the heart of 
every origin is tha t which the genealogist strives to reveal. 
"[Ujnderstood this way [as genealogy], critique is also at its most 
positive . . . This is why critique is never conceived by Nietzsche as a 
reaction but as an action . . . Critique is not a re-action of re-sentiment 
but an active expression of an active mode of existence; attack and not 
revenge" (NP 2-3).
By ontology we mean certain fundamental assumptions about the 
existence underlying our conceptual or rational schema, i.e., will to 
power and eternal return are said of everything tha t exists. In 
Platonism every phenomenal thing represents a copy of an eternal Idea. 
Ideas therefore were the ontology that inspired Plato to differentiate 
between the ’real' and the 'apparent' world. For Deleuze, the ontological 
is not transcendent, but rather transcendental; tha t is to say, 
ontological being subsists within life as a process of pure becoming 
whose limits are defined by the two extremes of materialism and 
idealism. In this sense ontology is said to constitute the surface plane 
of immanence upon which thinking takes place. On the plane of 23
23 This notion of critique is subsequently dropped by Deleuze in Difference and Repetition and The 
Logic of Sense, presumably since it implies the requirement of recognising an object to be overcome, 
and this in turn implies the prerequisite of being conscious in order that recognition take place. This 
would place critique under the yoke of representation. Whereas the affirmative character of will to 
power is said to be essentially unconscious, thereby eluding the form of recognition and identity. 
Therefore, will to power cannot be critical except in terms of a symptom of its primary functioning.
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immanence the creation of value is a question of a throw of the dice, 
wherein each throw affirms the whole of chance.
The singular points are on the dice; the questions are the dice themselves; the imperative 
is to throw. Ideas are the problematic combinations which result from throws . . . Ideas 
emanate from it just as singularities emanate from that aleatory point which every time 
condenses the whole of chance into one time. (DR 198)
By affirming chance difference (pathos of distance) is affirmed as the 
very object of affirmation itself. This imperative does not refer back 
to a Cogito, but rather to a fractured ‘I’. "Imperatives do indeed form 
the cogitanda of pure thought, the differentials of thought, at once that 
which cannot be thought and that which must be thought and can be 
thought only from the point of view of the transcendent exercise" (DR 
199). Thus, the question is not a subjective determination marking a 
moment of insufficiency in Knowledge, but rather corresponds to the 
pure thought of the cogitanda, which designates the impossibility of 
thinking that is  thought. Herein lies Nietzsche's becoming sensible of 
thought: thought and evaluation which derive from a domain of forces 
that originate outside the cogito - that is to say, exterior to the form 
of recognition and identity that subordinates difference to the model of 
representation.
Like Schopenhauer, Nietzsche presents inner experience in terms of a 
duality between conscious and unconscious forces. The latter which 
constitute the domain of the body - the real - remain essentially 
obscured from the former which correspond to the realm of language - 
the ideal. We can only know the effect of something that originates 
from the outside, impressing itself upon us through the senses in the 
form of raw data. The interpretation which we impose upon this 
effect, which is nothing other than an "excitation of nerve centres,"24
24 F Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §479.
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is determined by our inner experience, i.e., instinct, habit, memory and 
understanding. For this reason "we are always unconscious of the real 
activity of the outer world."25 From the fact of inner experience, or the 
principle of sufficient reason, we derive the three forms of space 
(outer sense), time (inner sense), and causality. That is to say, from the 
effect we infer a cause. But the cause that we infer - the 
interpretation imposed upon sensation - is itself conditioned by past 
experience: " ’to understand' means merely: to be able to express 
something new in the language of something old and familiar."26 To 
suppose that there is a direct causal connection between an 
unconscious sensation and its conscious interpretation, between 
thought and its object, between thought and truth, is to allow oneself 
to be seduced by what Nietzsche elsewhere calls the ‘chronological 
inversion’. That which is inferred cannot be grasped in its reality, we 
can only know it through its effects which are solely our affects. 
Therefore, Nietzsche tells us in relation to the functioning of will to 
power on the subjective level; "that nothing is 'given' as real other than 
the world of our desires and passions."27
Furthermore, this distinction is compounded through its application to 
the material level. The scientific concept of force corresponds to the 
world as described by Newtonian mechanics, whereas the notion of will 




27 F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §36.
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reactive, the la tte r affirmative-negative.28 Deleuze’s Nietzsche 
defines a body as a quantity of force locked together in a struggle for 
domination that establishes a hierarchy between the constitutive 
forces. Every relationship between forces constitutes a body; the 
minimum being two unequal forces irreducible to one another. As 
Deleuze tells us:
Representation
In a body the superior or dominant forces are known as active and the inferior or 
dominated forces are known as reactive. Active and reactive are precisely the original 
qualities which express the relation of force with force. Forces which enter into relation 
do not have quantity w ithou t each of them having, at the same time, the quality 
corresponding to  their difference in quantity as such. This difference between forces 
qualified according to  their quantity as active or reactive will be called hierarchy. (NP 
4 0 )
A body therefore Is a quantity of force constituted by an irreducible 
complex or multiplicity that is essentially differential. "Nietzsche's 
reproach to every purely quantitative determination of forces is that it 
annuls, equalises or compensates for differences in quantity" (NP 43). 
Difference in quantity is the irreducible element of quantity, and 
quality is merely the difference in quantity between forces which enter 
into a relation. When a force dominates another force, the latter force 
does not cease to exist, that is to say, it is not consumed by the 
dominating force, but merely assimilated and continues to exercise its 
own quality. Obeying is a reactive quality of force, whereas active 
force is "reaching out for power . . .  To appropriate means to impose
28 This distinction between active-reactive ceases to appear in Deleuze’s writings after Nietzsche and 
Philosophy. It would appear to us that describing force in terms of extreme oppositional tendencies 
implies that it possess an original directionality and telos. If we take the body’s digestive system as an 
example, we see that the process of breaking down a nutritional compound into its elementary 
components would imply a reactive process: that is, negating the compound. However, on closer 
examination this ‘chemical’ action is necessary if the consuming body is to perpetuate itself. Thus, 
depending on the perspective from which the process is viewed a reactive force is conceivable in 
terms of affirmation; likewise an active force can be negative. Active and reactive are therefore not 
applicable to the realm of forces.The distinction between force and will is thereafter defined by 
Deleuze in terms of energetics: kinetic and dynamic respectively which elude the metaphysics 
intrinsic to the active-reactive distinction.
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forms, to create forms by exploiting circumstances" (NP 42). The 
irreducible complex of forces constitutes the body as being, but 
Nietzsche also affirms an innocence of becoming as the inner will of 
force. This is deduced, Deleuze tells us;
immediately from the principles o f a philosophy of force and will. Every thing is 
referred to  a force capable of interpreting it; every force is referred to  what it is able to 
do, from which it is inseparable. It is this way of being referred, of affirming and being 
affirmed, which is particularly innocent. Whatever does not let itself be interpreted by 
a force nor evaluated by a will calls out for another will capable of evaluating it, another 
force capable of interpreting it. (NP 22)
Moreover, the inner will is essentially unitary which presents the 
irreducible complex of forces as a hierarchised whole. As inner will of 
force, it corresponds to what a force can do, and in this capacity shows 
itself as either affirmative or negative. It is from this domain of 
competing forces that value is derived. Value, or interpretation, is 
properly speaking a property emergent from an encounter between 
quantities of force. Since the encounter itself constitutes necessity, 
events represent a certain ‘throw of the dice’, and where the result is 
purely contingent. But value as interpretive act is carried out by an 
evaluating will. As Nietzsche puts it: “The will to power interprets . . . 
it defines limits, determines degrees, variations of power. Mere 
variations of power could not feel themselves to be such: there must be 
present something that wants to grow and interprets the value of 
whatever else wants to grow.” 29 Genealogy as method is a product of 
the will to power, since it corresponds to the genetic element in value: 
it is the dynamism that every kinesis presupposes. As Deleuze explains:
This is because relations o f force remain indeterminate unless an element which is 
capable of determining them from a double point o f view is added to  force itself. Forces in 
relation reflect a simultaneous double genesis: the reciprocal genesis of their difference 
in quantity and the absolute genesis of their respective qualities. The will to  power is
29 F. Nietzsche. The Will to Power, §643.
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thus added to  force, but as the differential and genetic element, as the internal element of
its production. (NP 51)
We are composed by will to power, an expression of will to power, 
inescapably ensnared within the cosmic flux that is will to power. 
Nietzsche therefore distances himself from the notion of a 
foundational thought, since this presupposes the ability to step outside 
the will to power and purely observe rather than participate, and would 
correspond to a philosophy that would aspire to supply history with an 
identity, unity and telos. In this sense, truth becomes a simulacrum: the 
acceptance of this fact manifests the meaning of "accomplished 
nihilism." The Idea is understood by Nietzsche in terms of an intensive 
field of competing forces hierarchically organised in terms of dominant 
and dominated: that is, depending on the level from which a particular 
force is conceived, it could appear as either dominant or dominated. The 
Idea is a multiplicity that contains an infinity of levels which when 
taken as a whole define the Idea in terms of a 'problem' to which a 
solution is sought. Such solutions constitute the values that are 
imposed upon life: solutions constitutive of the ‘ lies’ by which man 
lives.
In short, the revolutionary element in Nietzsche’s thought introduces an 
irreducible rupture into ‘ identity thinking’ characteristic of Modernity, 
through a radicalisation of its own innate tendencies, rather than an 
attempt at a ‘critical’ overturning. Truth is conceived in terms of a 
series of metaphors imposed upon the real. That is to say, metaphors 
that go "from the thing to the mental image, from image to the word 
which expresses the individual’s state of mind, from this to the word 
that social conventions determine to be the 'right' one, and once again 
from this canonical word to the thing, which we now see only in terms 
of the traits which may most easily be metaphorised in the vocabulary
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that we have inherited."30. Thus, modernity is not overturned by 
substituting it with a new model of the true, but rather by means of a 
"chemical"31 analysis wherein the very notion of truth itself is 
dissolved. Without a comprehensive notion of truth critique is 
unrealisable. Thought as truth becomes thinking as process and wherein 
the simulacra is grasped as the very ground which constitutes it - 
nihilism - while simultaneously turning this ground into an act of 
affirmation - tragedy.
4. What returns in the eternal return is not the Same but the Different: 
being is not that which returns, but rather returning itself is what 
constitutes being. Returning is that which is affirmed of becoming. 
"That everything recurs is the closest approximation of a world of 
becoming to a world of being."32 Ultimately this proposition throws 
into question the validity of the 'second law of thermodynamics' which 
postulates that every system tends toward thermal death: entropy. How 
is this claim reconcilable with the fact that the cosmos is an ever 
expanding and complexifying entity? The idea of a 'big bang’ has several 
consequences: firstly there would have to be a beginning of time of 
infinite density and infinite curvature. Secondly, such a point in time 
would constitute a singularity in which all the known laws of science 
collapse. That is, an absolute beginning which in turn must imply an 
absolute end. However, Hawkins has argued that the quantum theory 
does not necessarily imply a singularity point - in an absolutist sense - 
and that the ordinary laws of science would hold even at the beginning 
of time. He supports this position by offering two features which the
30 G. Vattimo, The End of Modernity, p. 167.
31 F. Nietzsche, Human all too Human, ‘Of First and Last Things' §1. Nietzsche advocates breaking 
things down into their constituent elements in order to reveal how our highest values derive from the 
basest of elements.
32 F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §617.
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universe must possess if we are to unify general re lativity and 
quantum mechanics. As he tells us:
Representation
One is that it should incorporate Feynman's proposal to  formulate quantum theory in 
terms of a sum over histories. In this approach, a particle does not have just a single 
history, as it would in classical theory. Instead, it is supposed to  follow every possible 
path in space-time, and with each of these histories there are associated a couple of 
numbers, one representing the size of a wave and the other representing its position in 
the cycle. 33
And a little further on, he argues:
A second feature that we believe must be part of any ultimate theory is Einstein’s idea 
that the gravitational field is represented by curved space-time: particles try  to  follow 
the nearest thing to  a straight path in a curved space, but because space-time is not flat 
their paths appear to  be bent, as if by a gravitational field. When we apply Feynman's 
sum over histories to  Einstein's view of gravity, the analogue of the history of a particle 
is now a complete curved space-time th a t represents the history o f the whole 
universe.34
In the quantum theory of gravity, space is indistinguishable from what 
Feynman calls imaginary time: that is to say, imaginary time is 
indistinguishable from directions in space; imaginary time moves both 
forwards and backwards. This allows Hawkins to propose that space- 
time is finite, an enclosed egg: a four-dimensional space without 
absolute singularities or limits like the surface of the Earth but with 
more dimensions - topology. On the quantum level the universe is 
neither created nor destroyed. Therefore, in imaginary or virtual time 
directionality is meaningless: there subsists only the pure becoming in 
which both forwards and backwards are affirmed simultaneously. 
However, the same does not apply to a general relativity, since in ‘real’ 
time we perceive identities and thereby distinguish between direction. 
Therefore, the second law of thermodynamics, or the arrow of time, is 
applicable only within a general theory of relativity. That is to say, as
33 S. Hawkins, A Brief History of Time, p. 148-49.
34 Ibid, p. 150.
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a derived or inverted image of the universe. The eternal return 
corresponds to the paradox constitutive of the two levels of relativity 
theory, or rather proposes itself as a solution to the problematic 
relation between being and becoming. The double affirmation of the 
eternal return corresponds to the affirmation of Dionysus as difference 
and Ariadne as identity. Nietzsche affirms that pure becoming could 
never have an absolute origin, and therefore could never have an 
absolute end. "This is why we can only understand the eternal return as 
an expression of a principle which serves as an explanation of diversity  
and its reproduction" (NP 49). This principle is will to power as 
differential and genetic element.
Therefore, being is life viewed from the perspective of reactivity, 
whereas becoming corresponds to the active point of view. The ethical 
imperative in Nietzsche is located in his desire to transform the 
triumph of reactive forces into an active force. As we have seen, the 
relationship between forces in each case is determined to the extent 
that each force is affected by other forces. It follows that will to 
power is manifested as a capacity for being affected. This affective 
capacity manifests itself as a sensation or feeling of power, rather 
than a feeling of happiness. It is in this sense that the will to power is 
the primitive affective form from which all other feelings derive. As 
Deleuze tells us: "The will to power manifests itself, in the first place, 
as the sensibility of forces and, in the second place, as the becoming 
sensible of forces: pathos is the most elementary fact from which a 
becoming arises" (NP 63). This constitutes thought primarily within the 
sphere of sensibility; it makes thought sensible and perception 
material. But we do not know any becoming other than becoming 
reactive, since consciousness is essentially a reactive phenomena 
derived from an unconscious domain. By pushing the reactive force to
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the limit of what it can do, the reactive force does not thereby become 
active. The question is: How is the transmutation of reactive force into 
active force possible? As the internal will of force, the will to power 
possesses qualities more subtle than the qualities of force: that is, 
affirmation and negation are the immediate qualities of becoming 
itself. "Affirmation is not active but the power of becoming active, 
becoming active personified. Negation is not simple reaction but a 
becoming reactive. It is as if affirmation and negation were both 
immanent and transcendent in relation to action and reaction" (NP 54). 
The transmutation of reactive force into active force requires the 
affirmation of the eternal return as a selective principle: “ My formula 
for greatness in men is amor fati: that one should not wish things to be 
otherwise, not before and not after, in the whole of eternity.”35 Only 
when the will to nothingness is related to the eternal return does it 
break its alliance with reactive force, that is, by making negation a 
negation of reactive force: an active negation. This makes sense of 
Nietzsche's claim that only by going to the end of nihilism is it 
overcome: nihilism vanquished by itself wherein reaction is transmuted 
into action. But only to return again in the movement of the eternal 
return, ad infinitum.
In Nietzsche’s work two conceptions of the affirmation-negation 
relation are opposed. In the first model, we are presented with the 'Yes' 
of the Ass, where to affirm is to bear the burden.
This Ass and the dialectical ox leave a moral aftertaste. They have a terrifying taste for 
responsibility, as though one could affirm only by expiating . . .  It is as though 
Difference were evil and already negative, so th a t it could produce affirmation only by 
expiation . . . Always the same old malediction which resounds from the heights of the 
principle of identity. (DR 53)
Representation
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In this instance Difference is mediated through the negative within the 
dialectic circle that conserves all the moments in an infinite 
representation: Aufheben.36 in the second model, difference is no longer 
the negative, but rather corresponds to a 'No' which results from the 
affirmation of difference and distance itself. This ‘No’ embodies the 
force of anarchy-creativity that undermines the conservative forms of 
representation by actively unbearing oneself of the Ass’s load. 
However, this effect of affirmation, as subversion, is nonetheless a 
shadow of difference in itself: that is to say, it is merely "the effect of 
an affirmation which is too strong or too different" (DR 54). Thus, 
Zarathustra's 'No' is a consequence of affirmation and not a pure 
affirmation which 'makes' a difference: in itself it does not make a 
unilateral difference, but merely throws off the yoke of representation. 
In this sense, it is still caught within representation because by 
rejecting negation it remains within the domain of critique: i.e., the 
atheist who negates God remains within a theological framework,37 
while the ‘atheist’ who purely affirms a non-belief - agnosticism - 
passes beyond theistic thought. Difference in itself is a multiplicity of 
positive differential elements which determine the genesis of 
affirmation and the difference affirmed. But negation is an effect 
produced by the genesis of affirmation. Both these affirmations, the 
affirmation of the load and the affirmation of the unloading, correspond 
to the form of representation which always fails to grasp the world of 
affirmed primary difference.
For this reason, Nietzsche also described the eternal return as a 
selective test that eliminates the average forms and uncovers 'the
36 This reference is to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, its aim toward the end of history in the 
recovery of the absolute concept.
37 An example of this would be the work of de Sade, whose constant and repetitive polemics against 
God and the moral order perpetuate that same structure, albeit from its reverse side.
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superior form of everything that is.' Eternal return creates the superior 
form wherein everything which can be denied is and must be denied by 
means of the operation of active forgetting. By positing difference at 
origin the only equality is that which affirms the eternal return. All 
things which affirm repetition are equal within univocal being because 
they express the same power: that is to say, the power to go beyond the 
limits and affirm difference in itself. Unilateral difference is that 
which is equal, while the eternal return is that which is said of 
difference in itself. In this sense the repetition is a simulacra of 
difference; the mask that difference wears in the eternal return of the 
same. As Deleuze writes:
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If eternal return is a wheel, then it must be endowed w ith a violent centrifugal 
movement which expels everything which 'can' be denied, everything which cannot pass 
the test. Nietzsche announces only a light punishment for those who do not 'believe' in 
the eternal return: they will have, and be aware of, only an ephemeral life! They will be 
aware of themselves and know themselves fo r what they are: epiphenomena. This will be 
their absolute knowledge. In this manner, negation as a consequence, as the result o f full 
affirmation, consumes all that is negative, and consumes itself at the  mobile centre of 
eternal return. For if eternal return is a circle, then Difference is at the centre and the 
Same is only on the periphery: it is a constantly decentered, continually tortuous circle 
which revolves only around the unequal. (DR 55).
The difference we locate at the centre implies a plurality of centres 
and multiplicity of perspectives that continually undermine the model 
of representation: difference and identity mediated by means of the 
negative. The pathos of distance is the affirmation of difference: the 
positive difference between health and sickness is made the object of 
an affirmation itself. Health is an evaluation of sickness, just as 
sickness is an evaluation of health - the affirmation of positive 
difference is wholly transcendental and thereby eludes the action of 
hermeneutic. This affirmation of difference corresponds to Nietzsche’s 
understanding of perspectivism and opens, Deleuze tells us:
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onto a divergence which it affirms: another town corresponds to  each point of view, each 
point of view is another town, the towns are linked only by their distance and resonate 
only through the divergence of their series, their houses and the ir streets. There is 
always another town within the town. Each term becomes the means o f going all the way 
to the end of another, by following the entire distance. Nietzsche's perspectivism - his 
perspectivism - is a much more profound art than Leibniz's point of view; for 
divergence is no longer a principle of exclusion, and disjunction no longer a means of 
separation. Incompossibility is now a means of communication. (LS 1 74)
This difference is sub-representative immediacy, a multiplicity of 
positive singularities tha t refer to other differences without 
identifying them, but rather differentiates them. In this manner 
difference is shown differing. It is this world of implicated difference 
that the eternal return relates to a complicated world without identity: 
the viscous circle of a chaosmos.
With eternal return, chao-errancy Is opposed to  coherence, o f representation; it 
excludes both the coherence of a subject which represents itself and that of an object 
represented. Re -petition opposes re-presentation: the prefix changes its meaning, since 
in the one case difference is said only in relation to  the identical, while in the other it is 
the univocal which is said of the different. Repetition is the formless being o f all 
differences, the formless power of the ground which carries every object to  that extreme 
'form' in which its representation comes undone. (DR 57)
Difference is the in itself which Nietzsche called will to  power, and 
the eternal return, as the groundless 'law' and consequence of this 
difference, is the for itself of difference. Hence, it is not the One that 
returns but the many, not the similar but the dissimilar, not the same 
but the different. Furthermore, it is not necessity that governs over 
this repetition, but rather, 'Lord Chance'. Within this system the Same 
and the Similar are only simulated effects, retrojected onto difference 
in itself and interiorized within the disparate series, by the eternal 
return itself. In this sense it is the eternal return that returns; it is 
the only same of that which returns.
Nietzsche makes repetition a "power peculiar to language and thought, a 
superior pathos and pathology, but also the fundamental category of a
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philosophy of the future . . . [Also, there] corresponds a testament as 
well as a Theatre, a conception of the theatre, and a hero of repetition 
as a principal character in this theatre" (DR 5). A veritable 
philosophical theatrics wherein masks, play and laughter take on a 
movement that opposes repetition to generality. Repetition, then, is the 
power of thought or rather of thinking which corresponds to the 
ontological and intensive dimension of will to power which can be 
reduced to neither ideal nor material; to neither language nor body; to 
neither signifier nor signified. To think is to allow the differential and 
genetic element into the model of thought defined in terms of 
knowledge subordinate to representation.
Repetition is opposed to the laws of nature. In fact, Nietzsche 
"discovers repetition in the Physis itself, this is because he discovers 
in the Physis something superior to the reign of laws: a will willing 
itself through all change, a power opposed to law, an interior of the 
earth opposed to  the law of its surface" (DR 6). Thus repetition in the 
eternal return is understood as Being. Repetition opposes the moral 
law, taking thought beyond good and evil to the point where ethics 
itself is suspended. This is the trial of the private thinker in opposition 
to the public professor. This moral test of repetition substitutes Kant's 
categorical imperative by challenging the thinker to will in such a 
manner that whatever he does so will he also wills its eternal return.
There is a 'formalism' here which overturns Kant on his own ground, a tes t which goes 
further since, instead of relating repetition to  a supposed moral law, it seems to  make 
repetition itself th e  only form of a law beyond morality . . . The form of repetition in the 
eternal return is th e  brutal form of the immediate, tha t of the universal and the singular 
reunited, which dethrones every general law. (DR 7)
In this manner, repetition is opposed to habit and memory in order that 
it become the thought of the future; and in this sense it opposes
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Platonic reminiscence. "It is in repetition and by repetition that 
Forgetting becomes a positive power while the unconscious becomes a 
positive and superior unconscious" (DR 8). That is, the immediacy and 
singularity of repetition is the expression of the will to  power which 
separates a selective operation of thought: the Overman.
Therefore, the selective test “ is a question of producing within the 
work a movement capable of affecting the mind outside of all 
representation; it is a question of making movement itself a work, 
without interposition; of substituting direct signs for mediate 
representations; of inventing vibrations, ro tations, whirlings, 
gravitations, dances or leaps which directly touch the mind" (DR 8). A 
movement which directly affects the soul through its theatrics of 
plays and masks, the 'wild clangings' and 'log-rollings',38 and the 
monstrous roar of laughter at it's  own expense. Herein we do not find 
the production of the Same but of the absolutely different, of a 
multiplicity of superimposed masks whose inner emptiness is filled 
within a theatrical space: "by inserting both the in fin ity of real 
movement and the form of the absolute difference given in the 
repetition of eternal return" (DR 9). Thus, real movement which 
theatricality extracts is not 'mediation' but repetition, not a 
representation of concepts but a veritable dramatisation of Ideas. As 
Deleuze writes:
The theatre of repetition is opposed to  the  theatre of representation, ju s t as movement is 
opposed to  the concept and to  representation which refers it back to  the  concept. In the 
theatre of repetition, we experience pure forces, dynamic lines in space which act 
without intermediary upon the spirit, and link it directly with nature and history, with 
a language which speaks before words, w ith gestures which develop before organised 
bodies, with masks before faces, with spectres and phantoms before characters - the 
whole apparatus of repetition as a 'terrib le  power"' (DR 10)
Representation
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Repetition in the eternal return corresponds to a betrothal between the 
dead God and the dissolved self forming the true condition by default 
and the true metamorphosis of the agent, both of which disappear in the 
unconditioned character of the product. Eternal return is not a faith, 
but the truth of faith: it has isolated the double or the simulacrum, it 
has liberated the comic in order to make this an element of the 
superman. For Klossowski, the eternal return is not a doctrine but the 
simulacrum of every doctrine. We should not judge the atheist from the 
viewpoint of faith, but from the truth of faith, that is, of repetition as 
the elevation of thought to the power of the simulacrum - Antichrist. 
All these swirling 'breaths'39 are productive of so many intensive 
states based on the intensity = 0: the BwO. The subject himself passes 
through all these intensive states, identifying with each one of them 
and, thereby, claiming to be all the names of history. This transport 
does not correspond to the realisation of a system, but rather the 
actualisation of a programmatic parodic recollection of events as 
intensive states. As Klossowski writes:
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An intensity is at work in everyone, its flux and reflux forming the significant or 
insignificant fluctuations of thought. And while each appears to  be in possession of this, 
in point of fact it belongs to  no one, and has neither beginning nor end.
But, contrary to  this undulating element, if each of us forms a closed and apparently 
limited whole, i t  is precisely by virtue of these traces of signifying fluctuations; i.e., by 
a system of signs that I will here name the everyday code of signs. So far as the beginning 
or end of our own fluctuations is concerned - on which basis these signs permit us to  
signify, to  speak to  ourselves as well as to others - we know nothing, except that for this 
code a sign always corresponds to  the degree o f intensity, sometimes the highest, 
sometimes the lowest: even if th is  sign be the me, the I, the subject of all our 
propositions. It is thanks to  this sign, however, which is nothing but an ever variable 
trace of fluctuation, tha t we constitute ourselves as thinking, that a thought as such 
occurs to  us, even though we are never quite sure that it is not others tha t think and 
continue to  think in us. But what is this other who forms the outside in relation to  the 
inside that we hold ourselves to  be? Everything leads back to  a single discourse, to
fluctuations of intensity that correspond to  the thought of everyone and no one.40
39 C.f. P. Klossowski, The Baphomet, in relation to these swirling breaths.
40 P. Klossowski, Nietzsche's Experience of the Eternal Return, p. 112.
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Thus, the highest point of intensity corresponds to the eternal return in 
which the incoherency between outside and inside manifests itself in 
thought as an affirmation of a code of signs. But the codes themselves 
are contingent, and I also am contingent in the instant of affirmation of 
will, in which each affirmation is singular and different; the for itself 
alone. Only after the fact o f affirmation is it filtered through the 
apparatus of recognition and accorded a location within the signifying 
nexus of representation. The eternal return as principle of individuation 
is the object of the Dionysian faith: amor fati. This faith corresponds 
to the element in Nietzsche’s understanding of the role of the artist- 
philosopher in the service to  life, and to which we now turn as 
constituting the third theme of our Nietzschean characterisation.
5. In terms of an aesthetic theory Nietzsche’s work is divisible into 
two parts. In the early essays, notably The Birth o f Tragedy, Nietzsche 
describes life and cultural production in terms of an opposition 
between two irreducible tendencies or gods: Dionysus and Apollo. 
Dionysus corresponds to a purely fluid and passionate domain that is 
given form by the Apollonian individuating principle. Man is said to 
primarily entertain an irrational and poetic rapport with life; an 
experience that provides him with the content that will come to be 
cast in the form of a cultural edifice by means of the individuating 
principle. As Nietzsche tells us with reference to this element of life: 
“A becoming and a passing away, a building up and tearing down 
without any moral additive: the world is the play of an artist and a 
child, in perpetual innocence.”41 For Nietzsche, the Dionysian element
41 F. Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic A g e  o f G reece, §7.
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is the impetus and tonic content that fills Apollonian form.42 As a 
tonic, the Dionysian corresponds to a feeling of power and joy that is 
wholly sensible rather than rational. True art, as both a process of 
production and reception, enhances the feeling of power and makes one 
stronger. Furthermore, the Dionysian irrational domain constitutes the 
cause of everything that enters consciousness as effect and object of 
knowledge, but of the Dionysian itself we can know nothing. The 
authenticity of any moral system consists therefore in its claim to 
reflect the true cause and purpose of life. But as we have seen, they 
merely express a human production of values in accordance with the 
actions and passions of the individual. Such nihilism does not imply a 
return to a barbaric mode of existence, but rather should impel us to 
embrace the creative power of Dionysus in order to transform life into 
a veritable aesthetic event. Values are merely metaphors that come to 
form “ an infinitely complex cathedral of concepts upon shifting 
foundations and flowing waters.”43 These metaphors form so many 
expressions for experiences which in themselves there are no words. 
Here we can grasp the meaning behind Nietzsche’s persistent polemics 
against the Socrates who presented rationalism, science and logic as 
the definitive mode of human expression.
But if life is essentially illusion, as Nietzsche maintains, how is it 
possible to distinguish between a true artistic expression - Dionysian 
lyricism - and a purely formal one - Apollonian sculpture. It is 
precisely this dualistic metaphysicalism that Nietzsche begins to  
question in Human, AII-too-Human, substituting it with a model 
wherein Dionysus is no longer conceived in terms of a transcendent 
being, but rather as the immanent will to power within the process of
42 In chapter II we will present Deleuze's critique of the form-content duality by introducing a third term: 
expression.
43 F. Nietzsche, Concerning Truth and Falsehood in an Extramoral Sense, §1.
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individuation itself - that is, as the process of individuation itself. 
Now, the Dionysian and Apollonian components form two 
complementary aspects of the same whole: tragic art. Reason, science 
and logic are no longer conceived as degraded forms of a primary and 
passionate mode of existence, that the so-called artist is privy to, but 
rather every single manifestation of form is understood as a product of 
the process of self-creation out of chaos. It is not that Apollo is 
discarded but merely integrated into the Dionysian: the plane of 
immanence which is populated by preindividual and non-personal 
singularities is the inhuman domain that bestows form. Dionysus is not 
form but form-giving; not the basic material elements constitutive of 
the world but the relations that exist between the elements. Since 
form is merely a given relation between certain elements, the 
Dionysian corresponds to  the potential for the transformation of the 
relations existing between elements. It is no longer the artist who is 
elevated as a superior type, rather the process of creative production 
itself, as a process of invention and transformation, becomes the value 
bestowing virtue and the veritable ethic and justification for life. 
Nietzschean aesthetics does not concern itself uniquely with the 
production of the Beautiful and pleasurable, but rather embraces the 
force of the grotesque, suffering and cruelty channelled through a 
process of sublimation in order to utilise it in the service for life; “ to 
intensify it into a comprehensive symbol.” 44 The Dionysian therefore 
implies an austere self-discipline and the ability to integrate into 
distinctive forms a multiplicity of disparate elements. Thereby the 
brute physis is elevated from the depths of bodies to the limit between 
bodies - the relations they entertain amongst themselves - and is 
transformed into an aesthetic event. It is exactly this that Deleuze
Representation
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means when he writes:
No wonder, then, that aesthetics should be divided into tw o  irreducible domains: tha t of 
the theory of the sensible which captures only the real’ s conform ity with possible 
experience; and that of the  theory of the beautiful, which deals with the reality o f the 
real in so far as it is thought. Everything changes once we determine the conditions of 
real experience, which are not larger than the conditioned and which differ in kind from 
the categories: the two senses of the aesthetic become one, to  the point where the being of 
the sensible reveals itse lf in the work of art, while at the  same time the work o f art 
appears as experimentation. (DR 68)
Beauty would correspond to the immutability of eternal rest and peace, 
which as we have seen is wholly incommensurate with the fundamental 
notions of will to power and eternal return - both of which demand a 
heroic self-discipline and perpetual skepticism within the maelstrom 
of irredeemable repetition. Aesthetics does not preoccupy itself with 
truth, but with the imposition of value upon an event-horizon, which 
necessitates a cold and cruel sense of realism: accepting the reality of 
existence as suffering. Thus, aesthetics must embrace the grotesque: 
feasting, cruel spectacles, sexual license. We find a similar appeal in 
M. Bakhtin45 where he presents carnivalesque laughter as an implicit 
becoming that subsists ‘between’ the two extremes of the ideal and the 
grotesque. Grotesque realism - feasting, defecation, swearing, 
drunkenness, sexual promiscuity - and the ideal - work, officiality, 
ecclessiasticality, Court pomp, bureaucracy, legislation - are related 
extrinsically, whereas laughter represents the univocal implicate. 
Since it envelops both extremes, carnivalesque laughter is paradoxical 
by nature. The grotesque is not definable purely in terms of the formal 
psychological mechanism of perception (phenomenological organicism), 
but must also embrace the objective content or reality of the object 
itself. By including both extremes a revolutionary topography 
expressing a plethora of potential relations subsistent within the
45 M. Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World.
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products of a cultural edifice are liberated. Through the mechanisms of 
reversal, grotesque exaggeration, caricature, and defilement, a great 
wealth and fullness of meaning is revealed that was formally repressed 
under the yoke of conventional representation. By displacing the 
official form of the object we open onto a purely topographical plane 
wherein objects are rendered partial; the anus of defecation can be 
connected with the mouth of consumption: talking out of one’s arse, and 
talking shit; to vomit and to shit. By partializing and complicating the 
identity of the images, and by rendering the relations that exist 
between them interchangeable, the power of metamorphosis is 
liberated. The Dionysian therefore represents the affirmation of the 
whole of life, even its cruelest suffering: meaning of amor fati. 
Christianity distances itself from the grotesque as such, and thereby 
identifies itself with the peaceful and beautiful image of a merciful 
Christus. It separates the real content of life from its ideal image by 
means of the denial of suffering. It is in this capacity reactive since it 
fails to embrace the whole of life, and thereby separates life as will to 
power from what it is potentially capable of doing.
This grotesque spirit of festivity shatters the respectable and ideal 
object of truth, while intoxicated rapture breaks through the limits 
imposed upon becoming by the reactive self-preservative drives 
constitutive of identity. “ Preoccupation with itself and its ‘eternal 
salvation’ is not the expression of a rich and self-confident type; for 
that type does not give a damn about its salvation - it has no such 
interest in happiness of any kind; it is force, deed, desire - it imposes 
itself on things, it lays violent hands on things.”46 For this reason 
Nietzsche affirms a will to self-annihilation as a means to self­
creation: “ Life itself, its eternal fruitfulness and recurrence, creates
Representation
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torment, destruction, the will to annihilation.” 47 The death drive, then, 
as the element of creativity presupposes the affirmation of the eternal 
return of the same. But the will to power is the principle of eternal 
recurrence, thus what returns, eternally the same, is difference in 
itself clothed in the form of the recognised object. In fact, Deleuze 
goes on to distinguish between three types of repetition: material, 
psychical and ontological.48 The material corresponds to an absolute 
present; the psychical to  an absolute past; and the ontological to the 
future as evolutionary and revolutionary dynamic. It is the future 
dimension of time that possesses the power to liberate itself from the 
yoke of representation. This third repetition, by distributing difference 
throughout the system as a whole, enacts the ungrounding of both 
physical (physis) and psychical ( metaphysis) repetition - it therefore 
corresponds to the death drive which separates instinct from habit and 
Ideas from memory.
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Perhaps the highest ob jec t of art is to  bring in to  play simultaneously all these 
repetitions, with their differences in kind and rhythm, their respective displacements 
and disguises, their divergences and decentrings; to  embed them in one another and to 
envelop one or the other in illusions the 'effect' of which varies in each case. Art does not 
imitate, above all because it  repeats; it repeats all the repetitions, by virtue of an 
internal power (an im ita tion is a copy, but art is simulation, it reverses copies into 
simulacra) (DR 293).
Aesthetic production therefore implies both a radical conception of 
time, and a new understanding of the manner in which eternal objects 
are constituted. The concept of eternal recurrence is Nietzsche’s 
response to the necessity for a time that is neither the linearity of the 
purely historical, nor that of the eternal wherein a God would 
supposedly reside. The movement of the eternal return, far from being
47 Ibid, §1052.
40 We will analysis more fully these three repetitions in chapter three. For now it suffices to indicate 
how the material and psychical mark the limits of the ontological as a pure becoming and futural 
dimension, and wherein we locate the evolutionary dynamic and artistic creativity intrinsic to life.
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linear, presents itself in a certain sense as the return of a point on the 
circumference of the wheel of time. But as we saw in relation to Plato 
and the manner in which he employed the circularity of myth in order to 
found truth, the metempsychotic model is far from adequate. Nietzsche 
grappled with this problem from quite early on in Of the Use and 
Disadvantage o f History for Life-, even before he had articulated his 
theory of the eternal return. In this ‘meditation’ he distinguishes 
between three types of history: the unhistorical; the historical; and the 
supra-historical. In fact, these three types of history are the three 
forms of repetition which we attributed above to Deleuze: the material; 
the psychical; and the ontological. The unhistorical corresponds the the 
absolute present; the historical to memory; and the supra-historical to 
the ‘monumental’. The value of art resides in the creation of values that 
surpass mere contingency; values which add something to life and make 
it worth living, or at least endurable. The justification for this 
prioritisation of the value of aesthetic production can be understood 
only in terms of the process of culture creating: a “conception of 
culture as another and improved physis without inside and outside . . . 
culture as a harmony of living, thinking, appearing, and willing.”49 
Beyond material and psychical repetition we locate the ontological as 
evolutionary and revolutionary. As Deleuze writes:
A philosophy of repetition must pass through all these 'stages’, condemned to  repeat 
repetition itself. However, by traversing these stages it ensures its  programme of 
making repetition the category of the future: making use o f the repetition of habit and 
that of memory, bu t making use of them as stages and leaving them in its wake; 
struggling on the one hand against Habitus, on the other against Mnemosyne; refusing the 
content of repetition which is more or less able to  'draw o ff' difference (Habitus); 
refusing the form o f a repetition which includes difference, but in order once again to  
subordinate it to  the Same and the Similar (Mnemosyne); refusing the overly simple 
cycles, the one followed by a habitual present (customary cycle) as much as the  one 
described by a pure past (memorial or immemorial cycle); changing the ground of 
memory into a simple condition by default, but also the foundation of habit into a failure
49 F. Nietzsche, Untim ely Meditations, II, 10.
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of 'habitus', a metamorphosis o f the agent; expelling the agent and the condition in the 
name of the work or product; making repetition, not that from which one 'draws off' a 
difference, nor that which includes a difference as a variant, but making it the thought 
and the production o f the 'absolutely different'; making it so that repetition is, for itself, 
difference in itself" (DR 94)
The eternal return is intrinsically related to Nietzsche’s understanding 
of eternal objects. The eternal object is a pure event, the Eventum 
Tandum. With difference in itself as their foundation, the boundaries 
separating eternal objects become indistinct.50 Nonetheless they 
possess a singular nature which constitutes their Wholeness. Events 
therefore are not eternal yet they endure: that is, they possess 
‘duration’. True artistic production therefore takes place only within 
durational time.51 Whitehead, Deleuze tells us, gives us four 
components which constitute an event. If we begin with chaos or 
multiplicity, the problem is how we make the One from the Many. For 
this to occur, “ [a] great screen has to be placed between them” (F 76), a 
formless skin, prior to space and time, which envelops a multiplicity of 
elements, and thereby forms a whole. This whole-parts structure forms 
an infinite series without limit. This is the first component: extension. 
The second is intension, which corresponds to the value attributed to 
the extensive series. These values enter into a “ new infinite series, 
now converging toward limits, with the relations among limits 
establishing a conjunction” (F 77), producing characteristics which fill 
space and time. The third component is prehension, which itself has 
three characteristics, namely: ‘subjective form’ or project; ‘subjective 
aim’ or becoming; and ‘self-enjoyment’ in its own becoming. The latter 
drives it ever forward toward making new connections: invention. The
50 We can also compare events to the uniqueness of "situations" as characterised by the Situationist 
Project in the 50's and 60's.
51 We will analysis this ontological time and its relation to production more fully in chapter II in terms of 
nonsense words and Aionic time, and in chapter III in terms of aleatory points and duration - that is, 
linguistic production and biopsychical production respectively.
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fourth components are the “eternal objects or ‘ingressions’ . . . [which] 
gain permanence only in the limits of the flux that creates them” (F 
79-80) - that is, the durations that compose them. Therefore, art as 
the highest expression of will to power is a form giving force.52 
By means of this four-fold relation the role of the artist as creator of 
values becomes apparent - let us consolidate this estimation of the 
Nietzschean philosopher-artist with the aid of two examples from 
poetry and painting respectively. A). Repetition is the power of 
language which always implies an excessive Idea of poetry. This Idea of 
poetry is laudably represented in the symbolism of the Mallarmean 
poetic Word.53 Each line of the poem, each differentiated series, is 
constituted by a sequence of singularities or pattern of repeated beats 
(as in music) which characterise them. Moreover, all the differentiated 
series resonate or focus on a aleatory point. Blanchot names this point 
the essential Word which stands for the totality of all the levels of 
differentiated series, and through which all the series communicate 
and repeat themselves in all the other series. In essence therefore this 
element is simultaneously displaced and Whole. In this sense, all the 
series form so many 'synonyms' in relation to this element which itself 
plays the part of a 'homonym' for the to ta lity  of levels. Or "as in a 
song,” Deleuze writes, where “the differentiated series are organised 
into couplets or verses, while the [dark] precursor is incarnated in an 
antiphon or chorus . . . the chorus which represents the object = x" (DR 
292). This identification of the essential Word with the chorus is 
reminiscent of Nietzsche's fascination with the Dionysian chorus which 
was represented by those dark elemental powers of the fates and the
52 In connection to the will to power as doctrine of form shaping force, c.f., F. Nietzsche, The 
Genealogy of Morals, Essay II, 12.
53 For an exemplary analysis of Mallarme's poetry see Blanchot’s The Space of Literature, p. 38-48.
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furies. B). Ukiyo-e or 17th century Japanese colour print was otherwise 
known as the ‘Pictures of the Floating World’ School. As the title 
suggests, this form of art is concerned not so much with mere 
contingencies as with the eternal verities of the world. Essentially 
Ukiyo-e style is not purely a representational art-form which mimics 
optical appearance: it does not copy the objects from nature as ends in 
themselves, but rather the artist stores a great many impressions from 
nature in his mind for use as and when the intensity of an inspiration 
impels him to paint. The work therefore originates not so much within 
the visual field, but in the passions seated in a constitutive 
imagination. Thus, the Japanese genius was for the brush-stroke itself 
or expressive line, for pattern and for design. Balance is established 
between all the elements constitutive of the painting by paying each 
one no more attention than any other. In this manner diversity is 
harmonised into a whole, and wherein the works verity resides in the 
relational order created between the component parts. In this sense, 
the work’s value is in its design or constructive synthesis. Moreover, 
it is the will of the artist seated in the constitutive imagination that 
produces this synthesis. As Lyotard and Thebaud tell us in relation to 
Kant: "The ability to judge does not hang upon the observance of 
criteria. The form that it will take in the last Critique is that of the 
imagination. An imagination that is constitutive. It is not only an 
ability to judge; it is a power to invent criteria."54 It follows, that 
what Nietzsche means by the philosopher-artist is the Overman; he who 
creates his own criteria and invents himself through his own rules. He 
thereby creates a best possible world out of the fabric of the given 
world. It is in this sense that we must understand Nietzsche’s 
rejection of the moral world. As Deleuze tells us:




As for the subject of this new discourse . . .  it is not man or God, and even less man in the 
place of God. The subject is this free, anonymous, and nomadic singularity which 
traverses men as well as plants and animals independently o f the m atter of their 
individuation and the forms of their personality. 'Overman' means nothing other than 
this - the superior type o f everything that is. This is a strange discourse, which ought to  
have renewed philosophy, and which finally deals w ith sense not as a predicate or a 
property but as an event. (LS 107)
Therefore, the value of the overman as creator cannot be considered as 
a function of the race or species to which it belongs (Darwin), but 
rather the high point of evolution is the individual himself: meaning of 
aristocracy.
For Deleuze’s Nietzsche, aesthetics reveals itself as a practice which 
expresses the possibility of the poetic, free and wild nature within 
empiricism. Aesthetics cannot be defined as a science of the sensible 
nor theory of the Beautiful, but rather it becomes an apodictic 
discipline only when the being o f the sensible - as the difference and 
difference in intensity behind qualitative diversity - is itself 
apprehended. In this manner empiricism becomes transcendental, 
replacing representation with repetition. By determining the conditions 
of real experience, the forms of experience are united within the work 
of art as experimentation: since the immutable centre is always 
lacking, one can only go on inventing by means of the potential within 
the constitutive imagination or the power of the subconscious.55 This 
power corresponds to that which takes art from representation to 
abstraction. The creation of eternal objects corresponds to cultural 
integration; physis raised to the surface. Life may well begin with the 
raw matter of the universe, but its creative force is located at the 
limit of bodies, the relations between bodies, and the integrations that 
the relations form: greater bodies.
55 This theory is proposed by P. Klee in, Paul Klee On Modern Art, Faber and Faber, mcmxlviii.
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To conclude, in Platonism we locate a condemnation of art in its 
relation to truth. Plato conceives art purely in terms of a mimetic 
process extrinsic to the Idea; it corresponds to the production of the 
false and is thereby relegated to the level of the sensible. Its value is 
less than that of a truth conceived in terms of pure reason and beauty. 
Therefore, art’s veneration poses a threat to the constitution of an 
ideal polis which has as its underlying principle the idea of a ‘natural’ 
organic growth. To the Idea belong the notions of permanence and self­
sameness which stand in opposition to becoming and change. The artist 
does not produce the Idea, but merely re-produces a copy of an Idea as 
it manifests itself as a shadow cast through reflected light on the wall 
of a cave. This conception of art is purely ocular. The Idea lies behind 
the form (mask) by which things show themselves; it constitutes 
content as Being. Moreover, the essence of Being is unitary and singular. 
For Plato therefore there exists a discordance between Being and its 
manifest appearance. Hence art as the re-production of the visible 
stands far removed from truth.
Nietzsche rejects Plato's understanding of the relation between art and 
truth, restores the power of the sensible to the Idea, and thereby 
affirms the worth of art over truth. Nietzsche's reversal of Platonism 
finds its basis in the primacy of sensibility and becoming over 
intelligibility and being. The real is the sensuous, that from which all 
experience and knowledge - even of the Ideas - is derived. For 
Nietzsche, the Ideas are merely concepts of representation, forming a 
nexus of intelligible symbols which ‘diagram’ an otherwise enigmatic 
and fluid domain of pure becoming. The work of art is an enigma, having 
its value in the feelings and passions that are aroused in both artist 
and recipient alike. Thus the greater worth of a discordant and sensible 
intoxication over a calm and rational reflexivity. This justifies
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Nietzsche’s claims for the primacy of the physiological over the 
intellectual, and the requirement therefore to deviancy, through a 
process of sublimation, the senses. Out of this discordant sensibility, 
this multiplicity of perspectives derivative from a plethora of forces 
and power relations wherein everything is at war with everything else, 
the aim of the true philosopher-artist is the production of an eternal 
object. The element of the real is pure becoming graspable not in 
totality but through perspective; Being corresponds to the petrification 
of any one perspective. Thus Nietzsche makes of truth a mere 
semblance and seduction: truth as Woman. As Heidegger tells us: "Art as 
will to semblance is the supreme configuration of will to power. But 
the latter, as the basic character of beings, as the essence of reality, 
is in itself that Being which wills itself by willing to be Becoming. In 
that way Nietzsche in will to power attempts to think the original 
unity of the ancient opposition of Being and Becoming. Being, as 
permanence, is to let Becoming be a Becoming. The origin of the thought 
of 'eternal recurrence' is thereby indicated."56 Only through artistic 
excess will we ever be able to create. This is the singular importance 
of the artist-overman in Nietzsche. We go from despair, to the limit of 
nihilism, from rapture to the creation of a new valuation out of 
sensibility. The absolutely singular encounter through sensibility with 
the object, as opposed to the universal character of representation. The 
unique, unrepeatable event, as opposed to the repetition of the Same. 
Thus, Nietzsche's formulation of eternal recurrence is different from 
that of the Ancients, since it specifies singularity rather than 
universality; Difference rather than Same; the unique rather than the 
normative.





Having discussed the manner in which representation subjugates 
difference under its four-fold yoke, it is now incumbent upon us to 
articulate in greater detail the element of tha t which is subjugated 
from the point of view of language. However, we must not comprehend 
the subjugated as being in some sense a transcendent Being, or a 
concrete presence that would possess the power of redeeming the 
slippage immanent within the domain o f representation while 
simultaneously bestowing to the life of Self a centre of absolute 
certainty. Since it is our wish to characterise this transcendence in 
terms of a ’third’ ontology, it will be necessary to articulate it from 
two radical perspectives: the above and the below; language and 
empiricism; idealism and materialism. To th is  end, it  will not be 
feasible to establish the conditions of possibility in terms of a set of 
fixed principles, but on the contrary these conditions may only be 
predicated upon an originary heterogeneity; not an original sense but a 
co-presence of sense with its own nonsense.
To a great extent postmodern thought preoccupies itself with the task 
of overcoming metaphysics, of dismantling the structural and binary 
systems of opposition, and taking to the point of absurdity methods 
based upon first principles. The realisation of this ambition is pursued 
by means of affirming a certain poetics of play. Deleuze's The Logic o f 
Sense exemplifies jus t such a concerted e ffo rt to think a non- 
foundational thought that would overcome any naive philosophy of 
'origins'. This objective reminds us of the phenomenological motif of a 
'radical beginning', which would always-already remain irreducible to
1 By this title we infer a mode of thought which emphasises the intuitive in language. The necessity for 
an intuitive approach arises from the premise that life and language are constituted upon paradox 
rather than certainty. A purely rationalist and empirical approach fails to grasp the transcendental 
conditions which constitute them - that is to say, fails to grasp the ambivalence within the heart of life.
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the objective truths of fact, and thereby introduce the demands of a 
certain h istoric ity grounded in contextual contingencies and 
specificities to whose exigency the philosopher responds. In this 
respect The Logic o f Sense corresponds, perhaps in a limited sense, to a 
rethinking of Husserlean phenomenology in order to retain the latter’s 
philosophical rigour while simultaneously rejecting its metaphysical 
presuppositions.
However, we should not over-hastily conclude from these introductory 
remarks that an anti-logos thinking would condemn philosophy to the 
aimless wanderings of a pure derive, since the determination of value 
or meaning represents a composite constituted by two irreducible 
components: material contextualities and subjective specificities. 
Furthermore, this so-called ‘th ird ’ ontology does not constitute a 
reconciliation, or unification into a kind of monism between the two 
radical extremes, but rather a problematising and deepening of both 
that allows us to perpetually rethink the relations that have, do, will 
or potentially could exist between the two extremes.
For these reasons, Deleuze distances himself from the contemporary 
(at the time of writing The Logic o f Sense and Difference and 
Repetition - the late 1960's) "structuralism" of Lacan, Barthes and 
Lévi-Strauss, by claiming that meaning has less to do with binary 
oppositional structures and more to do with the nomadic and singular 
distribution of "signs" within a signifying space. As we have already 
remarked, this space cannot be understood in purely linguistic terms, 
but rather sense (Sens) is more like a frontier or surface between the 
two extremes of an idealism and an empiricism that mark the limits of 
a pure becoming. Thus, Deleuze's intention is to attribute both an 
independence to each limit in the constitution of meaning and, more 
importantly, an asymmetrical value to each. It is the asymmetrical
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element that confirms the irreducibility between the two constitutive 
components. Deleuze’s aim therefore is not simply to  reject 
phenomenology by adopting some naive empiricism, but rather to pass 
through it in order to maintain its transcendental move.
As the "father" of phenomenology, Husserl set it up as the way of 
avoiding metaphysics. What he meant by metaphysics was a certain 
‘naturalistic attitude’ or complacency on the part of philosophers who 
use concepts, words, symbols, etc., without having access to the their 
intuitive grounding.1 2 The purpose, then, of phenomenology, at least for 
Husserl, is to reclaim an originary ground in order to situate language 
meaning upon a stable and certain foundation. The task, is to uncover 
the primordial experiences which give rise to  our concepts. The extent 
to which Husserlean phenomenology is itself metaphysical and the 
manner in which Deleuze addresses this problematic with the aim to 
its overcoming will be investigated through four central themes: the 
presumed distinction between two kinds of sign; the logical a priori 
motif; the transcendental ego; and lastly the collapse of the meaning- 
surface.
1. Husserl distinguishes between two heterogeneous signs: expression 
and indication.3 The former type of sign possesses meaning, whereas 
the latter lacks meaning but has sense. Although both types of sign 
have a sensory basis, it can nonetheless be said, in a certain limited 
way, that sense belongs to the material dimension of expression, while 
expression is purely ideal (logical) and for consciousness. As Husserl 
tells us: "Let us start from  the familiar distinction between the
2 This attitude is described by Deleuze in terms ot a good sense and a common sense attributable to 
the domain of representation that covers over the transcendental, or the difference in itself and 
repetition for itself constitutive of meaning.




sensory, the so to speak bodily aspect of expression, and its non- 
sensory 'mental' aspect."4 However, Husserl is not so concerned with 
pursuing the sensory side of expression, which corresponds to the 
noematic sphere of lived experience or communicative speech, as he is 
in tracking down the mental or ideal side, which corresponds to the a 
priori as the element of meaning. Communicative speech articulates the 
pre-expressive physical sphere of sense, while charging this content 
with the form of meaning: a meaning which is purely intentional and 
therefore immanent to consciousness. Consciousness is always 
consciousness of something, speech therefore must always contain 
both an indicative stratum and a purely logical expression, the two 
being inextricably interwoven. The problem for Husserl will be to 
radically distinguish the one from the other. Moreover, since the same 
phenomena may be grasped as either expression or indication, Husserl 
will attempt to capture the logical purity of meaning as the possibility 
of logos itself. In fact, expression and indication are not so much 
beings in the substantial sense, as modes of being for being in general. 
So how does Husserl distinguish between expression and indication? In 
cautioning us against understanding expression merely as a species of 
the genus indication, he writes:
If, as one unwillingly does, one lim its oneself to  expressions employed in living 
discourse, the notion of an indication seems to  apply more widely than tha t of an 
expression, but this does not mean that its content is the genus of which an expression is 
the species. To mean is not a particular way of being a sign in the sense of indicating 
something. It has a narrower application only because meaning - in communicative 
speech - is always bound up with such an indicative relation, and this in its turn leads to 
a wider concept, since meaning is also capable of occurring w ithout such a connection. 5
Husserl therefore affirms that there exists a certain distinction 
between expression and indication - even though in the instance of
4 E. Husserl, Ideas. 1. § 124, p. 346.
5 E. Husserl, Logical Investigation I, § 1, p. 269.
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communicative speech expression is inextricably intwinned with 
indicative relations - since the application of meaning to being in 
general implies a certain “conceptuality” beyond the mere connectivity 
between discursive signs and what the signs denote.
In order to maintain the purity of expression as having meaning, it is 
necessary for Husserl to show that the indicative sign maintains an 
extrinsic relation to expression. He thus defines the connectivity 
characteristic of the indicative sign as a certain "motivation"6 which 
allows a 'thinking being' to make the association between a sign and 
what it is a sign of. As he tells us:
the fact th a t certain objects or states of affairs of whose reality someone has actual 
knowledge indicate to  him the reality of certain other objects or states of affairs, in the 
sense that his belief in the reality of the one is experienced (though not at all evidently) 
as motivating a belief or surmise in the reality of the other. 7
Here, Husserl infers the distinction between belief and truth. We 
believe in the existence of certain extrinsic relations, yet we have no 
real or absolute certainty that these relations are in fact the case: they 
are mere contingencies existing between perceptual phenomena. On the 
one hand, belief describes only a very general notion of motivation, on 
the other hand, in the case of apodictic demonstrations, the relations 
evidenced are necessarily persistent - that is, beyond empirical 
contingency. Apodictic demonstrations do not reveal indicative 
motivations or connections, but rather necessary relations between 
ideal objects. Thus, a sign can be both an expression wherein it carries 
an intuitive weight, and an indication wherein it refers to another sign 
or what it  is a sign of. For Husserl, language therefore has a 
fundamental aspect and a secondary aspect: the expression is
6 This notion of motivation Deleuze articulates in The Logic of Sense in terms of 'manifestation'.
7 E. Husserl, Logical Investigation I, § 2, p. 270.
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fundamental, the indication secondary. Even though expression is 
always caught up in indication, it can nonetheless be grasped in all its 
purity within the silence of "solitary mental life" that suspends the 
outside. This suspension does not eradicate the outside, but grasps it in 
its ideal objectivity within a meaning-intention gaze. Moreover, 
solitary mental life not only suspends the outside, but implies a 
suspension even of speech itself, in order to  grasp the internal voice 
and pure intention within all speech acts. A pure intention which is 
present only within The Voice o f the Silence.8 9
One of course speaks, in a certain sense, even in soliloquy, and it is certainly possible to  
think of oneself as speaking, and even as speaking to  oneself, as, e.g., when someone says 
to himself: ‘You have gone wrong, you can’t  go on like that.’ But in the genuine sense of 
communication, there is no speech in such cases, nor does one tell oneself anything: one 
merely conceives of oneself as speaking and communicating. In a monologue words can 
perform no function of indicating the existence of mental acts, since such indication 
would there be quite purposeless. For the acts in question are themselves experienced by 
us at that very moment.»
As this quotation makes clear, Husserl’s aim is to present the 
possibility of attaining the full presence of intentionality with itself, 
through the suspension of the sensuous world of indication, in order to 
uncover the full intuitive weight of a primordial experience that would 
serve as the foundation of meaning and truth in general. From such an 
experience one could command precepts.
However, we must not understand by the suspension of indicative 
speech a complete eradication of sensibility, since our imagination has
8 The reference is to a work by H. P. Blavatsky, the prolific writer and founder of The Theosophical 
Society; a movement which attracted vast intellectual interest at the early quarter of the Twentieth 
century. This tradition condemned the attachment to objects of sense and pursued a path of ethics 
toward self-knowledge wherein the flame of bodily desire as the embodiment of self would be 
extinguished and the true Sell revealed. Even though Husserl bases the Logical Investigations on 
the rejection of just such a psychologism, he nonetheless affirms, in some fundamental sense, the 
distinction between form and content, where expression would correspond to the purely formal 
character of an indicative sensible content. This dualism is essentially metaphysical.
9 E. Husserl, Logical Investigation I, § 8, p. 279-80.
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limits which the things themselves fix, e.g., we are unable to imagine 
colour independent of space. Thus, essences are constituted by that 
which remains identical throughout the imagining of all possibilities: 
the noetic core of the noemata. Essences are the pure eidetic forms, a 
pure formal ontology, identifiable with the Mathesis Universalis of 
both Descartes and Leibniz which takes philosophy beyond the purely 
empirical. In this manner, Husserl addresses the problem of what it 
means to know; what knowledge itself is in its meaning for the subject. 
He can therefore preserve the notion of truth founded on the subject of 
knowledge while rejecting a Kantian separation of this subject from 
the empirical ego, and thereby avoiding the pure psychologism of which 
he accused the latter.
However, is the distinction between the two kinds of sign justified in 
the first place? And, since the bracketing of the outside is never an 
eradication of the outside, but merely an extraction of an ideal 
objectivity or form through a meaning-intention, does this not imply an 
always-already contamination of expression by indication?
Deleuze rejects the distinction between the two kinds of sign; between 
indication and expression, and reconstructs the problematic in terms of 
a distinction between the three different levels which constitute an 
Event as such. The three levels coincide with: bodies, language and the 
frontier between these two extreme limits. Bodies correspond to the 
material dimension of the Eventum Tandum, whereas language 
corresponds to its subjective dimension. In fact, everything happens on 
the border between things and propositions: a border that is 
characterised as a virtual surface of unlimited becoming that affirms 
the simultaneity of past and future within the infinitive instant. The 
triple consequence of affirming the past-future infinitive is the 
contestation of personal identity, absolute certainty, and pure
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intentionally. In short, the denouncement of the Husserlean notions of 
the transcendental ego, apodictic truth and idealism.
Deleuze does not idealise meaning at the expense of denigrating sense, 
but rather brings the two limits together in what he elsewhere calls an 
‘encounter’ constitutive of the event as such. Although it constitutes an 
ideality, an event cannot be said to correspond to a pure eidetic form, 
but rather is both simultaneously the expression of a proposition and 
the attribute of a state of affairs. For Deleuze, therefore, there is 
always-already an intertwining of expression with indication - this 
necessary intertwining motivates him to speak purely in terms of 
sense. The sign of the encounter is that which is presented to the mind 
in the form of an ideal event, but an encounter which must not be 
understood as constituting a pacification or mediation between the two 
levels of subjectivity and materiality. The ideal event is not a pure 
origin, Word or Being, but rather it is what Foucault has named the 
"thread of discourse"10 due to its correspondence with what he has 
elsewhere presented under the name "the statement."11 Let us examine 
these three dimensions in turn - states of affairs, language and the 
event respectively - in order to fully comprehend Deleuze's rejection of 
the manner in which Husserl distinguishes between expression and 
indication as well as the priority he accords to the former over the 
latter.
a). In Stoic philosophy Deleuze uncovers a fundamental distinction 
between two kinds of being: corporeals and incorporeals. Firstly, 
corporeal bodies with their quantities and qualities, actions and
10 M. Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, p. 175.
11 For a full explication of this notion see G. Deleuze's Foucault, especially pp. 1-22. Briefly, what 
characterises a statement is that it corresponds to a regularised transversal movement that Deleuze 
likens to a “statistical curve" (p. 4). Regularity allows for repetition, while the rules governing the 
formation of a statement’s distribution does not owe its production to a transcendental subject, but on 
the contrary to a certain non-personal ‘gathering’ of particular elements.
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passions, enter into mixtures forming states of affairs. Not in the 
manner of cause and effect, but as one massive causal entity in which 
all bodies are absorbed into a unity which the Stoics called ‘Destiny’. A 
veritable corporeal determinism that coincides with the time of the 
chronic present: the moment. Secondly, this mixture of bodies produces 
effects which are not themselves bodies, but incorporeal entities 
which play at the surface and limit of bodies. These effects are likened 
to ephemeral attributes and correspond to events rather than actual 
beings. Events do not form amongst themselves a causality, but rather a 
quasi-causality of incorporeals to which there corresponds the time of 
the unlimited Aion: the instant. As Deleuze tells us:
They are not physical qualities and properties, but rather, logical or dialectical 
attributes . . .  They are not substantives or adjectives but verbs. They are neither agents 
nor patients, but the results of actions and passions. They are not living presents but 
infinitives: the unlim ited Aion . . . Thus time must be grasped tw ice, in two 
complementary though mutually exclusive fashions. (LS 5)
There corresponds to an event, therefore, both the time of the present 
where actions and passions develop, and the impassive, incorporeal 
time of a pure becoming. These are two entirely different beings, or 
rather, states of affairs are said to have being whereas incorporeal 
events have extra-being. It follows:
If bodies with their states, quantities and qualities, assume all the characteristics of 
substance and cause, conversely, the characteristics of the Idea are regulated to  the other 
side, tha t is to  th is impassive extra-being which is sterile . . . the ideational or the 
incorporeal can no longer be anything other than an effect. (LS 7)
The consequence of this operation raises unlimited becoming up from 
the depths of bodies where Plato attempted to bury it - that is, to the 
surface where the effects of the mixtures of bodies insinuate 
themselves, forming the entire Idea, while denying it its "causal and 
spiritual efficacy." The Idea is now conceived purely in terms of an
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effect. However, this is not the Idea in the real sense of the concept, 
but a sense-event which constitutes the sensibility of sense: the 
material dimension of the surface frontier.
b). There exists between events and language an essential relation, 
since it is in the nature of events to be expressed in propositions. 
Deleuze distinguishes between three aspects which constitute 
propositional logic: denotation, manifestation and signification, i) 
Denotation is the relation of language to an external state of affairs, 
where words function as empty forms for the selection of images 
which represent states of affairs. "The state of affairs is individuated; 
it includes particular bodies, mixtures of bodies, qualities, quantities, 
and relations. Denotation functions through the association of the 
words themselves with particular images which ought to 'represent' 
the state of affairs" (LS 12). In this capacity words function as 
substantives, ii) Manifestation is the relation of the proposition to the 
person who expresses himself: the ""I" is the basic manifester" (LS 13) 
of the relation between word and state of affair. "Manifestation 
therefore is presented as a statement of desires and beliefs which 
correspond to  the proposition" (Ibid). There is always an essential 
motivation at the heart of language and desire is the causal inference 
that makes denotation possible, iii) Signification is the relation of the 
word to general concepts, and the manner in which concepts connect 
and imply other concepts: that is, the movement of signifiers in 
general.
From the standpoint of signification, we always consider the elements of the proposition 
as 'signifying' conceptual implications capable of referring to  other propositions, which 
serve as premises of the first. Signification is defined by th is order o f conceptual 
implication where the proposition under consideration intervenes only as an element of a 




The logical value of the movement of signification is that of providing 
the conditions of truth in general. In this manner, signification 
establishes both the possibility of truth as well as that of error, since 
we are liable to make erroneous as well as correct associations within 
the signifying process.
In the domain of 'speech' (parole) manifestation enjoys a certain 
privilege or primacy in relation to denotation and signification, since it 
is the “ I” of speech which begins absolutely. This primacy Kristeva has 
aptly named "Desire in Language."12 Whereas, in the domain of language 
(langue) significations are primary in relation to denotation and 
manifestation. "In it, a proposition is able to  appear only as a premise 
or a conclusion, signifying concepts before manifesting a subject, or 
even before denoting a state of affairs" (LS 15). However, the primacy 
of signification over denotation is unable to  ground denotation, since 
the movement of signification is lateral, and therefore can only refer
12 In Desire in Language, Kristeva appropriates the manner in which Lacan links language to 
the unconscious, and by so doing, shows how desire is immanent within language. In fact, 
language operates on two distinct levels, which allows fo r the possibility o f undermining a 
purely formal linguistic sense, which in turn reveals how absurdity and paradox lie at the 
heart of linguistic practice. Moreover,this practice o f paradoxical or nonsensical 
signification gives rise to  the possibility o f political and ethical resistance. The subject of 
resistance, or what Kristeva calls the "speaking subject", is divided between two levels of 
motivation: unconscious and conscious drives, physiological processes and social constraints. 
This divided subject can not, therefore, be identified with the subject of phenomenology, that 
is, Husserl's transcendental ego whose experiences are always correlates o f consciousness. 
Kristeva, therefore, posits two types of signifying processes as always-already operative 
within any production of meaning: the semiotic and the symbolic. The semiotic corresponds 
to the economy of primary processes articulated by Freud's instinctual drives, and upon 
which social and familial structures are imprinted through the mediation o f the maternal 
body - primary repression. The symbolic process refers to  the to  the domain of philology, 
that is, sign, syntax, grammar, law, etc., - secondary repression. The divided subject 
functions or resonates between these two extreme levels and manifests what Kristeva calls 
"poetic language," which she appropriates from the Russian post-formalists - Bakhtin et al. 
Thus, the signifying process which the divided subject employs in her poetic language 
consists of both a 'phenotext' (a mathematical treatise) and a 'genotext' (as exemplified by 
the works of Artaud). However, no one signifying process can be employed in a pure state, 
totally separate and uninfected by the other process.
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to other concepts along a chain of possible significations in which 
propositions are substantiated by the next proposition in the chain of 
significations, and this next proposition by the proposition following 
it, regressus in infinitum. Except, that is, when implication "gives 
itself a ready-made denotation, once in the premises and again in the 
conclusion" (LS 16). That is, the conditions which constitute 
signification require that both the premises and conclusions be posited 
as effectively true. In virtue of this necessary presupposition, 
denotation enjoys a certain primacy over signification. This whole 
circle and mutual dependency between denotation, manifestation and 
signification constitutes the circularity of the proposition in general. 
However, propositional logic is ultimately impotent and therefore 
requires another dimension in order to adequately account for language 
use. Perhaps we could provisionally conclude tha t signification 
corresponds to the process of association characteristic of expression; 
denotation to  the presupposition of tru th  in indication; and 
manifestation to the belief motivating the particular indication,
c). To this ternary logic Deleuze adds a fourth element: the verb as 
sense proper, which replaces the Husserlean notion of expression, in 
order to refute the purely apodictic character attributed to the latter 
by Husserl. The relations existing between the logic of the proposition, 
the state of affairs, and the event is elucidated by Foucault in his 
essay Theatrum Philosophicum, which concerns itself exclusively with 
Deleuze’s The Logic o f Sense and Difference and Repetition. As he tells 
us:
For a ternary logic, traditionally centred on the referent, we must substitute an 
interrelationship based on four terms, "Marc Anthony is dead" designates a state of 
things; expresses my opinion or belief; signifies an affirmation; and, in addition, has a 
meaning: "dying". An intangible meaning w ith one side turned toward things because 
"dying" is something that occurs, as an event, to  Anthony, and the  other toward the
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proposition because "dying" is what is said about Anthony in a statement.' 3
The Event (dying) merges exclusively with neither the state of affairs 
nor with the proposition, but rather is the expressed of the proposition 
and the attribute of a state of affairs.13 4 The Event is the frontier 
between words and things and for this reason is defined as something 
aliquid, since it is a composite constituted by two unequal components. 
This duality between bodies and language is reflected on both sides: 
viewed from the side of the thing, this duality is represented as that 
between states of affairs and incorporeal effects; viewed from the 
perspective of language, it becomes a duality between substantives (or 
adjectives) and verbs expressive of pure becomings.
In this manner, Deleuze characterises the event as a double-sided 
entity which does not constitute a unity between the two extreme 
positions. Rather, while partaking of both in unequal proportion, it is 
that by which the two extremes communicate. "We will not ask 
therefore what is the sense of the event: the event is sense itself. The 
event belongs essentially to language; it has an essential relationship 
to language. But language is what is said of things" (LS 22).
However, it is not sufficient to formulate this duality simply in terms 
of bodies and language. Rather, the duality must be developed within 
the proposition itself in order to deepen our understanding of the two 
dimensions constitutive of each term within language: the denotation 
of things (signified) and the expression of a proposition (signifier). 
Sense, Deleuze tells us:
is endowed with an efficacious, impassive, and sterile splendour. This is why we said that 
in fact we can only infer it indirectly, on the basis of the circle where the ordinary 
dimensions of the proposition lead us. It is only by breaking open the  circle, as in the
13 M. Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, p. 173.
14 Note carefully that the Event is the expression of the proposition and attribute of a state of affairs, 
and not the expression of a transcendental ego that would certify an absolute truth.
85
Transcendental Linguistics
case of the Mobius strip, by unfolding and untwisting it, that the dimension o f sense 
appears for itself, in its irreducibility, and also in its genetic power as it animates an a 
priori internal model of the proposition. (LS 20)
Sense is an ideational objective unity, without purely physical or 
psychological existence, as exemplified by the now famous distinction 
between the two noemata; "evening star" and "morning star." A purely 
ideational and intentional correlate of an act of perceiving. The noema 
is a pure event, not given in a perception, yet not existing outside the 
proposition that expresses it. The sense attributable to the two 
concepts “evening star” and “ morning star” is ideal, it functions 
immanently within the two distinct substantive terms. Hence, we can 
"distinguish between green as a sensible colour or quality expressed in 
the substantive form, and 'to  green' as a noematic colour or attribute" 
(LS 21). The event is both sensible and ideal - it is immanent and 
functions a priori from within the dimensions of the proposition and 
states of affairs. The substantive green is a crystallisation of the 
infinitive verb to green; a veritable abstraction from the ideal event of 
greening as expressed by its verb 'to green'. Sense does not exist 
outside the proposition, but is both the expressed of the proposition 
and the attribute of the thing; 'to green' does not have being, but extra­
being; it is not a spatio-temporal realisation, but an incorporeal or 
pure event. For Deleuze, meaning is purely the function of signification 
and from which it extracts its a priori character, whereas sense 
entertains an irreducibly double relation. Unlike Husserl who is at pains 
to prioritise meaning over sense, what Deleuze understands by meaning 
is the purely formal logic of the proposition in general. The two levels 
of sense are accorded a certain participation in the constitution of the 
event: the material is no less important as the subjective. In fact, both 




Sense is never only one of the two term s of the duality which contrasts things and 
propositions, substantives and verbs, denotations and expressions; it is also the 
frontier, the cutting edge, or the articulation of the difference between the tw o terms, 
since it has at its disposal an impenetrability which is its own and within which it is 
reflected. (LS 28).
Sense has its own internal paradoxes, of which Deleuze identifies four, 
namely: the paradox of regress; sterility; neutrality; and absurdity. Let 
us look at each of these in turn: i). Regress - the sense of that which I 
designate is always presupposed. However, since we can never directly 
state the implied sense of that which is being designated, we require 
another designation. And to state the sense of this second designation 
we would need yet another, ad infinitum. This constitutes the “ infinite 
power of language to speak about words” (LS 29). ii). Sterility - in 
relation to bodies sense is sterile, since only bodies act and suffer. 
Moreover, since sense entertains a certain independence from the 
proposition, it suspends the latter's affirmations and negations, iii). 
Neutrality - it  follows that “ [s]ense is s tric tly  the same for 
propositions which are opposed from the point of view of quality, 
quantity, relation, or modality” (LS 32). iv). Absurdity - contradictory 
objects still have a sense (i.e., square-circles) even though they are not 
realisable in a state of affairs: they are “pure, ideational events” (LS 
35).
It is from the paradox of regress that the other paradoxes are derived. 
This paradox is serial by nature; i.e., a series of terms. As we have 
seen, each term itself is constituted upon the dualism of denotation 
and expression. It therefore follows that each base series of terms 
subsumes at least two heterogeneous series, where, the denotation 
functions as the signified  and the expression corresponds to the
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signifier. There is a perpetual relative displacement between signified 
and signifying series, not a pure chaos, but a disequilibrium which is 
oriented toward the signifying series by virtue of the excess which it 
produces over the signified series. However, the heterogeneous series 
do not remain completely isolated from each other, nor wholly unified 
(neither monism nor absolute dualism), but enter into communication 
via an aleatory point which is neither reducible to the signified nor the 
signifying series. Nonetheless, Deleuze tells us:
It circulates w ithout end in both series and, fo r th is  reason, assures their 
communication. It is a two-sided entity, equally present in the signifying and the 
signified series . . . Thus, it is at once word and thing, name and object, sense and 
denotatum, expression and designation, etc. It guarantees, therefore, the convergence of 
the two series which it traverses, but precisely on the condition th a t it makes them 
endlessly diverge. (LS 40)
The paradoxical entity, or esoteric word, as differentiator of the 
heterogeneous series is itself the principle of the emission of 
singularities. This en tity  indicates displacements which are 
essentially indeterminate - that is, aliquid.
2. The second important aspect is Husserl’s commitment to a logical 
ground - that is, Husserl maintains that language essentially has an a 
priori structure. The logical structure of language itself, the way in 
which it is structured gives rise to meaning. Meaning is structure, 
since there exists no deep enunciator in language but only the structure 
of language. In order to emphasise the a priori foundation of language, 
Husserl distinguishes between two kinds of meaning; that is to say, a 
general a priori and a logical a priori of language. The purpose behind 
this distinction is to authorise Husserl’s prioritisation of the logical 
over the general; meaning over sense. As Husserl tells us:
We propose in the interests of distinctness to  favour the word Bedeutung (meaning at the
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conceptual level) when referring to  the old concept, and more particularly in the 
complex speech-form "logical" or “expressive" meaning. We use the word Sinn (Sense 
or Meaning simpliciter) in future, as before, in its  more embracing breadth of 
application.'5
This “more embracing breadth of application” refers to the manner in 
which a sign functions as an indicator of a state of affairs - that is, 
the bracketed matter, but which is not wiped off the phenomenological 
slate.15 6 The difference between sense and meaning is presented as a 
difference between a general structure and a logical structure of 
meaning as such. On the one hand, sense embraces communicative 
speech insofar as it (faithfully) corresponds to a thing or state of 
affairs. On the other hand, meaning is a purely formal structure that is 
identical with itself, and thereby possesses the power of being 
infinitely repeated independently of any state of affairs. It is, 
therefore, capable of presenting itself as identical to like-minded and 
rational persons. As Husserl goes on to tells us:
From the noetic standpoint the rubric "expressing" should indicate a special act-stratum 
to which all other acts must adjust themselves in the ir own way, and with which they 
must blend remarkably in such wise that every noematic act-meaning, and consequently 
the relation to  objectivity which lies in it, stamps itself "conceptually” in the noematic 
phase of the expressing. ' 7
From the point of view of the noetic, meaning possesses a wholly 
sterile or unproductive18 nature in relation to the neutral19 noematic 
sense, since it merely impresses upon the latter the form of its pure 
conceptuality. It is in the special act-stratum “expression” that the 
power of repetition resides. Therefore, there would appear to exist a
15 E. Husserl, Ideas, § 124, p. 346.
16 Ibid, §76, p. 212.
17 Ibid, p. 347.




kind of parallelism between a material or content sense-substratum 
and an ideal or formal meaning-superstratum.2° The superstrata 
constitutes the ideal meaning-form that delineates a general rule of 
logic and under the hegemony of which the noematic sense is 
subjugated. Because of its neutral or passive character, the noematic 
content is reworked into a form which reflects the noetic logico- 
scientific structure. Expression, then, as an act-strata is intended in a 
certain ‘logic’ and possessing an ‘intentional’ character. In the words of 
Husserl:
A peculiar intentional instrument lies before us which essentially possesses the 
outstanding characteristic of reflecting back as from a mirror every other intentionality 
according to  its form and content, of copying it whilst colouring it in its  own way, and 
thereby of working into it its own form of "conceptuality".20 1
That is to say, expression is an intentional act that ‘expresses’ 
meaning. On the other hand, ‘ indication’ corresponds to the material 
side of the ‘expressed’ intention, insofar that a state o f affairs is 
denoted by a sign. Essentially, Husserl is making a distinction between 
form and content: the content is the sense which will be reworked by 
the meaning-form. Moreover, form enjoys, within the sphere of 
meaning, a certain prioritisation over content - a pre-eminence which 
affirms his desire to establish a theory of pure meaning-forms that 
would be wholly scientific. Husserlean phenomenology therefore 
reveals its orientation toward a pure formalism. This formalism is 
what introduces a certain telos into phenomenology in the form of the a 
priori motif. This form-content dualism is brought together in an 
encounter through the peculiar intentional instrument he calls
20 However, as Husserl cautions us, “we should not hold too hard by the metaphor of stratification: 
expression is not of the nature of an overlayed varnish or covering garment; it is a mental (geistige) 
formation, which exercises new intentional influences (Funktionen) on the intentional substratum and 
experiences from the latter correlative intentional influences.” (Ibid, p. 349).
21 Ibid, p. 347-48.
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expression. But this tripartite model requires further elucidation since 
expression itself appears as a double-sided entity. In relation to sense 
it is an indicator; in relation to meaning it becomes the expression of a 
pure logical grammar. As Husserl tells us:
So far we have considered expressions as used in communication, which last depends 
essentially on the fact that they operate indicatively. But expressions also play a great 
part in uncommunicated, interior mental life . . .  A word only ceases to  be a word when 
our interest stops at its sensory contour, when it becomes a mere sound-pattern. But 
when we live in the understanding of a word, it expresses something and the same thing, 
whether we address it to  anyone or not.
It seems clear, therefore, that an expression's meaning, and whatever else pertains to  
it essentially, cannot coincide with its feats of intimation.22
It follows that the expression does not require to be signified - that is, 
along with Frege, Husserl affirms the possibility of meaning without a 
referent. The proposition 'Sis P’ has meaning but lacks a referent: it is 
purely formal. We must not understand by this that it would be possible 
to totally separate sense from meaning - admittedly a view Husserl 
affirms in the Ideas - since, as he tells us:
If I am right, it is o f basic importance for linguistic investigations that they should 
become clear as to  the  distinctions provisionally shadowed fo rth  here. They should 
possess themselves o f the insight that the foundations of speech are not only to  be found 
in physiology, psychology and the history of culture, but also in the a priori. The latter 
deals with the essential meaning-forms and their a priori laws o f compounding or 
modification, and no speech is conceivable that is not in part essentially determined by 
this a priori. . . . [W ]ith in  pure logic one must separate o ff what, considered in itself, 
forms the first, basic sphere, the pure theory of meaning-forms. Considered from the 
standpoint of grammar, it must lay bare an ideal framework which each actual language 
will fill up and clothe differently, In deference either to  common human motives or to 
empirical motives tha t vary at random.2 3
What exactly, then, does Husserl mean by the distinction between the 
general and the logical a priori? In the Logical Investigations IV, §10, 
Husserl describes the manner in which individual meanings are subject
22 E. Husserl, Logical Investigations I, § 8, pp. 278-79.
23 Ibid, §14, pp. 525-26.
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to a priori laws governing the combinations that they form between 
themselves during the process of constructing new meanings. That is, 
since combinations cannot be formed in a totally free and independent 
manner, there must exist categories which set a priori limits in 
relation to the number of possible combinatorial forms. “Wherever, 
therefore,” Husserl tells us; “we see the impossibility o f combining 
given meanings, this impossibility points to an unconditional general 
law to the effect that meanings belonging to corresponding meaning- 
categories, and conforming to the same pure forms, should lack a 
unified result.”24 That is to say, constituent elements belonging to 
incompatible categories brought into a combination by means of a 
purely formal logic - i.e., of the form 'S is  P’ - while the grammar of 
the proposition holds good, its sense vanishes by virtue of the natural 
non-correspondence between the signs and the material objects that 
the signs represent. This incompatibility Husserl calls ‘nonsense’ in 
order to distinguish it, on the material side of the existential dynamic, 
from sense. In short, S and P cannot stand for any object; it is 
necessary that a natural correspondence should exist between the 
objects referred to in the proposition. When this general a priori law is 
violated false propositions result. Nonetheless, the abstracted logical a 
priori form ‘S is P’, as a pure grammatical law holds true in every case 
- that is, the principles governing the combinatorial forms pertaining 
to the logical a priori enjoy a certain independence from those that rule 
over the general a priori. Therefore, Husserl tells us; “every concrete 
meaning represents a fitting together of materials and forms, that each 
such meaning falls under an ideal pattern that can be set forth in 
formal purity, and that to each such pattern an a priori law of meaning
24 Ibid, §10, p. 511.
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corresponds.”25 The distinction, then, between the general and the 
logical corresponds to what Husserl elsewhere calls the ‘material 
specificity of meaning’ and the ‘form-theory of meaning’. 
Incompatibilities, therefore, within the domain of sense, are the result 
of an ungrammatical combination of linguistic elements which present 
the proposition in the form of an un-unified or disparate meaning, e.g., 
‘a round or’, ‘a man and is’ etc.. But this is not the case for what 
Husserl calls absurd propositions, an example of which would be ‘a 
square circle’, ‘wooden iron’. In this instance the grammatical form is 
correct and produces a unified meaning or sense, even though no state 
of affairs corresponds to the proposition. Nonetheless it testifies to an 
ideal meaning. The difference between nonsense and absurdity, Husserl 
tells us, is:
In the one case certain partial meanings fail to  assort together in a unity o f meaning as 
far as the objectivity or truth  of the to ta l meaning is concerned . . .  In the other case the 
possibility of a unitary meaning itse lf excludes the possible coexistence of certain 
partial meanings in itself . . . The judgment of incompatibility is in one case connected 
with ideas, in another with objects; ideas of ideas enter the former unity o f judgment, 
whereas plain ideas enter the latter.26
We must not assume that the pure logical grammar responsible for the 
production of meaning within absurd propositions is absolutely 
separable from the grammatical rules governing the sphere of 
communicative speech, but rather see in the pure logico-grammatology 
a geological, historical and cultural infection. Nonetheless, an 
essential difference does emerge from the distinction: the difference 
between independent and non-independent meanings. The task for 
Husserl, therefore, is to; “ fix the primitive forms o f independent 
meanings, o f complete propositions with their internal articulations,
25 Ibid, §10, p. 513.
26 Ibid, §12. p. 517.
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and the structures contained in such articulations."27 To each of these 
independent meanings there corresponds a constitutive a priori law. 
Nonsense is deviant, therefore, from the pure theory of forms, whereas 
absurdity is not. In this sense, the pure formal logic holds itself aloof 
from the four types of logical proposition: connective, conjunctive, 
disjunctive and hypothetical. The latter Deleuze interprets in terms of 
the ‘forced movement’ or creative dynamic intrinsic to systems in 
general. The a priori therefore corresponds to nothing less than the 
“ intrinsic essence of meanings, and is seen from this essence with 
apodictic evidence.” 28 29There’s the rub. In relation to meaning, that 
which is intrinsic to a system, body or proposition is not disparate but 
unified and true. Therefore, in “ the a priori which has its roots purely 
in the generic essence of meaning as such . . .  we recognise the 
undoubted soundness of the idea of a universal grammar” 29 that would 
be wholly rational and capable of transgressing all racial, tribal and 
cultural boundaries. Thus, from the above analysis we will focus on two 
aspects of Husserl's phenomenology: the form-content dualism, and the 
logico-a priori motif so dear to phenomenology.
a). As we have seen, Husserl proposed a kind of parallelism between 
meaning and sense. Essentially, the notion of a “ psychophysical 
parallelism” in Husserl takes a Cartesian orientation, in tha t pure 
intentionality, constituted as it is by an ideal objectivity, is not solely 
mental, but is nonetheless an a priori form graspable only within 
consciousness. That is, thinking and ultimately meaning are orientated 
toward the subjective pole of the dualism. Deleuze’s understanding of 
parallelism differs slightly, in that the emphasis is shifted away from
27 Ibid, §13, p. 519.
28 Ibid, §14, p. 523.
29 Ibid, p. 524.
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the heights of meaning and orientated toward the surface which 
corresponds to sense. The psychical and the physical come together in 
what he calls an encounter: this encounter, or event is what constitutes 
sense. In this respect, Deleuze’s understanding of parallelism employs 
the so-called ‘bracketed’ content, to a far greater extent, thus allowing 
him to intitate a material dynamic genesis that would constitute a 
parallel with a psychical static genesis. In actual fact, the relation 
between the two is always asymmetrical and unequal. The logical a 
priori of meaning-forms are discarded, or rather understood purely in 
terms of signification in general. The logic now becomes, as the title 
suggests, The Logic o f Sense.
In Deleuze's Foucault we find a similar gesture being attributed to the 
eponym of tha t work, but this time articulated in terms of a 
parallelism between what Foucault calls non-discursive and discursive 
formations. In order to elaborate this distinction, let us call the non- 
discursive formation an extrinsic  material substratum constituted by 
visibilities: that is, 'things' or states of affairs. Whereas, the 
discursive formation is an ideal intrinsic superstratum constituted by 
articulabilities: that is, concepts, propositions, and language in general 
which signify states of affairs. Extrinsicality and intrinsicality - 
contingent and essential - are here implied in relation to 
intentionality. However, there is a third component, what Foucault 
calls the ‘statement’, and what Deleuze names the Event. The statement 
is that which, in a certain sense, precedes both non-discursive and 
discursive formations, allows for a relation to arise between the two 
extremes, and which is defined as "a multiplicity that passes through 
all levels and 'cuts across a domain of structures and possible unities, 
and which reveals them, with concrete contents, in time and space'" (FU 
14-5). Statements are transversal lines of variation productive of both
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visibilities and articulabilities. In a certain sense, the statement is 
neither intrinsic nor extrinsic, but outside: an outside which is at the 
same time the profoundest interiority. This ‘outside’ is immanent in 
the sense that it is universally pervading - that is, it has existence 
beyond the limits of intentionality. Now, in order for sense to emerge 
there must arise an encounter between a non-discursive and a 
discursive formation, and the means by which both communicate their 
respective essences is via the statement.30 But since the statement 
itself is defined in terms of a virtual multiplicity which is neither a 
visibility nor an articulability, no direct causal relation or 
correspondence can exist between them: both extremes remain 
essentially irreducible to each other.
The non-discursive formation, therefore, defines a visible content that 
corresponds to  the element which Husserl indicated through the notion 
of a ‘bracketed’ material substratum of raw phenomenological 
perception, whereas the discursive formation corresponds to the form  
of what he has designated as the expressive superstratum which is 
wholly logico-mathematical. It is as though the model, through 
Foucault, has been stretched to embrace the material dimension given 
to us through sensibility - that is to say, the brackets have been 
removed and a certain ‘continuation’ between the material and the 
phenomenological inaugurated. A demarcation or limit inherent within 
phenomenological methodology has been transgressed, to the effect 
that the phenomenological plain is flooded with an autonomous - in 
relation to an ‘outside’ of the intentional gaze - material dynamic. 
Moreover, we are all part of this dynamic, constituted by it and wholly
30 By this concept of 'communication' we do not merely refer to its linguistic connotations, but use it in 
the wider application - that is to say: to give a share of; to impart; to reveal; to bestow; as a means of 
passage between, etc.. In this sense, communication constitutes the ‘new’ community and commune 
- its relevance to the emerging communications environment is plain.
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immersed: it is impossible to grasp it from a detached point of view. 
We are part of the universe as it is a part of us; we pass through it as 
it passes through us - within the domain of the ‘outside’ “ I” and “ it” 
have no points of reference, they are wholly meaningless. In this 
respect, a proposition can be apodictically true in relation to the 
logical a priori, since even absurd propositions are grammatically 
correct, but a proposition can never be determined as being necessarily 
true in relation to its referent. That a proposition fails to correspond 
to that which it is a proposition of, defines a proposition, as we have 
seen, as ‘nonsense’. It must follow that all propositions contain an 
element of nonsense - that is to say, sense is always co-present with 
its own nonsense. In Husserlean phenomenology, therefore, truth or the 
meaning-forms are wholly abstract: they are what Deleuze elsewhere 
refers to as a transcendental illusion. The process by which visibilities 
and articulabilities are related through an irreducible communication 
is given over to the power of the “subjectification of the subject” 31 in 
general: it follows from what has been said above that this power 
cannot be a wholly intentional or conscious process.
Therefore, what Deleuze discovers in Foucault, specifically in
31 In Deleuze's work Foucault, we find that knowledge is constituted upon an irreducible non- 
correspondance between the two forms of visibilities and articulabilities. These formalised strata trace 
lines of light and articulable curves through transcendental points, which entertain relations amongst 
themselves, and which relations define power. These relations of power are outside and irreducible to 
the forms of knowledge. A problem arises: it is the impasse in which power situates us, since if power 
is productive of truth, where may we locate a truth that would resist power. “This could be resolved 
only if the outside were caught up in a movement that would snatch it away from the void and pull it 
back from death" (FU 96). This condition is provided by the outside itself whose movement is one of 
spontaneous folding, unfolding and refolding. This movement overcomes the impasse by producing 
an inside which is not a subjective interiority, but rather, The inside of the outside” (FU 97) as the 
process of subjectivation which is independent from the relations of power and the forms of 
knowledge. What is folded is not the One but the Other. "It is not a reproduction of the Same, but a 
repetition of the Different” (FU 98). Folding back the outside upon itself by means of a series of 
practical exercises, the Ancient Greeks produced a relation to oneself, that is, ‘a relation which force 
has with itself, a power to affect Itself, an affect of self on self" (FU 101), that is constitutive of a space 
wherein subjectivity enjoys an independence from both force and form. In this sense, the struggle for 
subjectification reveals itself as the exigency of difference and metamorphosis.
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Discipline and Punish, is a critique of the form-content opposition, and 
a substituting of it  by the expression-content distinction. The 
opposition between expression and content is no longer characterised 
in terms of a transcendent distinction, but rather is defined in purely a 
formal fashion. Why formal? Because, for Deleuze, both expression and 
content possess form; this has the consequence of multiplying form 
twofold: once in the visibilities and once again in the articulabilities. 
Taking the penal system as an example: On the one hand, from the 
perspective of a visibility, Deleuze tells us that the form o f content 
would be a 'prison', as an environmental formation: a 'thing', and the 
content the 'prisoner' himself. "But this thing or form does not refer 
back to a 'word' designating it, or a signifier for which it would be the 
signified. It refers to completely different words and concepts, such as 
'delinquency' or 'delinquent', which express a new way of articulating 
infractions, sentences and their subjects" (FU 31, modified). These 
“different words and concepts” have more in common with verbs than 
with substantives, and correspond to what Deleuze calls an ideal event. 
On the other hand, from the perspective of articulabilities, penal law 
"is a system of language that classifies and translates offences and 
calculates sentences" (FU 32). The form of expression of penal law, the 
written codes, are capable o f authentically articulating and 
indefinitely repeating a category of object which has been classified 
delinquent: this is the function of conceptuality or language in general. 
The expression itself in the instance of this articulability, would be, 
for example, the classification of the object "leprosy" as an historical 
example of delinquency. As Deleuze tells us:
Form here can have two meanings: it forms or organises matter; or it forms or finalises 
functions and gives them aims. Not only the prison but the hospital, the school, the 
barracks and the  workshop are formed matter. Punishment is a formalised function, as
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is care, education, train ing, or enforced work. The fact is tha t there is a kind of 
correspondence between them, even though the two forms are irreducible (in fact, care 
was not the function o f the  seventeenth-century hospital and the penal law in the 
eighteenth-century does not refer essentially to  prison). (FU 33)
What are the implications which follow on from this critique of the 
form-content opposition for Husserlean phenomenology? In Deleuze, 
both the extreme poles of content and expression have form. Form no 
longer functions as an ideal superstratum that impresses its originary 
logicality upon a material content, but is grasped purely in terms of an 
ideal abstraction. Between the two forms there exists a 'mutual 
presupposition', but no conformity. The two irreducible forms come 
together in an "encounter" which does not constitute an unity, in the 
monist sense of the word, but a virtual multiplicity of divergent forces 
which cannot be resolved into an identity: the statement. However, 
multiplicity does exhibit an unity that gives itself to  us as an essence: 
an Event.
The first consequence, which we have already articulated above, is to 
shift the notion of meaning away from a conscious or ideal orientation, 
where Husserl had located it, to an essentially transformative domain 
which lies “between” the two extreme poles; where it is understood in 
terms of sense. In actual fact, the third domain is both immanent and 
transcendent to both extremes: it is transcendent with respect to 
knowledge, and immanent with respect to materiality. Sense, which 
belongs to the surface, is a Heraclitan pacifier. "What are we to call 
this philosophical operation, insofar as it opposes at once Platonic 
conversion and pre-Socratic subversion? Perhaps we can call it 
"perversion," which at least befits the system of provocations of this 
new type of philosopher - if it is true that perversion implies an
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extraordinary art of surfaces" (LS 1 33).32
The second consequence subverts the concept of phenomenon, perhaps 
even phenomenology itself, since a phenomenon can no longer be 
conceived in terms of an appearance, but rather, purely in terms of a 
sign. An ‘appearance’ is always an appearing to someone capable of 
recognising it: appearance presupposes both a fixed subject of 
interpretation and a concrete object capable of being viewed from 
various perspectives, but which ultimately possesses one essential 
form. On the one hand, for Kant a phenomenon is an object capable of 
being interpreted through categories, for this reason, the task set 
phenomenology by Husserl was an a p rio ri investigation of 
'conceptuality' in general and the meanings common to the thought of 
different minds. On the other hand, a sign is essentially inadequate 
with respect to producing a consensus of meaning between like-minded 
persons, as well as lacking in the possibility of a thorough 
interpretation by means of categories.
In order to further explicate the Deleuzean subversion of the
phenomenon, let us take the example from the point of view of the
production of art in general. The modern conception of the work o f art
characterises it as a creative and experimental process of 'producing'
signs. Production of this kind does not predetermine the outcome o f its
experimentations with reference to preestablished truths, but rather,
as in the manner of Paul Klee and John Cage, allows the subconscious
forces to take possession of the productive process, as well as inviting
chance factors to influence its outcome. This attitude necessarily
implies a certain ecstatic death of Self. As J. London tells us:
32 What is meant here by perversion? We will illustrate this by means of an example: The kana for 
Yakuza is made up of three numbers, eight, nine and three, totalling twenty: twenty corresponds to a 
losing number in Japanese gambling. It is out of a perverse pride that the Japanese gangster has 




There is an ecstasy that marks the summit of life, and beyond which life cannot rise. And 
such is the paradox of living, this ecstasy comes when one is most alive, and it comes as a 
complete forgetfulness that one is alive. This ecstasy, this forgetfulness of living, comes 
to the artist, caught up and out of himself in a sheet of flame; it comes to  the soldier,
war-mad on a stricken field and refusing quarter.33
The origin of the work of art can only be understood as a seeming unity 
constituted upon an essential and originary disparity - a heterogeneity 
which excludes the Self - that remains eternally incommensurable with 
its formal actualisation(s). This unity, which Deleuze articulates in 
terms of essences,34 is a kind of 'superior perspective’ or principle of 
individuation, signifying both the birth of the world as well as its 
original character. In terms of a specific example, Picasso’s Les 
Demoiselles d ’Avignon, would correspond to this method of production. 
This painting employs both a fluid and flattened space which 
eliminates narrative in favour of the pure stylisation of its figures. 
These figures are fragmented and fuse within themselves a 
multiplicity of perspectives in one ‘superior perspective’ (the 
beginnings of Cubism). As a whole, Les Demoiselles is openly 
heterogeneous rather than homogeneous in its being, in that it invites 
us to witness differences in style without resolving them, even while 
the composition as a whole works wonderfully, to the effect that all 
the figures are harmonised into a portrayal of perverted desire. This 
work can in no way be understood as a mirror of the world or nature, it 
is purely a sign representing one of many possible ways of 
representing. As Deleuze writes, not with reference to this painting:
Thus the entire problem of objectivity, like that of unity, is displaced in what we must 
call a 'modern' fashion, essential to  modern literature. Order has collapsed, as much in
33 J. London, The Call of the Wild, p. 36.




the states of the world which were supposed to  reproduce it as in the essences or Ideas 
which were supposed to  inspire it. The world has become crumbs and chaos. Precisely 
because reminiscence proceeds from subjective associations to  an originating viewpoint, 
objectivity can no longer exist except in the work of art: it no longer exists in significant 
content as states of the world, nor in ideal signification as stable essence, but solely in 
the signifying formal structure o f the work, in its style. (PS 98-9)
“Internationalism,” the aspiration of post-war Modernism which sought 
to bridge racial, ethnic and class barriers by means of the inauguration 
of a global rational matrix: i.e.,Esperanto, ultimately falls short of its 
ideal. The possibility of a universal language between like minded 
persons is simply not realisable. If we begin from the hypothesis of 
difference in itself, everything is singularised, become univocal or 
unilateral. The rationality behind the hypothesis demands we pursue 
difference to its logical conclusion: no reconciliation, and no universal. 
History is always a process of conquest, subjugation and assimilation; 
today we are all too aware of this tyranny, thus our aim is to construct 
a social milieu constituted upon racial and cultural differences without 
attempting to homogenise; to accept difference and live within 
difference. This constitutes the exigency to  which we must now 
respond. Language is not a purely rational matrix; desire lies at its 
foundations, and with desire we have instinct, and with instinct we 
have genetics. Individual genetic difference influencing how each of us 
interprets and understands the world. Likewise, as we see with Les 
Demoiselles, which is productive of an irreducible multiplicity of 
languages and modes of communication, such an homogenising 
aspiration proves futile. Physical death is perhaps the most powerful 
empathic emotion, but even this is too soon forgotten, while the death 
drive remains for us an ideal to aspire toward. Essentially, signs like 
life envelopes an irreconcilable disparity that requires interpretation 
and infinite hermenutical praxis. Thus, Deleuze tells us,
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we must be Egyptologists. For there are no mechanical laws between things, nor 
voluntary communications between minds. Everything is implicated, everything is 
complicated, everything is sign, meaning, essence. Everything exists in those obscure 
zones which we penetrate as into crypts, in order to  decipher hieroglyphs and secret 
languages. The Egyptologist, in all things, is the man who undergoes an initiation - the 
apprentice. (PS 91)
Signs are the product of an encounter between heterogeneous elements; 
we arrange signs in patterns or forms which constitute a narrative; 
this narrative is re-channeled into the interpretation of signs that will 
become new signs. Everything works on the model of a feedback loop in 
which we ‘sing’ ourselves into existence. In this respect, there is no 
distinction - except perhaps a geopolitical one - in the manner in which 
the Australian Aboriginal “songlines” function in the production of 
cultural, social, tribal and individual identity, and the way in which the 
Western World produces its own identity. Essentially, mankind dreams 
itself into existence.
A fundamental distinction lies at the heart of this theory. Science - the 
physico-chemical explanation of the universe - prioritises intellect- 
form over intuitive-force, in so far that it is an intellectual discipline 
with the aim of apprehending explicit relations and significations. The 
intuitive, that is, art and literature correspond to a certain antilogos 
and intuitive praxis, nourished by the secret interpretation of the 
implicit meanings in signs (Implicit meaning, here, does not signify a 
universal form, but a particular and individual subconscious desire). 
Bergson's wish, in Creative Evolution, is that philosophy undergo a new 
renaissance, wherein it will begin to incorporate in equal measure both 
tendencies immanent to life: intellect and intuition. For Bergson, this 
interpenetration and communication between the intellectual and 
intuitive represents the next stage in the evolutionary process; a
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process that consciousness will actualise beyond the evolution of 
cerebral matter. Man, by means of the intellect, has brought matter 
under his control, but this to the expense of the intuitive half, “which 
hangs limp and lifeless from his body like a deformed and neglected 
limb.” The whole function of the intellect is to separate, to analysis, to 
make into discontinuous and disparate elements which are then 
categorised, classified, and systematised, giving rise, in its turn, to a 
concrete network of formulae as explanation and knowledge. Intuition, 
on the other hand, is one with the synthesis of life, a tension which 
binds the trillions of matter-particles in a Whole that is greater than 
the parts. But the Whole must incorporate time - that is to say, it is 
necessarily historical. The past is preserved in its entirety and co­
exists with the present, both are contracted into an infinitesimal point 
which is projected into the future, thus constituting the non-linear 
time of Aion, which we do not think but live. This permanence of the 
past, as a whole, which grows without ceasing and is continually 
hanging over the present is what constitutes what Bergson calls 
duration. Thus, every present - since the past is continually adding new 
experience to itself, which it preserves, the whole of which leans upon 
the present, and where both past and present combined constitute the 
future - is an absolutely new moment, a repetition of the present as 
Different not Same. The whole therefore is not the principle of 
multiplicity but its ‘e ffect’; only the formal structure of the work of 
art - its logic on the surface of sense - serves as a unity. In this 
capacity the topological surfaces encountered in the novels by A. 
Robbe-Grillet are exemplary; they are neither allegorical nor 
psychological but objective: the point, the line and the plane.35 Perhaps 
the task assigned philosophy in general is to bridge the divide between 
3SC.f„ A. Robbe-Grillet, Jealousy.
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these two disciplines. We are certainly unable to put all our faith in 
language alone, since language is not merely a container of a rational 
matrix. There is therefore a necessity for an alliance between language 
and the intuition of the philosopher-artist.
The unity of the work of art is also described by Deleuze in terms of 
ideal events, or rather, the Event in which all event subsist. As an 
illustration of the wholeness of an ideal event let us contemplate 
death. The transversality immanent to the transcendental Event is 
nothing other than the 'death drive' which constitutes man's ultimate 
experience and from which all real futural living and questioning 
arises. The unity of an event can be articulated in terms of a near­
death experience, in which the person in danger can sometimes 
recapitulate the whole of their life within an instant of time, and from 
which is extracted the meaning and essence of that single life. Since, if 
they are fortunate enough to survive the experience, their life generally 
takes on a completely new trajectory: the born-again Christian. The 
essence, grasped as a sign in its unitary form, both contextualises and, 
in a certain sense, predetermines all the particular experiences which 
go to make up the life as a whole. Essence precedes the particular 
elements as an afterthought. However, paradoxically, the meaning and 
essence of a singular life is the effect of the causal elements which 
constitute that life. Nevertheless, the transcendental whole is always 
more than its immanent constituent parts; i t  is all perspectives given 
at once, in an instant, as epiphany; a real event which presupposes the 
death of Self, World and God. But this death must not be understood in 
terms of a return to animality, as Bataille36 would have us believe, 
which radically opposes the rational human to the animal - attaining 
the latter by transgressing the former. For Deleuze, stupidity does not
36 G Bataille, Madame Edwarda, pp. 135-160.
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imply animality, since the death drive is neutral not polarised, 
erogenous not sexual. Besides the anthropomorphism and metaphysics 
inherent in such binary oppositions characteristic to Western thought, 
transgression itself as a possibility is impossible. For the simple 
reason, that by an act o f transgressing we appropriate that which is 
beyond the possible, in this case impossibility. But if it is truly 
impossible, then the transgression of all possibility and the 
appropriation of the impossible must itself be impossible. Thus, 
transgression as experience is impossible. Perhaps there is nothing at 
all to transgress; everything is given, everything is present on the 
surface of a cosmic Mobius strip which generates an illusion of depth. 
The notion of a primary depth is merely the final trace of identity 
thinking; the secret centre which silently determines all the parts and 
into which the mystic desires to pass.
b). As we have seen, sense is constituted by two heterogeneous 
dimensions. On the one hand, grasped from the material perspective of 
corporeal mixtures of which it is an effect, sense is impassive in 
relation to the states of affairs and neutral in relation to the 
proposition.37 On the other hand, viewed from the subjective 
perspective of incorporality, sense enjoys a certain autonomy by virtue 
of the associations tha t exist between the incorporeal effects 
themselves. The genetic element responsible for this autonomy is the 
paradoxical element or aleatory point, which produces and distributes 
sense at the surface. This veritable production and distribution makes 
sense itself something productive, since the genetic element is 
bequeathed to both the states of affairs of which sense is an attribute 
and the proposition of which sense is an expression. Since sense is both 37
37 This neutrality is exemplified by the  fact tha t the notion of "square-circles” , fo r example, 
still possess a sense even if they lacks an objective correspondence.
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material and subjective, it is necessarily paradoxical in essence. And if 
it is paradoxical, sense must, Deleuze affirms entertain a co-presence 
with its own nonsense. Thus, nonsense is the quasi-cause of sense that 
ensures the latter's autonomy. Sense is both impassive-neutral and 
productive, therefore, Deleuze asks:
How are we to  reconcile the logical principle, according to  which a false proposition has 
a sense (so that sense as a condition of tru th  remains indifferent to  both the true and the 
false), and the no less certain transcendental principle according to  which a proposition 
always has the truth, the part and kind o f tru th  which it merits, and which belongs to  it 
according to  its sense? (LS 96)
This paradox constitutes the opposition between formal and 
transcendental logic, the reconciliation of which is only possible 
within an impersonal and pre-individual transcendental field which is 
wholly unformed. But why an unformed field?
Husserl distinguishes between sense and expression. Noematic sense is 
the material aspect of meaning and corresponds to that which is 
perceived. Noetic expression is the a priori, logico-mathematical form 
which "stamps" sense with its conceptuality. That is, expression 
corresponds to the transcendental core which constitutes the meaning 
intrinsic to sense. Moreover, the core of sense "is nothing other than 
the relation between sense itself and the object in its reality" (LS 97). 
This core of sense corresponds to the genetic moment which bestows 
upon sense its autonomy, while paradoxically establishing it as an 
effect of a corporeal mixture. Taking Husserl to task, Deleuze tells us: 
"But the Husserlean genesis seems to be a slight-of-hand. For the 
nucleus has indeed been determined as attribute; but the attribute is 
understood as predicate and not as verb, that is, as concept and not as 
event" (Ibid). The predicate possesses an identity which it owes to the 
domain of conscious representation, and therefore cannot be tru ly
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transcendental. Whereas the verb is unformed and lacks individuation. 
Therefore, by virtue of sense's autonomy, false propositions have a 
sense, and by virtue of sense's correspondence with objectivity, a 
proposition always has the truth it merits. By understanding the core of 
sense in terms of predicates and concepts, Husserl was able to 
postulate a logical a priori structure of language. But by determining it 
as verb and event, Deleuze establishes a co-presence of sense with 
nonsense, collapses languages supposedly logical foundation and 
inaugurates the primacy of paradox and play. For this reason, Deleuze 
proposes a formal logic of sense. The Husserlean distinction between 
nonsense and absurdity, becomes one between that which obeys the 
logic of signification in general and that which doesn’t. There is no 
transcendental logic; no deep structure - everything that happens 
occurs on the surface. In this respect, we employ the concept of 
‘nonsense’ not in its Husserlean sense, but to affirm the purely 
disparate as the only depth out of which sense is produced. Sense is 
structured difference.
But how does the disparate transcendental field come to be structured? 
For there to be a structure, Deleuze tells us, there must exist at least 
two heterogeneous series. Moreover, each of these series, which itself 
is constituted by terms that differ in nature from the terms of the 
other series - material and subjective - emit a distribution of singular 
points which correspond to the values of the differential relations 
between the terms of each series. Hence, there are two distributions of 
singularities which correspond to a base series of names: the material 
distribution and the linguistic distribution. Moreover, each singularity 
extends itself out to the vicinity of another singularity, thereby 
forming sub-series. That is to say, the base series diverge, while the 
singularities which form the sub-series converge. The distribution of
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the singularities which corresponds to the two heterogeneous series - 
signifier and signified - are distinguished only by their distribution. 
However, the moment that the series are traversed by the paradoxical 
element, they undergo a displacement which brings the two series of 
singular points into resonance. In this manner singularities, as events, 
"communicate in one and the same Event which endlessly redistributes 
them, while their transformations form a h is to ry  (LS 53). Thus, 
Deleuze tells us:
They have . . .  an eternal truth, and their time is never the present which realises them 
and makes them exist. Rather, it is the unlimited Aion, the infinitive in which they 
subsist and insist. Events are the only idealities. To reverse Platonism is firs t and 
foremost to  remove essences and to  substitute events in the ir place as je ts  of 
singularities, (LS 53).
The mode of the event is the problematic; a problematic field which is 
determined by the distribution of singular points which express its 
conditions. The "problem" must not be confused with either a subjective 
category nor an imperfection in the method of knowledge, but as that 
which should be understood as being the "very object of the Idea" (LS 
54). The Idea is no longer conceived in terms of ideal Platonic Forms, 
but rather events are the only idealities. The problem therefore is 
essentially subconscious. From the perspective of an inquisitory mind, 
the problem "expresses the objective equilibrium of a mind situated in 
front of the horizon of what happens or appears" (LS 57). The mind 
grasps the problematic in the form of an Idea, and the question which is 
addressed to this field is determined by the paradoxical element. "This 
paradoxical instance is the Event in which all events communicate and 
are distributed" (LS 56). In short, events are distributions of 
singularities in a problematic field which bestows a totality or whole 
by means of the the resonance subsisting between singularities. The
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function of the paradoxical element consists in its potential of 
invention.
The paradoxical entity is likened by Deleuze to an ideal game which 
lacks preexisting categorical rules; a nonsense game in which chance is 
ramified to the nth degree. The time of nonsense is not the time of the 
present, but rather, it is the non-linear time of Aion in which the pure 
becoming of the past-future infinitive subsists, subdividing each 
present ad infinitum while stretching it out over the straight line of 
the labyrinth. It is this straight-line time that corresponds to the time 
of events. "Each event is the smallest time, smaller than the minimum 
of continuous thinkable time, because it is divided into proximate past 
and immanent future. But it is also the longest time, longer than the 
maximum of continuous thinkable time because it is endlessly 
subdivided by the Aion which renders it equal to its own unlimited line" 
(LS 63).
The paradoxical entity therefore is at once both word and thing, and 
possesses the power of saying its own sense. As esoteric word, 
nonsense enacts both a determination of signification and a denotation 
of sense. It is productive, and what it produces is sense itself. This 
production of sense is enacted by the circulation of the paradoxical 
entity throughout the series. This makes sense an effect of resonance, 
produced and distributed over the entire surface while maintaining an 
essential coextensiveness with its own cause. As Deleuze tells us: 
"Nonsense is that which has no sense, and that which, as such and as it 
enacts the denotation of sense, it is opposed to the absence of sense. 
This is what we must understand by nonsense" (LS 71).
By means of an example, Sydney Pollock’s film The Yakuza proves itself 
more than adequate, specifically the manner in which a certain 
ideogram operates within it, mimicking traditional values of Japanese
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culture. In actual fact, without this ideogram there would be no film, 
since all the divergent series which constitute it are brought into 
resonance around the ideogram, and from which the bestowal of sense 
is effected upon the distinct elements and scenes of the movie. The 
ideogram itself is called Michi and is interpreted as possessing various 
meanings such as, "a road, a path in the country, duty, obligation, and 
even God." The function of this ideogram is to produce an ethics 
wherein its crowning principle is sort through a total responsibility 
towards one's actions, since, as is postulated, it is only by paying one's 
own debts and discharging one's own obligations that one becomes and 
is recognised as a true (wo)man. The functioning of Giri,38 meaning 
obligation, within the structure of Japanese ethics confuses the young 
American gangster, who consequently asks the Katana master why it is 
that they follow such a strict code of obedience when they neither 
believe in God nor in an afterlife where one's actions would be 
rewarded or punished according to a system of moral meritocracy. The 
swordsman answers paradoxically: it is Giri itself - that is, Giri is its 
own reason, or as Deleuze says; " it speaks its own sense". As such, it 
does not depend upon the propositional logic of signification, 
manifestation, and denotation, rather it functions immanently and 
requires no extra term or justifying principle. Michi therefore is a 
paradoxical element that traverses all the series producing 
ramifications of displacements and resonances between disjunctions. 
From this analysis we conclude that the structure of language is not 
fundamentally logically a priori, but rather, paradoxical and 
nonsensical. 38
38 The functioning of the ideogram "Michi” and “Giri” appear interchangeable within the film. More 
than likely Giri is the concept for obligation, whereas Michi has a far wider extensivity, and thereby 
pertains properly to the paradoxical element.
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3. Husserl is committed to a project whose task is to uncover the 
foundational apodictic truths which supposedly constitute the essence 
of the world. From the natural standpoint, Husserl tells us:
Evidence is, in an extremely broad sense, an ‘experiencing’ of something that is, and is 
thus; it is precisely a mental seeing of something itself . . . Perfect evidence and its 
correlate, pure and genuine truth, are given as ideas lodged in the striv ing for 
knowledge, for the fulfilment of one's meaning intention. By immersing ourselves in 
such a striving, we can extract those ideas from it. 39
This pure and genuine truth is not individual and contingent, but rather 
generic and necessary. For Husserl particular truths must attach 
themselves to a self-sufficient foundation that is purely eidetic. As we 
have seen, this essence or eidos is expressed by predicates and 
concepts.
An individual object is not simply and quite generally an individual, a 'th is-there ' 
something unique, but being constituted thus and thus 'in-itself' it has its own proper 
mode of being, its own supply of essential predicables which must qualify it (qua“ Being 
as it is in itself” ), if other secondary relative determinations are to  qualify it also.««
This 'proper mode of being' - given by Husserl in the sense of a 
substantive: “ as it is in itself” - is grasped, according to Husserl, by 
means of the phenomenological reduction which 'suspends' the material 
aspect of the phenomenological gaze, and thereby attests to the pure 
meaning-forms that manifest apodictic evidences. To achieve this, we 
must ‘bracket out’ or clear our phenomenological field of operation 
from any preconceived ideas, previously accepted standards and 
methods, and untested premises which would condition or prejudice our 
findings beforehand. For Husserl, the empirical sciences lack this 
phenomenological rigour and, therefore, lack apodictic certainty. The 
empirical sciences are founded upon historical layers of theoretical 3940
39 E. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, § 5, p. 12.
40 E. Husserl, Ideas, 1, § 2, p. 53.
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sedimentation piled one on top of the other: the effect of this is a 
generalised obscuring of the originary character of our thematisations, 
of which it is the purpose of the phenomenological reduction to 
uncover. To this end, Husserl distinguishes between the objective and 
the ideal aspects of the sciences.
Pure logic aims at the ideal side of science, in respect to  its form. It does not aim at the 
peculiar material of the various sciences or the peculiarity of their tru ths and forms of 
combination: it aims at what relates to  truths and theoretical combinations of truths as 
such. For this reason every science must, on its objective, theoretical side, conform to 
the laws of logic, which are of an entirely ideal character.41
Note, that what Husserl means by objective is theory - that is to say, 
the materiality of the objective domain is wholly lacking: the objective 
remains an aspect of language. Thus, Husserl proposes to ground 
absolutely science as phenomenology within the purely eidetic. That is, 
to uncover “ the historical meaning-structures given in the present, or 
their self-evidences, along with the documented chain of historical 
back-references into the hidden dimensions of the primal self­
evidences which underlie them” .42 In fact, the reduction has two 
moments: the bracketing of the natural world which suspends our belief 
in the associative relations that exists between sensible signs, and the 
bracketing of the developed ego of the natural standpoint, since it 
corresponds the apperceived world's supportive counterpart by virtue 
of its constitutive contiguity. With the neutralisation of the developed 
ego, what remains is pure intentionality, uncontaminated by both the 
developed self and the world. This reduction, Husserl believed, revealed 
the self-same origin and absolute foundation of all thought. As he tells 
us: I
I can 'see' the 'seeing' itself in which this givenness, or this mode of being, is constituted
41 E. Husserl, Origins of Geometry, pp. 173-74.
42 E. Husserl, Origins of Geometry, p. 175.
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. . .  I am now working on an absolute foundation: namely, this perception is, and remains 
as long as it lasts, something absolute, something here and now, something tha t in itself 
is what it is, something by which I can measure as by an ultimate standard what being 
and being given can mean and here must mean, at least, obviously, as far as the sort of 
being given is concerned which a 'here and now' exemplifies.'13
For Husserl, the Cartesian subject of 'reduction' is not abstract, but a 
lived reality and a self-sufficient or absolute entity with no need of 
anything upon which to found its being. This originary intuition acts as 
a standard by which we may measure what 'being' and 'being given', 
meaning and sense signify. By suspending the world, I do not reject it, 
but merely place it in parenthesis in order to  go beyond its contingent 
characterisation, and thereby attain a more 'adequate' and 'rigorous' 
grasp of it. The intentionally that accompanies every perception is 
given as absolute: “as soon as I glance towards the flowing life and 
into the real present it flows through, and in so doing grasp myself as 
the pure subject of this life . . .  I say forthwith and because I must: / 
am, this life is, I live: cogito.” 43 4 Life is what it is through the cogito. ‘ I 
think therefore I am’ is extended to ‘I am therefore the world is’. The 
“I” is the guarantor of the World, as God is the Guarantor of the “ I” . The 
objects of the world can be doubted, whereas any experience given to 
the pure ego is necessary - it is evident to itself as an apodictic truth. 
By means of the reduction the eidetic radicality brings us to a 
transcendental radicality which provides us with the originary mode of 
presentation of an object. This mode of presentation is a pure 
intentionality related to its ideal object, and constituting the absolute 
foundation or apodictic certainty of experience in general.
From the preceding analysis it is clear that there corresponds to the 
reduction two fundamental aspects: the postulation of the transcendent
43 E. Husserl, Idea of Phenomenology, p. 24.
44 E. Husserl, Ideas, 1, § 46, p. 143.
114
Transcendental Linguistics
as a conscious, or pure intentional milieu, and the apodictic certainty 
that is uncovered by the transcendental ego of the reduction. Let us 
examine the Deleuzean critique of both these attitudes, 
a). As stated above, sense is neutral in relation to the proposition. One 
of the consequences of this neutrality is the undermining of the 
correspondence theory of truth. Husserl himself affirmed this 
neutrality, however;
what prevents him from conceiving sense as a full (impenetrable) neutrality is his 
concern with retaining in sense the rational mode of a good sense and a common sense, as 
he presents incorrectly the latter as a matrix or a 'non-modalized root-form ' (Urdoxa). 
It is this same concern which makes him conserve the form of consciousness within the 
transcendental. (LS 102)
Both Husserl and Sartre maintained the idea that the transcendental 
constitutes a conscious field to which there corresponds, as an 
originary faculty, a common sense and a good sense. It is from this 
perspective tha t they were able to affirm the existence of a 
transcendental subject. Defining the transcendental in terms of a 
conscious milieu, imposes a complete disjunction within consciousness 
itself. In which case, consciousness is “either the root position of the 
real cogito under the jurisdiction of reason; or else neutralisation as . .
an 'improper cogito' . . . withdrawn from the jurisdiction of reason” 
(Ibid). On the one hand, by defining the transcendental in terms of a 
conscious milieu, a reconciliation between the two extremes - bodies 
and language - of the disjunction becomes possible within the common 
medium of consciousness itself: a reconciliation that would constitute 
the uncovering of Being. On the other hand, if the transcendental is 
affirmed as an unconscious milieu tha t remains irreducible to 
consciousness, the possibility of reconciling the disjunction between 
the two extremes is permanently postponed. The material and ideal are
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essentially irreducible to  one another - they communicate via a virtual 
surface, but there exists no correspondence between the two. Foucault 
breaks with phenomenology principally on the point of intentionality. It 
is only by remaining on the level of language that we can affirm 
intentionality, likewise only by remaining on the level of the thing can 
we believe in a ‘savage’ experience. As Deleuze tells us:
But if phenomenology ‘places things in parenthesis’, as it claims to  do, this ought to push 
it beyond words and phrases towards statements, and beyond things and states of things 
towards visibilities. But statements are not directed towards anything, since they are not 
related to  a thing anymore than they express a subject but refer only to  a language, a 
language-being, that gives them unique subjects and objects that satisfy particular 
conditions as immanent variables. And visibilities are not deployed in a savage world 
already opened up to  a prim itive (pre-predicative) consciousness, but refer only to  a 
light, a light-being, which gives them forms, proportions and perspectives that are 
immanent in the proper sense - that is, free from any intentional gaze. (FU 109)
Therefore, Foucault analyses things and language within the irreducible 
dimension that generates them, and wherein intentionality collapses: 
“seeing and speaking means knowing . . . but we do not see what we 
speak about, nor do we speak about what we see” (Ibid). There can exist 
no savage experience, since everything is knowledge and knowledge is 
constituted by an irreducible double. In Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty 
the overcoming of intentionality is inclined towards Being as the fold, 
but only in order to found intentionality
in a new dimension: this is why the Visible or the Open does not give us something to  see 
without also providing something to  speak, since the fold will constitute the Self-seeing 
element of sight only if it also constitutes the Self -speaking element of language, to  the 
point where it is the same world that speaks itself in language and sees itself in sight. 
(FU 111)
For Foucault, knowledge-Being is a double capture which necessarily 
flows from an unformed domain that is neither wholly intentional nor 
material. It is therefore incapable of reconciling the two distinct
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forms constitutive of the encounter.
Deleuze understands the transcendental in terms of an unconscious 
domain, populated by impersonal and pre-individual singularities which 
are distributed in a problematic field: the Dionysian world of will to 
power wherein sense is discovered not as predicate but as verb, not as 
concept but as event. Only a theory of impersonal and pre-individual 
singular points can determine this field, as Deleuze writes:
A consciousness is nothing without a synthesis of unification, but there is no synthesis of 
unification of consciousness without the form of the I, or the point of view o f the Self. 
What is neither individual nor personal are, on the contrary, emissions of singularities 
insofar as they occur on an unconscious surface and possess a mobile, immanent 
principle of auto-unification through a nomadic distribution, radically d is tinct from 
fixed and sedentary distributions as conditions of the synthesis of consciousness. (LS 
102 ) .
That is to say, we are unable to retain consciousness as a fundamental 
milieu, while at the same time we object to the form of the person and 
the point of view of individuation. It is the singularities themselves 
which preside over the genesis of individuals and persons. Furthermore, 
with reference to the Husserlean project in general, we are unable to 
make this depth speak in its purity and originality since, as Deleuze 
writes:
beyond the person and the individual, you will discern nothing . . . The new discourse is 
no longer that of the form, but neither is it th a t of the formless: it is rather th a t of the 
pure unformed . . .  As for the subject of this discourse . . . [ it ]  is this free, anonymous, 
and nomadic singularity. (LS 107)
Since the two extremes remain irreducible, the reduction must 
necessarily fail to deliver a moment o f identity that would secure a 
conscious ego within the transcendental domain. The ego is an emergent 
quality from a domain populated by preindividual and non-personal 
singularities, much like the behaviour of ant or bee colonies whose
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unity is not transcendent but immanent. This model is also applicable, 
on a macrocosmic level, to human societies whose mass of individuals 
correspond to so many singularities, the unity of which constitutes 
that particular society. It is not that the social form precedes the 
individuals, but that the individuals produce the form as effect. This 
idea has come to be known as the ‘bottom-up’ approach, 
b). The second aspect concerns apodictic truth; the self-presence of 
truth in relation to the proposition. By defining the transcendental in 
terms of an unconscious milieu, all hope of uncovering absolute 
certainty is dissipated. Truth itself is now seen to be founded on a 
model of sense constituted between two irreducible causalities, each 
constituted by three stages within a genetic process. To the material 
causality there corresponds the ontological genesis, and to the ideal 
causality there corresponds a logical genesis. We will look at the 
ontological dimension first.
Firstly, individuation: an individual is always inalienable from a world. 
Above we characterised the transcendental as a distribution of singular 
points within a problematic field; what concerns us now is the process 
of genesis from the nomadic singular distributions to the actualisation 
of individuals and their conjoined worlds. As we have seen, 
singularities converge, and in their convergence centres are produced, 
or rather, circles around which a system of singular points are 
organised: such a singularity is an individual. Bodies are just such 
circles. Moreover, bodies converge with singularities exterior to their 
own singular points: this secondary convergence is what constitutes 
the world of an individual. In fact, in the World there subsists an 
infinity of centres; a veritable melee of singular points and centres of 
individuation which constitutes the World and the worldly individuals 
that populate it. "An individual is therefore always in a world as a
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circle of convergence, and a world may be formed and thought only in 
the vicinity of the individuals which occupy or fill it" (LS 110). To be 
actualised means simply this rule of convergence, which defines the 
concept of compossibility. On the other hand, where a series of singular 
points diverge another world begins; this divergence is what is meant 
by incompossibility. The expression of an individuated world exists 
only in individuals as a predicate, but, subsists as a verb in the 
continuum of singularities. Therefore, on one plane we have the 
continuum of singularities which preside over the constitution of 
individuals, and on the other plane we have the individuals which 
express the compossibilities and incompossibilites of the continuum 
itself. Individuals are instances of analytical propositions of the order: 
“Fred exists” . Secondly, a problem potentially possesses various 
instances of different solutions which correspond to it. Deleuze 
demonstrates this point by providing us with the celebrated Bergsonian 
example of the different "equation[s] of conic sections" which can be 
comprehended as "circle, ellipse, hyperbola, parabola, straight line" (LS 
114). From this he concludes:
We must th e re fo re  understand th a t incompossible worlds, despite there 
incompossibility, have something in common - something objectively in common - 
which represents the  ambiguous sign of the genetic element in relation to  which several 
worlds appear as instances of solution for one and the same problem (every throw, the 
result of a single cast). (LS 114).
This commonality between incompossibilities is described by synthetic 
predicates of persons. Persons are instances of synthetic propositions 
of the order: “ Fred has two arms and two legs”. These two elements of 
individuation and personalisation correspond to good sense and common 
sense respectively. But in view of the principle of their production 
within a transcendental field, both are continually endangered by the
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irreducible disparity or fragility which constitutes them. The third 
element of the ontological genesis corresponds to the multiple classes 
and the various properties which depend on persons. Classes as a third 
type of proposition are of the order: “Fred is human” .
Individuals and persons are embodied in ontological propositions: 
infinite analytic predicates are individuals, while fin ite synthetic 
predicates are persons. However, Deleuze tells us:
The third element of the ontological genesis . . .  is not embodied in a third proposition 
which would again be ontological. Rather, this element sends us over to  another order of 
the proposition, and constitutes the conditions or the form of possibility of the logical 
proposition in general. In relation to  th is condition and simultaneously with it, 
individuals and persons no longer play the role of ontological propositions. They act now 
as material instances which realise the possibility and determine within the logical 
proposition the relations necessary to  the existence of the conditioned. (LS 118).
In the order of the logical genesis what is primary is signification or 
the conditions of possibility in general. But signification refers to 
manifestation which grounds signification in the ontological order upon 
the person. Manifestation, in turn, refers to denotation to the extent 
that the person is grounded upon the individual. And vice versa: "From 
denotation to manifestation, then to signification" (LS 16). Thus the 
circularity of the proposition emerges in its genesis. Sense, therefore, 
not only engenders "the logical proposition with its determinate 
dimensions . . .  it engenders also the objective correlates of this 
proposition which were themselves first produced as ontological 
propositions" (LS 120). However, there is no strict correspondence 
between the dimensions of the ontological genesis and the logical 
genesis, between propositions in general and their objective correlates 
- between denotation and individuation, manifestation and persons, 
signification and classes and properties - but only a kind of "relay 
which permits every sort of shifting and jamming" (LS 119). The
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movement of language is not linear but circular. The signifier does not 
absolutely relate to the corresponding signified on a one to one basis, 
but rather every sign is a signifier that refers to another signifier ad 
infinitum: the indefinite regress of signification.
The notion, therefore, of an apodictic certainty collapses in light of the 
essential disparity which presides over the geneses of good sense and 
common sense. Although we have described sense in terms of form, this 
is not strictly the case: form is essentially rhythm, a resonance out of 
which a seemingly stable pattern is abstractly extracted as a surplus 
value. Four essential aspects arise from what has preceded: i). the 
relation between desire and language places in question any claim to a 
purely rational or logical meaning, ii). Propositions - analytic 
propositions included - are always-already infected by a general 
grammar, iii). The possibility o f a freedom from repression - the 
hegemony of the repressive signifier that the logical a priori 
authorises - is realised within just such a generalised grammar of the 
’material’ sign. iv). Essentially, the ‘material’ sign is not expressive 
but productive.
4. In Proust and Signs, Deleuze distinguishes between three kinds of 
machine: machines productive of partial objects; machines productive 
of resonance, and machines productive of the forced movement. The 
first corresponds to the raw material presented for interpretation; the 
second constitutes the particular style which "sets up a resonance 
between any two objects and from them extracts a 'precious image,' 
substituting fo r the determined conditions o f an unconscious natural 
product the free conditions of an artistic production" (PS 137). Thirdly, 
the idea of death sweeps away the resonant moments inaugurating the 
time of the Other. We have discussed the first two in relation to
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Husserl. However, Deleuze's transformation of a phenomenology into a 
transcendental empiricism ultimately derives its force from this last 
machine, and which in all probability corresponds to a transformation 
of the Husserlean category of ‘hypothetical propositions’. The aim is to 
tap into the profoudure of nonsense and turn it into a veritable creative 
impetus. In relation to sense, Deleuze tells us:
the g ift of sense occurs only when the conditions of signification are also being 
determined. The terms of the series, once provided with sense, will subsequently be 
submitted to  these conditions, in a tertiary organisation which will relate them to  the 
laws of possible indications and manifestations....This presentation o f a total deployment 
at the surface is necessarily affected, at each of these points, by an extreme and 
persistent fragility. (LS 81).
Located upon a fragile and ‘cracked’ surface, sense is constantly in 
danger of collapsing into a terrifying profondure, in which the 
meaningful world collapses but also wherein one is absorbed into a 
universal depth where everything becomes physical, and where the 
word loses its meaning and power to express. Within this universal 
profundity, what remain are only bodies and their depths. There is no 
longer a separation between bodies and language, since words 
themselves have become physical: everything is mixture without sense; 
everything is physical. Words fragment and merge with unbearable 
sonorous qualities, and in so doing penetrate, lacerate, and poison our 
bodies. In F. Scott Fitzgerald, this poisonous power of the word is 
described in terms of an identification “with the objects o f my horror 
or compassion.” 45 This "hell" or what Deleuze elsewhere calls after 
Artaud the ‘ theatre of crue lty ,’ corresponds to  the ‘failed’ 
schizophrenic position which has fallen through the cracks in the 
surface • that is to say, it is never desirable to totally fall into such a 
depth, but to simply employ its potential, as the 'forced movement' of
45 F. Scott Fitzgerald, The C rack-U p, p. 52.
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the death drive, in the service of constructing a sense-surface. 
Therefore, a distinction arises between breakdown and breakthrough. 
The possibility of collapse into breakdown, and the subsequent loss of 
the power to lift oneself out of that formless depth, constitutes a real 
danger. In this sense, Deleuze courts a paradoxical death by advocating 
a certain metamorphosis, while simultaneously alerting us of the 
necessity fo r maintaining a certain “ contro l.” Many Western 
intellectuals quite simply ‘lose-it’: E. Hemingway, J. Kerouac, M. Lowry, 
and F. Scott Fitzgerald. Perhaps this ‘likely eventuality’ is an effect of 
finding oneself a product of “ a generation grown up to find all Gods 
dead, all wars fought, all faiths in man shaken.” Is the individual 
therefore capable of becoming that Nietzschean ‘overman’, or quite 
simply is it impossible to sustain an existence lacking in any unifying 
principle and ideal? No doubt, this exigency constitutes the most 
demanding task to which post-modern ethics could direct its efforts: 
toward a new ideal by which we could live, besides the ideal of 
heterogeneity. This non-idealistic ideal is, for Fitzgerald, the 
“hold[ing] in balance of the sense of futility of effort and the sense of 
the necessity to struggle . . .  If I could do this through the common ills 
- domestic, professional and personal - then the ego would continue as 
an arrow shot from nothingness to nothingness with such force that 
only gravity would bring it to earth at last.”46 This balancing act 
Deleuze has elsewhere termed the “Governance of Temperance,” and 
corresponds to  an eternal game of equilibrating between the ‘not 
enough’ and the ‘too much.’ Can we now merely look forward to the 
profession of ‘tight-rope’ walking. Isn’t  that what Zarathrutra began 
with, and then went on to search for something more! Clearly the 
‘forced movement’ corresponds to  something more; a persistent
46 Ibid, p. 40.
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falling-down of the tight-rope walker.
Essentially we construct for ourselves a World-Form by which we live 
and give ourselves meanings, beliefs and directions. On the one hand, 
breakdown is when the World-Form in toto collapses and we have 
nothing to replace it with: it all happened too fast and was a process 
over which we had no control. Breakdown is an identification with the 
becoming process. Thus, when collapse occurs becoming-other is not 
possible because only the terrifying becoming process is experienced: 
there is no longer a Self who becomes, only the process of becoming 
itself. On the other hand, breakthrough corresponds to a free flowing 
process of becoming Other, the Other being the necessary complement 
of the self - together they form a composite. Breakthrough corresponds 
to a transgressing a specificity within our World-Form, an overcoming 
of its limits and a substitution of it with a modified form. Thereby the 
World-Form is constantly metamorphosing throughout a life span, and 
bears little resemblance at death to what it was at adolescence. An 
eternal process of transformation. “Was not this, however, the epitome 
of art, the very model of the reality of artistic creation? In order for 
Yuichi’s desire to come into reality, either his desire or his concept of 
what was real must perish. In this world it is believed art and reality 
live quietly side by side; but art must dare to break the laws of reality. 
Why? In order that it alone may exist.” 47 The reality of the world, or 
rather, the manner in which we identify with a certain World-Form 
must be perpetually challenged by means of the impersonal and pre­
individual process of desire. But this challenging must not take the 
form of a ‘feet-first’ approach, but must be employed as a gentle and 
gradual questioning, dismantling and rebuilding of our structural 
World-Form. We must not identify, nor must we move too fast. Like
47 Y. Mishima, Forbidden Colours, p. 33.
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artists, painstakingly chipping away at a marble block in order to 
realise an artistic production which is ourselves, but in actuality never 
realising, never completing, but continually chipping away, prudently 
and patiently. Therefore, Deleuze tells us, in relation to an ‘effective’ 
schizophrenia:
it is less a question of recovering meaning than of destroying the word, of conjuring up 
the affect, and of transforming the painful passion of the body into a triumphant action, 
obedience into command, always in this depth beneath the fissured surface. (LS 88).
This triumphant action involves the creation of "breath-words" and 
"howl-words" which are incapable of being decomposed into fragments, 
and whose values are purely tonic as opposed to written: language 
without articulation. Therefore, the ‘effective’ schizophrenic lives an 
action-passion ambivalence, racked as (s)he is between the inseparable 
extremes of pain and insufflation. Ultimately, the schizophrenic is 
unable to transform all corruption constituting this ambivalence into a 
perfect fluid mixture. Nonetheless, to the value of the howl-words 
there corresponds a glorious Body without Organs - that is, an "ocean- 
mass" within which these tonic values resonate without limit. These 
howl-words are fusions of consonants, similar to those portmanteau 
words used by Lewis Carroll and Antonin Artaud. As Artaud tells us:
Those howls, those rolling eyes, that unceasing abstraction, those sounds of branches, of 
chopping and log-rolling, all in a vast expanse of sounds flowing out from several outlets 
at once, all combine to  give rise in our minds, to  crystallise a new concept, what one
might term a concrete concept of the abstract.48
It is within this region that we catch a glimpse, or rather hear the 
thunderclap of Being - that is, Univocal Being. This univocity implies a 
polyvocity, and constitutes a violence against the logical a priori, and a 
concerted destruction of the hegemonic signifier - that is to say, a
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nonsense erected as a forced movement or death drive, a polyvocity 
that undermines all relations. Moreover, nonsense produces its own 
sense, since the code immanent to the paradoxical element finds its 
own solution. But why vocal? In James Joyce we find the same 
assertion being made. In Ulysses, almost from the very start it begins 
with: "Ineluctable modality of the visible: at least that if no more, 
thought through my eyes. Signatures of all things I am here to read."49 
But then he immediately questions this modality, questions the 
fundamentality of line and colour; the "[l]im it of the diaphane," and 
shuts down his occularcentrism in order to explore his surroundings 
acoustically. Immediately we sense an element of schizophrenia being 
injected into the language, a solidifying of individual sound and a 
certain undecidibility as regards personnel identity. In Finnegan's Wake, 
Joyce's art has become a pure symptomology where every word, every 
proper name is infected by equivocation and the repetition of the 
partial objects constitutive of language. The hero is called "Earwicker," 
affirming the fact that the ineluctable modality now belongs to the 
voice. We enter a veritable "echoland" in which we find it hard, if not 
futile, to locate the subject matter in the verb; a domain wherein all 
images have a phonetic form and only appear in the disguise of things. 
Therefore, to our original question; why voice, we answer; within the 
economy of the psyche the ear has a certain privilege in the 
constitution of the proper name.
Let us not conclude that redemption is to be found in the depths of 
bodies. What the above analysis exemplifies is the existence of an
49 J. Joyce, Ulysses, p.31.
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experience which is non-purposive and non-intentionalistic50 to a 
degree. Perhaps the same could be said of autistics who fail to 
understand the pronouns "me" and "you," and who are often extremely 
violent and commonly artistic. They lack however social skills. The last 
point is of great importance. The sage, as pacifier or equilibrator 
between the heights - as an over-zealous disposition for rationality - 
and the depths - as a total collapse into the action-passion 
ambivalence - corresponds to an ethical operation which seeks to 
preserve the meaningful world while infusing it with a certain 
metamorphic motility.
Therefore, to the time of Aion there corresponds the "crack" which 
extends its straight line at the surface in the form of the past-future 
infinitive. This wound , which all of us bear, is the locus of originary 
genetic thought, and which it is necessary to  actualise in the depth of 
bodies in the temporal form of chronos. Pure events are what the sage 
discovers at the surface.
Returned to  the surface, the sage discovers objects-events, all of them communicating in 
the void which constitutes their substances; he discovers the Aion in which they are 
sketched out and developed without ever filling it up. The event is the identity of form and 
void. (LS 1 36).
The event, as identity of form and void is the site of sense co-present 
with its own nonsense, and is that which reveals the impossibility of 
both a purely idealistic language and a physical language. The sage 
always starts at the event, and moves in the direction of its spatio-
50 If intentionality is always an intention for something, then a residual intentionality always remains no 
matter how fragmented or partial our global perceptions have been rendered. As long as we are aware 
of even the smallest parts, whether ocular or verbal, an intentionality necessarily accompanies that 
particular sensibility. There can be no crystallisation into new concepts of the understanding without 
intention: not an intentionality which would predetermine the ordering of fragments, nor an 
intentionality that would recognise objects and words prior to contextualization, but certainly an 
accompanying awareness. Interestingly, this notion of awareness, rather than intention, brings us 
closer to a Buddhist understanding, and which we will touch on shortly, since certain parallels 
between Zen practice and Deleuzean philosophy are replete throughout the latter's writings.
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temporal actualisation - that is, "the qausi-cause does not create, it 
"operates," and wills only what comes to pass" (LS 147). This 
formulation represents the Stoic ethic wherein the non-linearity of 
past and future are the starting point of a movement which aims 
toward a pure instant. An example of such an instant would be Rostov's 
calvary charge through the borderland which divided life from death, 
and wherein he completely lost all fear and self-consciousness in the 
"joy of the gallop," becoming "more lively and excited every moment," 
as the experience of the pure event - to live-to die - becomes more and 
more crystalline, as the delirium carried him "forward with 
supernatural swiftness"51 towards the pure instant wherein chronic 
time ceases. This ethical procedure must be conceived in terms of 
mimeticism.
The actor thus actualises the event, but in a way which is entirely different from the 
actualisation of the event in the depth of things. Or rather, the actor redoubles this 
cosmic, or physical actualisation, in his own way, which is singularly superficial - but 
because of it more distinct, trenchant and pure. Thus, the actor delimits the original, 
disengages from it in an abstract line, and keeps from the event only its contour and its 
splendour, becoming thereby the actor of one's own events - a counter-actualization. (LS 
150).
Therefore, counter-actualization does not imply an inner subject which 
expresses itself in its purity, rather it is a material process actualised 
through a pure event. This ethical procedure necessarily entails an 
overcoming of ressentiment and bad conscience; by making ourselves 
worthy of whatever happens to us, we apportion no blame and pass no 
judgments, neither do we see ourselves as being irredeemably guilty 
within divine plot. Rather, we become children of circumstance, mere 
actors upon a stage whose role asks of us nothing less than the 
expression of pure cruelty.
51 L. Tolstoy, War and Peace, p. 199.
128
Transcendental Linguistics
Such non-purposive behaviour is exemplified by Prince Andrew's 
military action at Austerwitcz: the Prince does not engage in a 
discriminative act between fighting and fleeing, but rather, allows the 
quasi-cause to operate through him. Since, he had no time to utter 
words and, therefore, no time to think, before he "was jumping off his 
horse and running to the flag."52 An important question arises: what is 
it that determines whether Prince Andrew will fight or flee? Or rather, 
how does the quasi-cause operate, or through what does it operate? The 
quasi-cause operates through sensibility, or the passionate body which 
is given to us by chance as our "lot": hence, the ethical principle of 
making ourselves worthy of what ever happens to us. That is, “ if you 
don't feel it, then you won’t  do it.” This analysis of ethics topples the 
hegemony of reason by prioritising the role played by sensibility in 
relation to action.
Counter-actualisation therefore represents a transcendence of the 
form of individuation; a transcendence which is possible since all 
events communicate in one and the same Event, by means of the quasi­
causality which expresses their noncausal correspondences. If 
individuals are to transcend their form, they must be able to make the 
disjunctions between individuals communicate. For this reason Deleuze, 
unlike Leibniz, does not make a negative use of the rule of 
incompossibility, but rather, he makes of it an affirmation. Things are 
affirmed by virtue of their difference, not their identity: Nietzsche's 
'pathos of distance.' Thus, each of the terms of a duality are an 
evaluation of the other term; health is evaluated in terms of sickness 
and vice versa. It is through the affirmation of difference, as 
difference in itself, that disjunction becomes a veritable synthesis. 
Thereby: "The communication of events replaces the exclusion of
52 L. Tolstoy, War and Peace, P. 298.
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predicates" (LS 174). This disjunctive synthesis affirms the 
communication between individuals within Univocal Being.
As the individual affirms the distance, she follows and joins it, passing through all the 
other individuals implied by the other events, and extracts from it a unique Event which 
is once again herself, or rather the universal freedom. (LS 178).
In summery: On the one hand, Husserl makes a fundamental distinction 
between two kinds of sign: between expression and indication; meaning 
and sense. Husserl locates meaning in the pure dimension of expression, 
while sense is relegated to the material sign of indication. Meaning is 
reduced to a purely logical process of signification in general and 
wholly for consciousness: an eternal object and ideal objectivity 
divorced from the world of contingency and materiality. On the other 
hand, Deleuze does not make sense exclusively a correlate of 
consciousness, but rather makes it both an expression and a denotation; 
both conscious and unconscious. Sense is the expressed of a proposition 
presented in the form of the noematic verb, and an attribute of a state 
of affairs presented in the form of a substantive. Sense therefore in 
Deleuze's understanding of the term is a double sided entity which does 
not merge with the proposition any more than with a state o f affairs, it 
is something indeterminate between both the proposition and the thing. 
By means of the critique of the form-content dualism and a situating of 
sense upon a surface ‘between’ the two extremes, Deleuze is able to 
avoid the metaphysical gesture characteristic of phenomenology: that 
of prioritising the a priori side of consciousness over the materiality 
of its signs. The phenomenon is distributed across both extremes in the 
form of the infinitive verb which corresponds to a pure becoming. 
Through this process, the phenomenon loses its ideality and is 
metamorphosed into a phantasm. In this manner, Deleuze locates the
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ontological within a signifying space participated by both ideality and 
physicality, without identifying it with either, nor making of this 
duality a unifying monism. By defining the transcendental in terms of 
preindividual and non-personal singularities the transcendental ego and 
logical a prio ri structure of language lose their privilege. Now, 
nonsense constitutes the foundation of sense, its genetic force. 
Essentially, then, Deleuze’s theory articulates a model of an ‘always 
questionable’ communication between disparate elements to which we 





Having analysed the virtual event from the subjective point of view, we 
will now deal with it from the perspective of materialism or 
empiricism. Together both perspectives will allow us to grasp the 
essence of the plane of immanence more comprehensively and thereby 
avoid any prioritisation of either. For these reasons evolutionary 
biology must now compose the essential component of this chapter, 
showing how the production of the organism - and therefore 
subjectivity - ultimately depends on biophysical and biopsychical 
processes emergent from a domain o f internal differentiation. To this 
end we will focus on four themes: 1. Deleuze’s appropriation of 
Bergson; 2. The idea of a biopsychism in Freud; 3. The contributions to 
this field of genetics, specifically in relation to J. Monod and J. Piaget. 
4. As a critique of the purely genetic model, we will unfold process 
philosophy in terms of embryology as a developmental process of 
differentiation and individuation within an implicate order.
I. ln  Deleuze’s Bergsonism, composites are divided into two halves or 
tendencies: spatial and durational. The former is quantitative 
(difference in degree), and the latter is qualitative (difference in kind). 
Spatial configuration is always homogeneous, whereas duration 1
1 By this title we wish to emphasis the supersensible, or non-lingulstlc animal communication and 
perception, in experience in general. The eagle, which swoops on Its prey from a great height, sees a 
magnified image at the centre of its field of vision, while some snakes have sophisticated Infrared 
detectors and can effectively 'see' their prey in total darkness. Pigeons learn to associate particular 
smells with their home area and rely on this to find their way, while monarch butterflies use the Earth's 
magnetic field to find their way in their annual 4000-kilometre migration. Bats dart around at high 
speed, guided by a system of echo location as complex as that of any radar; the kangaroo rat has a 
sense of hearing so acute that it can hear the rattle of an approaching snake's scales and leap to 
safety. Plants are able to detect changing daylength and open their flowers to coincide with the 
activity of pollinating insects: they are so accurate that they can be arranged Into a 'floral clock”' (John 
Downer, Superaenae). We are yet to discover what the human body Is capable of, what hidden 
faculties it possesses.
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possesses rhythms that differ in ways of being in time. Composites 
represent the facts of experience, while tendencies exist only in 
principle. In this manner ” [w]e go beyond experience, toward the 
conditions of experience" (B 23). The composite is experience itself; it 
is by tracing the lines of divergence that we are guided toward the 
conditions of real experience (percepts2) wherein that which differs in 
kind is experienced. Real experience is both spatial and durational. Both 
aspects combine: space corresponds to the form of extrinsic 
distinctions - homogeneous and discontinuous cut ups; and duration 
corresponds to a purely internal succession of immediate data - 
heterogeneous and continuous. ” [T]he subjective, or duration, is the 
virtual. To be more precise, it is the virtual insofar as it is actualised, 
in the course of being actualised, it is inseparable from the movement 
of its actualisation" (B 42-3). Space is objective quantitative 
differentiation in degree; duration is subjective qualitative 
discrimination in kind (difference in kind thus corresponds to Plato's 
'lines of descent'). In this manner, Bergson redefines the concept of 
movement in terms of a duration, or a becoming that endures. But this 
does not imply a purely psychological experience:
It is only to  the extent that movement is grasped as belonging to  things as much as to 
consciousness that it ceases to  be confused with psychological duration, whose point of 
application it will displace, thereby necessitating tha t things participate directly in 
duration itself. If qualities exist in things no less than they do in consciousness, if there 
is a movement of qualities outside myself, things must, o f necessity, endure in their own 
way. (B 48)
This naturally opens onto an ontological duration. "What Bergson calls
'pure recollection' has no psychological existence. This is why it is
called virtual, inactive, and unconscious . . . Only the present is
2 Percepts are not concepts which condition experience, but rather the very conditions of real 




'psychological'; but the past is pure ontology" (B 55-6). Hence, the pure 
past - the quantum theory in terms of a sum over histories - is not an 
endurance graspable through subjective intuition, it is a material or 
cosmic memory accessible through ‘reminiscence’. That is, recollection 
is preserved in the historical and evolutionary process of the universe 
in the form of a massive Memory: an inhuman memory or Mnemosyne. For 
this reason we must place ourselves in the past by means of a 'leap into 
ontology.' "The past and the present do not denote two successive 
moments, but two elements which coexist: One is the present, which 
does not cease to pass, and the other is the past, which does not cease 
to be but through which all presents pass. It is in this sense that there 
is a pure past" (B 59). The pure past affirms an ontological Memory 
which serves as the foundation of the unfolding of time. Thus, all our 
past coexists with each present.
While the past coexists with its own present, and while it coexists with itself on various 
levels of contraction, we must recognise that the present itself is only the most 
contracted level of the past. This Time it is pure present and pure past, pure perception 
and pure recollection as such, pure matter and pure memory th a t now have only 
differences of expansion . . . and contraction and thus rediscover an ontological unity. (B 
74)
Furthermore, this introduces repetition into duration, since the whole 
of the past is repeated in each present, slightly transformed in 
accordance with the specificities and circumstances of the present 
excitation.
"We said of life that, from its origin, it is the continuation of one and 
the same impetus, divided into divergent lines of evolution."3 Life is 
essentially the perpetuation of a primordial drive, which becomes 
differentiated during the process of evolution. This impetus 
corresponds to the vitalism immanent within all biological life-forms
3 H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 56.
134
Transcendental Empiricism
and is corroborated by the fact that evolution has repeatedly come up 
with the same solutions to certain problems; i.e., the independent 
evolution of the eye has occurred at least forty times during the 
history of this planet. Hence, Bergson infers that there must be a 
teleological element involved, which rules out the possibility of life 
evolving purely by the accumulation of chance mutations. Bergson 
conceives this telos as belonging to a whole which becomes divided 
while maintaining an essential programme that allows evolution to 
come up with the same inventions repeatedly. Hence, Bergson is anti- 
Darwinian, not accepting that exogenous factors alone constitute the 
diversity and increasing complexification of life. Nonetheless, they do 
play a significant part.
Now, we see that identical structures have been formed on independent lines of evolution 
by a gradual accumulation of effects. How can accidental causes, occurring in an 
accidental order, be supposed to  have repeatedly come to  the same result, the causes 
being infinitely numerous and the effect infinitely complicated?4 5
Neither is he neo-Lamarckian: one who upholds the notion of an inner 
directing principle, while placing too much emphasis on conscious 
behaviour or psychologism.
Certain neo-Lamarckians do indeed resort to a cause of a psychological nature. There, to 
our thinking, is one o f the most solid positions of neo-Lamarckism. But if this cause is 
nothing but the conscious effort of the individual, it cannot operate in more than a 
restricted number of cases - at most in the animal world, and not at all in the vegetable 
kingdom. 5
Rather, Bergson holds that the vitalism immanent to life must be an 
unconscious impetus that gets divided along the divergent lines of 
evolution. This division constitutes the fundamental cause of variation; 
thus life proceeds not by association and addition, but by
4 Ibid, p. 60.
5 Ibid, p. 91-2.
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differentiation and bifurcation. The process of differentiation is 
simultaneously integrated in a unity or whole: organs although 
constituted by an extreme complexity of individual parts and 
processes, nonetheless constitute a functional whole. “This contrast 
between the complexity of the organ and the unity of the function is 
what gives us pause.” 6 7 The operation of assembling and organising all 
the parts into a functional whole suggests a process o f invention 
crafted by an in te lligent impetus, rather than the handiwork of a ’blind 
watchmaker'. Thus Bergson contrasts a process of manufacture which 
works from the periphery to the centre, from an artistic tendency 
toward organising which works from the centre to periphery - that is, 
from essence to actuality.
If now we are asked why and how it is implied therein, we reply that life is, more than 
anything else, a tendency to  act on inert matter. The direction of th is  action is not 
predetermined; hence the unforeseeable variety of forms of life, in evolving, sows along 
its path. But this action always presents, to  some extent, the character o f contingency; it 
implies at least a rudiment of choice. Now a choice involves the anticipatory idea of 
several possible actions. Possibilities of action must therefore be marked out for the
living being before the action itself.'’
These possibilities are inscribed within the impetus in the form of 
potential tendencies immanent within life itself.
For Bergson, the movement of evolution is determined by a virtual 
potential which is ‘beyond’ the physico-chemical properties of matter, 
and which he identifies with the subjective or conscious processes. 
That is, although he grasps the dynamics of the virtual in terms of a 
process which operates unconsciously and inhumanly at all levels of 
existence, from the material to the psychic, he gives it the property of 
a vital force. There is implied in Bergson's Creative Evolution a
6 Ibid, p. 93.
7 Ibid, p. 102.
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veritable Theosophical tradition in the manner it perceives the cosmos 
as a creation by a ‘superconsciousness’ that is beyond the 
comprehension of human intelligence. This divine consciousness is 
ours, we are part of it, each individual in his limited capacity. It is 
through this essential belonging that Bergson believes that we may 
remerge with the vital impetus. The leap into ontology is possible only 
through ‘intuition’. Bergsonian intuition is a deductive method in search 
of the absolute, grounding its truth claims on the basis of a romantic 
idealisation of the irrational and a direct experience of the whole. As 
he tells us: "the interdependence of consciousness and brain is limited . 
. . the destiny of consciousness is not bound up on that account with the 
destiny of cerebral matter.”®
However, the vitalist tradition remains pertinent in that it articulates 
evolution in terms of an intelligent behavioural modus operandi that is 
not wholly conscious, as in Lamarckism, but rather unconscious and 
virtual. As F. Jacob tells us in relation to the overcoming of mechanism 
and finalism:
With the application to  heredity o f the concept of programme, certain biological 
contradictions formerly summed up in a series of antitheses at last disappear: finality 
and mechanism, necessity and contingency, stability and variation. The concept of 
programme blends two notions which had always been intuitively associated w ith living 
beings: memory and design. By 'memory' is implied the tra its of the parents, which 
heredity brings out in the child. By 'design' is implied the plan which controls the 
formation of an organism down to  the last detail.* 9
The two most eminent events to have occurred on Earth are the 
emergence of life and the emergence of thought: heredity and mind. The 
former tends toward reductionism, the latter toward finalism. The goal 
of any contemporary theory on evolution must be to provide an account
6 Ibid, p. 285.
9 F. Jacob, The Logic of Life, p. 2.
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for the emergence of these two extreme positions without falling into 
the idealism of prioritising any one over the other. Only through 
ontology can both extremes be transcended, and the powers 
constituting those extremes adequately postulated. It follows from the 
fact of transcendence that these powers must be essentially fluid, 
combining to form open systems that are both metastable and forward 
looking.
It is the subjective prioritising that we locate in Bergson that Deleuze 
wishes to redress. To this end, he affirms three distinct syntheses of 
time, to which there corresponds three different forms of repetition. 
We will now analyse each of these in turn.
A). The firs t synthesis of time corresponds to what Deleuze, 
appropriating from Hume and Bergson, calls habit. This originary 
synthesis functions by means of the repetition of discontinuous 
instants. On the one hand, a succession of instants, such as the strikes 
on a gong or the ’tick-tocks' of a clock, constitute a "discontinuity and 
instantaneity in repetition", wherein the presentation of one element 
does not arrive without the prior departure of the previous 
presentation. The repeated 'tick-tocks' remain identical in-themselves 
and present a series of elementary excitations that are essentially 
unthinkable. On the other hand, from the point of view of the mind 
which contemplates this series of disparate elements, something new 
is extracted which produces a change in the mind. That which is 
extracted is 'expectation'; e.g., the waiting in anticipation for the 
arrival of the next 'tick-tock'. In this manner habits are formed out of a 
repetition of disparate elements. However, "[a] succession of instants 
does not constitute time any more than it causes it to disappear; it 
indicates only its constantly aborted moment of birth. Time is 
constituted only in the originary synthesis which operates on the
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repetition of instants" (DR 70). Within this dimension of time, the past 
is constituted by a retention of contracted instants, and the future is 
constituted within the ‘expected’ arrival of the next repetition in 
relation to the contraction. Past, present and future are not distinct 
elements within this dimension of time, but rather the dimensions of a 
single contracted instant. “ In any case, this synthesis must be given a 
name: passive synthesis. Although it is constitutive it is not, for all 
that, active. It is not carried out by the mind, but occurs in the mind 
which contemplates, prior to all memory and all reflection. Time is 
subjective, but in relation to the subjectivity of a passive subject” (DR 
71).
Therefore, from the perspective of the passive synthesis we may speak 
of the physiology of affect, which corresponds to a contraction of 
elementary excitations. All organisms are constituted by this process 
of contraction: contraction thus constitutes the organism’s primary 
sensibility and passive synthesis. As Deleuze tells us:
Every organism, in its receptive and perceptual elements, but also in its viscera, is the 
sum of contractions, of retentions and expectations. A t the level of this primary vital 
sensibility, the lived present constitutes a past and a future in time. Need is the manner 
in which this future appears, as the organic form of expectation. The retained past 
appears in the form of cellular heredity . . . Each contraction, each passive synthesis, 
constitutes a sign which is interpreted or deployed in active synthesis. (DR 73)
In short, the originary synthesis of time is constituted upon both a 
passive synthesis or contraction of a quantity of elementary 
excitations, and an active synthesis which manifests a qualitative 
interpretation of the contraction. This contraction is the product of a 
'contemplative' soul, that is, a soul which fuses together the 
repetitions of similar instances into a certain compound. Everything is 
primarily constituted by a multitude of passive syntheses; an 
assemblage of minute habits which compose us organically. "We do not
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contemplate ourselves, but we exist only in contemplating - that is to 
say, in contracting that from which we come" (DR 74). The originary 
synthesis constitutes time as a living present, wherein the past and 
future are not understood as distinct elements from this present, but 
rather as dimensions of it. The present passes in time since it is 
constituted upon the contraction of a number of instances of which the 
past is the sum of retentions, and the future the full 'weight' of this 
retention projected in the form of expectation. This living present 
varies depending on the particular organism; depending, that is, on the 
rhythms10 by which the organism innately contemplates.
These thousands of habits of which we are composed...thus form the basic domain of 
passive syntheses. The passive self is not defined simply by receptivity . . . but by 
virtue of th e  contractile contemplation which constitutes the organism itself before it 
constitutes the sensations. This self, therefore, is by no means simple: it is not enough to 
relativise o r pluralise the self, all the while retaining fo r it a simple attenuated form. 
Selves are larval subjects . . . There is a self everywhere a furtive contemplation has 
been established . . . The self does not undergo modifications, it is itself a modification - 
this term designating precisely the difference drawn. Finally, one is only what one has: 
here, being is formed or the passive self is, by having. (DR 78-9)
This multitude of habits constitutes what will determine the desire- 
structure o f an organism, not in terms of lack, but rather as a positive 
drive toward a need - that is, a need that constitutes its very being. In 
this sense we can say that repetition is inscribed in need, since it 
corresponds to the compulsion to repeat an organically formed habit.
B). The passive synthesis of habit - Habitus - constitutes the 
foundation of time as the living present, but a present which passes. 
Our question is now; what causes the present to pass? For the present
10 It is David Epstein's contention, in Shaping Time, that human beings are constituted upon and 
driven by a whole mass of interrelated biological clocks, the rhythms of which structure our 
experience, and not only physically, but emotionally and intellectually too. These rhythms capture the 
fundamental manner In which we process time, and explain the preferences that we entertain In 




to be present it must not pass but be present. However, for the original 
synthesis to be a real synthesis of time, it must constitute this 
present as a passing present. This paradox leads us to conclude that 
there exists another time in which the time of the present in general 
may come to pass. That is, even though habit functions as the 
foundation of time, it itself must be grounded in something more 
profound if the present which habit constitutes is to pass. “The claim 
of the present is precisely that it passes. However, it is what causes 
the present to pass, that to which the present and habit belong, which 
must be considered the ground of time. It is memory that grounds time” 
(DR 79). Memory, or the second synthesis of time, must not be confused 
with the active synthesis which is built upon the passive synthesis of 
habit, but rather, must itself be conceived in terms of a passive 
synthesis. Mnemosyne: the being of the past in general. The active 
synthesis of memory, which is the principle of representation, has two 
aspects: it is capable of both reflecting on the present present, and 
reproducing the former present. However, th is  principle of 
representation requires an additional element.
It is with respect to  the pure element of the past, understood as the past in general, as an 
a priori past, that a given former present is reproducible and the present present is able 
to  reflect itself. Far from being derived from the present or from representation, the 
past is presupposed by every representation. In th is sense, th e  active synthesis of 
memory may well be founded upon the (empirical) passive synthesis of habit, but on the 
other hand it can be grounded only by another (transcendental) passive synthesis which 
is peculiar to  memory itself. (DR 81)
It follows that what Deleuze means by 'transcendental empiricism', is 
that our primary form of affectivity, or the passive synthesis of habit, 
constitutes the foundation of our sensibility, and this sensibility takes 
place within the transcendental dimension of a pure past which always 
eludes the present. After the manner of Bergson, Deleuze articulates
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four paradoxes which necessarily follow from this position: the 
contemporaneity of the past with the present; the coexistence of a ll 
the past with the present; the preexistence of the past in general; and 
the coexistence of the past with itself in an infinity of degrees of 
relaxation and contraction at an infinity of levels: the pure past as a 
virtual dimension. Therefore:
Between the two repetitions, the material and the spiritual, there is a vast difference . . . 
As a result, the tw o repetitions stand in very different relations to  'difference' itself. 
Difference is drawn from one in so far as the elements or instants are contracted within 
a living present. It is included in the other in so far as the Whole includes the difference 
between its levels . . .  In consequence the difference between presents themselves is that 
between the two repetitions: that of the elementary instants from which difference is 
subtracted, and tha t of the levels of the whole in which difference is included" (DR 84).
Both the passive syntheses are sub-representative, but once they come 
under the action of the active synthesis they are subordinated to the 
form of representation. The question is; is it possible to grasp the 
entire past without reducing it to the former present or to the present 
present? Reminiscence, Deleuze tells us, is the manner in which we 
may grasp this pure past for ourselves.
C). The third synthesis of time corresponds to the future. One example 
that Deleuze uses to illustrate this synthesis is Kant's critique of the 
Cartesian formulae: 'I think therefore I am'. The 'I am', or being, 
corresponds to the undetermined realm of the first synthesis of time; 
habit. The ’ I think' corresponds to the determination of the 
undetermined; memory which draws from habit both reproduction and 
recognition. However, Descartes' formulae explains nothing about the 
manner in which the determination of the undeterminable is produced. 
Kant's answer, Deleuze tells us, is to  add a third value, a value which 
would mediate the two extreme forms of habit and memory: that is, the 
determinable. "This third value suffices to make logic a transcendental
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instance. It amounts to the discovery of Difference - no longer in the 
form of an empirical difference between two determinations, but in the 
form of a transcendental Difference between the Determination as such 
and what it determines; no longer in the form of an external difference 
which separates, but in the form of an internal difference which 
establishes an a priori relation between thought and being" (DR 86). In 
Deleuze’s reading of Kant, the latter is said to insert time between the 
two extreme forms of habit and memory, thereby making the 'I think' an 
affectation of the passive self whose existence is essentially 
temporal. Determination is possible only on the grounds of a self, which 
is in constant flux, and which lives the two passive syntheses’ of 
Habitus and Mnemoysne. "It is as though the / were fractured from one 
end to the other: fractured by the pure and empty form of time. In this 
form it is the correlate of the passive self which appears in time. Time 
signifies a fault or fracture in the / and a passivity in the self, and the 
correlation between the passive self and the fractured I constitutes 
the discovery of the transcendental" (Ibid). This fractured or pure and 
empty form of time must be a more profound time than that which is 
constituted by a succession of instants, or a remembered past in 
comparison to a present. This form of time is not constituted by a 
movement of things, but rather this time is time itself, by itself and as 
itself. This "synthesis is necessarily static, since time is no longer 
subordinated to movement; time is the most radical form of change, but 
the form of change does not change" (DR 89). This third synthesis in 
which the future appears corresponds to an unequal distribution in a 
massive rupture between the before and the after, it profoundly 
distributes difference between the two extreme forms making possible 
a temporal series, while simultaneously drawing both the extremes 
together. In drawing the two extremes together the self becomes equal
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to the unequal and produces a future as something wholly new. 
However, "it causes neither the condition nor the agent to return: on the 
contrary, it repudiates these and expels them with all its centrifugal 
force. It constitutes the autonomy of the product, the independence of 
the work. It is repetition by excess which leaves intact nothing of the 
default or the becoming-equal. It is itself the new, complete novelty. It 
is by itself the third time in the series, the future as such" (DR 90). 
What conclusions may we draw from this tripartite  theory of 
repetition? In the first place, bare or material repetition corresponds 
to repetition in-itse lf; psychic or clothed repetition corresponds to 
repetition for-us; and ontological repetition corresponds to repetition 
for-itself. Secondly, it seems to us that the three syntheses’ of time 
articulated by Deleuze correspond to Kant's formulation, in his First 
Critique under the section Transcendental Deduction, of the three 
syntheses’ constitutive of the conditions of possibility for experience 
in general. The syntheses’ are: apprehension in intuition; reproduction 
in imagination; and recognition in a concept. The first corresponds to 
habit, the third to memory, and the second to metamorphosis. It is the 
second that will become the subject of Kant’s Third Critique, where the 
imagination is shown to be the ground of both intuition and the 
understanding. Thirdly, it  would seem possible to derive from this 
articulation of repetition the Heideggarian notion of the ontico- 
ontological distinction. However, this articulation is not exactly the 
same as it is in Heidegger, wherein the human Dasein corresponds to 
the only existent capable of revealing Being. Heidegger gives us five 
uses of transcendence:11 the towards the world; the immediate 
relation with other existents; the towards the future; the towards 
Being; and the out of Nothingness. In Deleuze, the three passive 1
11J. Wahl, A Short History of Existentialism, pp. 15-7.
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syntheses or repetitions - Habitus, Mnemoysne and Metamorphosis - 
which are also three forms of transcendence, correspond loosely to 
Heidegger's first three uses of transcendence: repetition in-itself is 
the toward the world; repetition for-us is the relation with other 
existents; and the repetition for-itself is the toward the future. What 
is ejected by Deleuze is Being and Nothingness, or rather a being 
(Dasein) which is toward Being and Nothingness. Therefore, ontological 
repetition, that is, the future, freedom and metamorphosis, loses its 
connection to a fundamental human being in order to become the for- 
itself, which undermines both condition and agent. Repetition for-itself 
is a movement alien to human being, it consumes human being in the 
furnace of the absolutely new. Ontological repetition constitutes the 
pure and empty form of time, an absolute formless form. This trace of 
Formalism which Deleuze also articulates in terms of depth, or an 
originary profondure, is withdrawn from the work subsequent to 
Difference and Repetition and The Logic o f Sense.
There exists a fundamental disparity at the heart of empiricism, 
between the hidden powers of nature and the principles of human 
nature.12 Ontological repetition is presumed to answer this problem, 
by hypothesising an irreducibly unequal merger across the abyss which 
separates the subject from the object, the material from the psychic, 
the real from the ideal. The passage between the two extremes is 
secured by the fact that both the material and the psychical repetitions 
find a common ground within ontological repetition - that is, 
ontological repetition is shown to be constituted by an irreducible 
duplicity or double bind. The two faces of an Event; the below and the 
above. Thought is shown to be material, and matter is shown to be
12 On the nature of this split see Deleuze's work on Hume in Empiricism and Subjectivity, wherein the 
constitutive imagination plays a fundamental role in mitigating the duality between the delirium of 
primary sensibility and the understanding.
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psychical. Quite simply, this is achieved through the reduction of the 
cosmos and all experience to a system of quantum mechanics: thought 
and matter are essentially energy. We find the same drama played-out 
in modern science, that is, the incommensurability between a general 
theory of relativity concerned with large-scale structure, and quantum 
mechanics concerned with micro-scale structure. What Deleuze wishes 
to derive from this is an originary mode of being beyond dialectics, a 
true transcendence wherein alienation is overcome. Ultimately, this 
will necessitate a unifying theory. However, let’s be certain that the 
mere hypothesising of a theory of energetics in no way demonstrates 
with all certainty the possibility of extracting a pure difference in 
itself for thought. A t this stage, it simply represents a hypothetical 
solution to the problem of traversing the abyss - that is, the problem 
of the overman.^
Before illustrating, by way of example, a model which Deleuze believes 
illustrates this double bind, let us look at the consequences for an 
understanding of difference which we derive from our tripartite  
repetition. To the three forms of repetition there corresponds three 
forms of difference; let us look at each of these in turn, in relation to 
the form of representation which the active syntheses extract,
a). The first form of difference is 'drawn off' from the passive 
synthesis of habitus, and concerns two determinations: genera and 13
13 Stephan Hawkins, in A Brief History of Time, takes the “view that a theory is just a model of the 
universe, or a restricted part of it, and a set of rules that relate quantities in the model to observations 
that we make. It exists only in our minds and does not have any other reality“ (p. 10-1). Therefore, all 
theories are hypothetical models which can not be absolutely proved. It is of interest to note that 
Deleuze names observations ‘qualities' to exemplify their subjective character. Hence, the importance 
given the distinction between the quantitative and the qualitative.
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species.14 Both determinations derive from the material perceptual 
field. On the one hand, in relation to species specific difference is 
determined between the species of a single genus. Oak, ash and beech 
are species of the genus tree: the genus tree is an emergent 
generalisation and out of which species are produced. In this manner, 
generalisation takes on an autonomy that subjugates the particularity 
of species. Thus, contrariety within  the genus becomes specific 
difference. "It seems indeed . . . that specific difference meets all the 
requirements of a harmonious concept and an organic representation . . . 
It is thus in the nature of genera to remain the same in themselves 
while becoming other in the differences which divide them . . .  In this 
manner, therefore, the determination of species ensures coherence and 
continuity in the comprehension of the concept" (DR 31). This kind of 
difference is no more than the inscription of difference within the 
identity of an undetermined concept (genus): a predicate of a concept; 
“This is an oak tree!” On the other hand, and in relation to genus, 
difference is assigned to a comparison between genera as categories. 
The comparison itself takes place within the identical concept of 
Being; that is, genera are attributes of a fundamental and all embracing 
Being which "is not collective, like genus in relation to its species, but 
only distributive and hierarchical: it has no content in itself, only a 
content in proportion to the formally different terms of which it is 
predicated" (DR 33). Spinozism. Moreover, that which carries out the 
comparison is judgment by means of analogy. "In this sense, the 
univocity of species in a common genus refers back to the equivocity of
14 In Hegel, singular individuality corresponds to the middle term of a duality between universal genus 
and universal individuality. Moreover, the middle term is reflected on both sides of the duality: once as 
species from the point of view of genus; and again as singular individuality (consciousness) from the 
perspective of the universal individuality. The process of a self-developing individual is intrinsic to the 
genus, therefore, "actuality starts from the genus” Phenomenology ot Spirit, §292. Deleuze reverses 
the priority: actuality starts from the singular.
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being in the various genera" (DR 34). Difference, therefore, is 
subjugated under the form of finite organic representation, since it 
concerns natural signs which always contain a matter. Organic, natural, 
perceptual, and finite, all imply a certain empirical consciousness. A 
connective synthesis which draws off difference from a series natural 
signs.
b). The second form of difference relates to the overcoming of organic 
representation by orgiastic representation. Orgiastic representation is 
constituted by two determinations: the infinitely small and the 
infinitely large. The active synthesis, which comes to fill the pure past 
constituted by the passive synthesis of Mnemosyne, is the form of 
representation which discovers the infinite within itself. The concept 
is now understood to include within itself all the particular elements 
which constitute organic representation, transforming it (concept) into 
a single and unique Whole which envelops all the finite parts. 
Leibnizianism and Hegelianism. "The signification of the very notion of 
limit changes completely: it no longer refers to the limits of finite 
representation, but on the contrary to  the womb in which finite 
determination never ceases to be born and to disappear, to be enveloped 
and deployed within orgiastic representation. It no longer refers to the 
limitation of a form, but to the convergence towards a ground; no 
longer to the distinction of forms but to the correlation of the grounded 
and the ground; no longer to the arrestation of power but to the element 
in which power is effectuated, on which it is grounded" (DR 42-3). 
Infinite representation thus includes the Whole which functions as 
ground which includes difference within itself and whose essence is 
the Self as the introspective self-consciousness. The Whole as an 
active memory whose restlessness moves toward the recognition of 
itself as an infinity of parts which constitute a totality.
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Infinite representation relates at once both the essence and the ground, and the difference 
between the two, to  a foundation or sufficient reason. Mediation itself has become 
foundation. However, in the one case the ground is the infinite continuity of the 
properties of the universal which is itself contained in fin ite  particular Selves 
considered as essences. In the other case, particulars are only properties or figures 
which are developed in the infinite universal ground, but refer to  essences as the true 
determinations of a pure Self, or rather a 'Self' enveloped by this ground. (DR 49)
In this manner, orgiastic representation subjugates difference under 
the principle of identity, that is, under the identity of World and Self. 
The conjunctive synthesis which internalises difference within the 
presupposed identity of the whole and the part.
c). The third kind of difference is difference in itself. Difference in 
itself is a multiplicity of positive differential elements; an ontological 
difference which ontological repetition makes. Difference in itself is 
primary to repetition for itself: difference in itself is pure becoming, 
repetition for itself is the being of this becoming. Subsisting between 
the two extreme forms, it does not equalise the difference between the 
extremes, but rather distributes difference amongst and within them. 
This difference implies a m ultip licity o f perspectives, which 
continually undermine the presupposed identity within finite and 
infinite representation. The pathos of distance is the affirmation of 
difference, wherein the irreducible difference(s) between two terms 
becomes the object of an affirmation. Disjunction and divergence are 
that which affirm and wherein the form of representation collapses 
within a sub-representative immediacy: a veritable multiplicity of 
positive singularities which do not identify the differences to which 
they refer, but perpetually displace difference itself. In this manner 
difference is shown differing - this is what Deleuze means by 
'unilateral difference. This world of implicated difference corresponds 




With eternal return, chao-errancy is opposed to  coherence, o f representation; it 
excludes both the  coherence of a subject which represents itself and that of an object 
represented. Re-petition opposes re-presentation: the prefix changes its meaning, since 
in the one case difference is said only in relation to  the identical, while in the other it is 
the univocal which is said of the different. Repetition is the formless being of all 
differences, the formless power of the ground which carries every object to that extreme 
'form' in which its  representation comes undone. (DR 57)
In relation to the formless ground, the Same and the Similar are only 
simulated e ffects, retrojected onto difference in itself and 
interiorised within the disparate series by repetition for itself. In this 
sense, it is the eternal return that returns; returning is the only same 
of that which returns. Herein, univocal Being constitutes an openness 
onto which thought may freely flow, not constrained as it was to 
equivocal Being in the synthesis of Habitus, nor to univocal Being of a 
contentless identity in the synthesis of Mnemoysne. In the synthesis of 
the pure empty form of time, Being constitutes the outside from which 
thought arrives, and within which thought is immanent: an outside 
which paradoxically is the most distant and imminent. A synthesis of 
inclusive disjunction in which divergence is affirmed in all its 
disparateness - an originary Otherness which constitutes a double 
crime against the Human: suicide and altrucide. However, suicide - and 
therefore altrucide - must be understood in terms of an act of empathy 
toward the infinite; wherein the surrender is not a result of a sense of 
futility, but rather constitutes a moment of productivity. This act is 
constantly jeopardised by the possibility of collapsing into the abyss 
of nihilistic despair. Paradoxically therefore a dynamic tension 
between self and transcendence must be maintained. This tension, as 
we will now explore, corresponds to a certain coincidence or coupling 
between two kinds of death. “ In fact,” Deleuze writes, “an entire
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difference of nature subsists between what is joined together or what 
is narrowly extended” (LS 156).
2. The goal of biopsychism is to articulate the differential structures 
that exist between the two extremities, thereby overcoming the 
fundamental antinomies postulated by philosophy, as well as providing 
a basis upon which to found a unified model of knowledge that would be 
grounded in action rather than intuition or reductionism. Freud makes 
the distinction between two kinds of instinct: life and death. Deleuze 
complicates this simple binarism by additionally distinguishing 
between two kinds of death.15
a) . Personal death refers to the death of the ego; the death which is 
encountered as absolute limit. This kind of death corresponds to the 
relation between the self-identity of the ego and a radical alterity. We 
can only conceive personal death by means of an inverted image 
generated by the ego - that is, an image of absolute negation that 
remains wholly unconscious. For this reason Freud described it as 
speculative.
b) . Impersonal death, refers to the Death instinct proper and defines a 
state of free differences, no longer subject to the form of identity 
which the ego imprints on transcendence. This kind of death is not 
speculative but experiential and immediate, owing to the manner that 
it is presented within psychic life. As Blanchot tells us: “Thus night, 
which is Igitur’s intimacy, the pulsating death which is the heart of
15 The distinction between the two kinds of death bears a striking resemblance to Blanchot’s own 
articulation, and almost certainly owes its origination, in Deleuze, to the manner in which it is presented 
in The Space oi Literature [pp. 85-159]. However, in Blanchot the impersonal death is presented in 
the third person individual and plural, whereas in Deleuze It It is taken beyond this model into the 
fourth person impersonal and preindividual. As he writes: “The splendour of the they’ is the 
splendour of the event itself or the fourth person. This is why there are no private or collective events, 




each of us, must become life itself, the sure heart of life, so that death 
may ensue, so that death may for an instant let itself be grasped, 
identified - in order that death might become the death of an identity 
which has decided it and willed it.” 16
Freud modelled his notion of death on personal death, thereby reducing 
it to a biological and mechanistic entity. He claims we can speak of 
death only in speculative terms because it essentially exists as an 
absolute alterity ungraspable by the ego. Deleuze challenges this 
reduction of the Death instinct to a biological model17 by means of 
Lacan's interpretation, which articulates it in terms of a rebellion by 
the unconscious instincts and drives on the imaginary unity of the ego. 
Through Lacan’s reading, the Death instinct finds a higher function as a 
psychological phenomenon.
For Deleuze, there can never be a moment in which death could be 
absolute or identical with itself. Absolute death is merely an effect 
generated by the transcendental illusion. Deleuze accordingly 
articulates death in terms of a positive model that does not affirm 
annihilation, but transformation and change. Furthermore, he wishes to 
think the time of the death drive, and insists that death is never what
16 Ibid, p. 115.
17 In connection with his belief in the conservative nature of the ego-instincts, Freud tells us: 'Those 
instincts are therefore bound to give a deceptive appearance of being forces tending toward change 
and progress, whilst in fact they are merely seeking to reach an ancient goal by paths alike old and 
new. Moreover it is possible to specify this final goal in all organic striving. It would be in contradiction 
to the conservative nature of the instincts if the goal of life were a state of things which had never yet 
been attained. On the contrary, it must be an old state of things, an initial state from which the living 
entity has at one time or other been departed and to which it is striving to return by the circuitous paths 
along which its development leads. If we are to take it as a truth that knows no exception that 
everything living dies for internal reasons - becomes inorganic once again - then we shall be 
compelled to say that the aim of all life is death' and, looking backwards, that ‘inanimate things existed 
before living ones'." (Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 310-11). Freud's argument is blatantly 
entropic, it is unable therefore to explain either the increasing complexification of life or the fact that 
death is a relatively recent invention. That is, bacteria as a life form constitutes the far greater history of 
the evolution of life on Earth. Moreover, because of its mode of reproduction, by means of 
androgynous replication, it cannot be said die. Potentially, germ-cells are immortal. We will discuss 
these points in greater detail shortly.
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it appears to be, but always involves a play of masks and disguises, of 
difference and repetition, of simulation and simulacra. In short, for 
Deleuze the Death instinct corresponds to  a more primordial, pre- 
organic and pre-egoic state which the Situationists sloganised as: The 
nostalgia o f mud. By taking death beyond the image generated of it by 
the transcendental illusion, Deleuze avoids the presupposition of the 
normative subject that we find in Freud. Within the pre-organic there 
is no difference between life and death: Thanatos is indistinguishable 
from the desexualization of Eros. In this manner, Deleuze is able to 
interpret the Freudian unconscious drives in terms of pure energy; 
energy that desires metamorphosis over stasis and destruction.
Let us take a closer look at his analysis of Freud, particularly in 
relation to repetition, in order to uncover the manner in which Deleuze 
complicates repetition through its extension onto the virtual 
dimension.
The three figures of repetition which Deleuze articulates concerns an 
analysis of Freud's essay Beyond the Pleasure Principle. The first 
passive synthesis, which corresponds to the formation of habit, is 
constituted by a contraction of elementary excitations. "A totality of 
this kind - a mobile distribution of differences and local resolutions 
within an intensive field - corresponds to what Freud called the Id" (DR 
96). This binding of difference is what organises biopsychical life, and 
is produced, not by means of pleasure, but by the value extracted from 
pleasure as a principle. These bound excitations constitute the drives, 
each drive forming a larval ego within the Id itself. "The Id is populated 
by local egos which constitute the time peculiar to the Id, the time of 
the living present there where the binding integrations are carried out" 
(DR 97). Habit, therefore, is not subordinated to pleasure, but rather, 
precedes it and renders it possible: we should not confuse the activity
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of reproducing an excitation because it is pleasurable, with the passion 
for repetition which precedes it. The distinction is between active and 
passive syntheses and corresponds to the subjective-objective dualism: 
the reproduction of pleasure is a function of the subjective principle, 
actualised by means of extracting a surplus value from the more 
primary objective repetitions which constitute pleasure's 'beyond'. "The 
repetition of an excitation has as its true object the elevation of the 
passive synthesis to a power which implies the pleasure principle 
along with its future and its past applications. Repetition in habit or 
the passive synthesis of binding is thus 'beyond' the principle" (DR 98). 
This binding constitutes what Deleuze calls the 'transcendental 
aesthetic',18 as the real conditions of sensibility which the passive 
self constitutes through its power of synthesis.
Upon the passive synthesis a double evolution is built: an active 
synthesis which relates the excitation to a real object, which 
activates the Ego by unifying the passive egos; and the construction of 
a virtual object which "governs and compensates for the progresses and 
failures of its real activity" (DR 99). The Ego itself sits at the 
intersection between the real and the virtual. These virtual objects, or 
idealities, are the ends toward which activity is directed. However, 
they are essentially paradoxical entities, under the power of a pure 
becoming which lacks an absolute identity, i.e., the serious and the 
playful father. But the virtual object is incorporated in the real object; 
"it remains planted or stuck there, and does not find in the real object 
the half which completes it, but rather testifies to the other virtual 
half which the real continues to lack" (DR 101). That is, the virtual 
object is ambivalent and belongs essentially to the past. "Although it is
18 In Kant's articulation of the Transcendental Aesthetic', in his Critique of Pure Reason, the binding 
principle is already subordinated to the forms of space and time, whereas for Deleuze, repetition itself 
constitutes both space and time within the simultaneous instant of binding.
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deduced from the present real object, the virtual object differs from it 
in kind: not only does it lack something in relation to the real object 
from which it is subtracted, it lacks something in itself, since it is 
always half of itself, the other half being different as well as absent. 
This absence . . .  is the opposite of a negative. Eternal half of itself, it 
is where it is only on condition that it is not where it should be" (DR 
102). Therefore, virtual objects exist as displaced fragments, and are 
discovered only as lost, belonging to a pure past which was never 
present: the object = x. This virtuality constitutes the second passive 
synthesis of Mnemosyne.
Deleuze criticises Freud for reducing these processes to the material 
or bare repetition. Within the bare repetitions constitutive of the Id he 
locates, or rather presupposes, the identity of the former present and 
the identity of the present present of a representing subject: past and 
present moments. This understanding of temporality opens up a space 
between the two discontinuous and instantaneous presents, which it is 
the aim of repetition to fill. Or rather, the aim of bare repetition to 
bridge. In this sense, Freud constituted time as a connective synthesis 
and linear temporalisation. Deleuze's question is; how is it possible for 
something to be acted upon from a distance? That is, how is it possible 
for the events experienced during infancy to perpetuate an effect which 
persists in adult life? The answer Deleuze offers is to constitute the 
past and present not in terms of a single linear serialisation, but 
rather, to view both past and present as forming their own series 
within a 'parallel' structure between and through which the virtual 
object traverses, circulates, and is displaced. "Repetition is 
constituted only with and through the disguises which affect the terms 
and relations of the real series, but it is so because it depends upon the 
virtual object as an immanent instance which operates above all by
155
Transcendental Empiricism
displacement" (DR 105). The genius of parallelism is that it undermines 
the notions of originality and derivation. The two presents "put a 
variety of terms and subjects into play in a complex intersubjectivity 
in which each element owes it role and function in the series to the 
timeless position that it occupies in relation to the virtual object. As 
for this object itself, it can no longer be treated as an ultimate or 
original term: this would be to assign it a fixed place and an identity 
repungent to its whole nature" (Ibid). Therefore, communication 
between the series takes place by means of a disguise proper to the 
displacement of the virtual object itself: a veritable play of masks 
behind which lie only more masks, ad infinitum. Therefore, Deleuze 
claims: "Repetition is thus in essence symbolic, spiritual, and 
intersubjective" (DR 106). In fact, the virtual symbolic object 
constitutes a problematic field of differential elements, which we 
know by the name of the ‘unconscious’. In this sense, the questioning 
directed toward differential structures correspond to the potential 
displacements which the virtual object could possibly actualise in 
answers. "Questions and problems are not speculative acts, and as such 
completely provisional and indicative of the momentary ignorance of an 
empirical subject. On the contrary, they are the living acts of the 
unconscious, investing special objectivities and destined to survive in 
the provisional and partial state characteristic of answers and 
solutions" (Ibid). Again we detect Deleuze making the distinction 
between the two extremes: objective and subjective. On the one hand, 
problems and solutions belong to the material stratum, i.e., chloroform 
as a solution to the problem of sunlight. On the other hand, questions 
and answers correspond to a subjective mind confronted by a 
problematic horizon. Furthermore, we should not understand the two 
extremes as being absolute, but rather, grasp the space between them
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as an infin ity of fractal levels and evolutionary stratums. It is 
Deleuze's contention that Freud, although recognising the unconscious 
as a differential structure populated by larval egos, nonetheless 
reduced these constitutive elements to phenomena like the 
representations found in consciousness: that is, to simple identities 
which subjugate difference in itself.
It follows that the virtual object is essentially displaced, while the 
real object is essentially disguised. By interiorising the difference 
between the two series of real and virtual, by experiencing itself as 
displaced and disguised,
the libido returns or flows back into the ego and the passive ego becomes entirely 
narcissistic. The narcissistic ego is inseparable not only from a constitutive wound but 
from the disguises and displacements which are woven from one side to  the other, and 
constitute its modification.... For while the passive ego becomes narcissistic, the activity 
must be thought This can occur only in the form of an affection, in the form of the very 
modification that the narcissistic ego passively experiences on its own account. 
Thereafter, the narcissistic ego is related to  the form of an I which operates upon it in 
the form o f an 'Other'. This active but fractured I is not only the basis of the superego but 
the correlate of the passive and wounded narcissistic ego. (DR 110).
Furthermore, the narcissistic ego corresponds to the pure and empty 
form of time, not as that which fills this time, but rather as the 
spatial phenomenon o f the form in general. Herein, we enter into the 
third synthesis of time, which has abandoned all possible content as 
well as the real and virtual circles of a present and past, of connection 
and conjunction. This empty form of time is the death instinct, the 
desexualised and displaced energy constitutive of Thanatos. This death 
"refers to the state of free differences when they are no longer subject 
to the form imposed upon them by an I or an ego, when they assume a 
shape which excludes my own coherence no less than that of any 
identity whatsoever" (DR 113). Within the third synthesis, thought 
becomes the pure straight form of a desexualised energy which opens
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us onto empty time: a 'genital' or unconscious thought which knows 
nothing of representation.
For a system of free differences to exist prior to representation, it 
must be capable of relating the different to the different within an 
immediate dimension of differentiation. As we have seen, for Deleuze 
there are three conditions which must be met in order for difference in 
itself to be conceivable: i). a serial organisation of different elements; 
ii). at least two such series in communication; iii). and a forced 
movement derived from the communication between series. "If we 
suppose that the series communicate under the impulse of a force of 
some kind, then it is apparent that this communication relates 
differences to other differences, constituting differences between 
differences within the system. These second-degree differences play 
the role of the 'differenciator' - in other words, they relate the first- 
degree differences to one another" (DR 117, emphasis added). Thus, the 
differences between serial elements are related to each other through 
a differentiator: Such a system of differences related by a 
differentiator is characterised as 'intensive'. In relation to the example 
of biopsychical life: habit is the serial organisation of different 
elements; memory is the tota lity of series within the system of 
communication; and the death instinct is the forced movement derived 
from the communication. Within such a system:
Spatio-temporal dynamisms fill the system, expressing simultaneously the resonance of 
the coupled series and the amplitude of the forced movement which exceeds them. The 
system is populated by subjects, both larval subjects and passive selves: passive selves 
because they are indistinguishable from the contemplation of couplings and resonances; 
larval subjects because they are the supports or the patients of the dynamisms. In effect, 
a pure spatio-temporal dynamism, w ith  its necessary participation in the forced 
movement, can be experienced only at the borders of the livable, under conditions beyond 
which it would entail the  death of any well-constituted subject endowed with 
independence and activity. (DR 118)
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Therefore, can difference in itself be experienced only under biological, 
chemical, or wholly unconscious conditions which necessarily preclude 
a well-constituted subject? It would appear that it is only under the 
conditions of a larval or partial subject that these dynamisms are 
experiential. This first difficulty raises doubts as the the possibility, 
or even validity, of proving this theory, given that we are unable to 
experience it by means of our critical analytic faculties. That is, 
ultimately, does this theory merely constitute an hypothesis about the 
world through the use of metaphors such as resonance, forced 
movement, seriality, communication, etc.? The difficulty Deleuze faces 
is that of showing the virtual to be more than merely hypothetical or 
metaphorical, that is, to show the virtual as real: yet a reality without 
substantiality, or actuality (Proust).
A second difficulty arises from this first: if, as is claimed, difference 
in itse lf is the prior condition to  all system atisation; Is 
systematisation as such possible without presupposing the identity 
(even the most minimal) of that which induces the forced movement? Is 
Deleuze merely pushing back the problem of essence and identity one 
stage further, while the problem itself remains unresolved? In fact, 
this is exactly what Deleuze himself tells us, but he stresses that this 
seeming identity is only an effect of the functioning o f this 
communicator, or what he otherwise terms a 'dark precursor'.19 Later 
in this chapter we will further clarify this position through the idea of 
‘quanta’. This precursor is essentially imperceptible, it covers over its 
own functioning as well as the in itself of difference. The identity and
19 The concept appears to be taken from R. Ruyer. Since Ruyer claims the idea of a subconscious to 
be illusory, he is forced to distinguish between two kinds of consciousness: the dark and the light. 
Light consciousness, lor obvious reasons, is associated with sight and self-consciousness, whereas 
dark consciousness is more like an implicate order and condition for any consciousness. As he tells 
us: “An embryonic area, not yet induced to differentiate itself according to its competence, is a dark 
consciousness” (There is no Subconscious, p. 27).
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resemblance attributed to it are merely the habit of thinking difference 
from the position of representation. As he tells us: "the logical identity 
abstractly imputed to it by reflection, along with the physical 
resemblance which reflection imputes to the series which it relates, 
express only the statistical effect of its functioning upon the system 
as a whole. In other words, these express only the manner in which it 
conceals itself under its own effects, because of the way it perpetually 
displaces itself within itself and perpetually disguises itself in the 
series" (DR 120). Thus, what the dark precursor names is disparateness 
itself, or rather the forced movement within the disparate.
A further difficulty arises: one which affirms that difference in itself 
exists prior to serialisation and resonance and, therefore, can exist by 
itself. In fact, all three conditions coexist and presuppose each other. 
The priority given difference in itself is that it produces movement, 
and in movement there is life, life at all levels of existence: physical, 
vegetative, organic and psychical. The only difference between these 
ontogenetic and phylogenetic strata are the frequency of the rhythms 
by which they resonate and the movements derived from the 
resonances. It is the connections, resonances and movements which 
constitute their particular quality through their specific speeds.
In short, the force under which series communicate in general is 
termed a dark precursor, which conceals itself, displaces itself, 
disguises itself, and is the disparate as such. Linguistically speaking, 
all these terms (conceal, dark, displace, disguise, and disparate, as 
well as mask, secret, obscure) have the same meaning, that is, to 
"conceal". Hence, the category of 'concealment' can only refer to the 
speculative or hypothetical nature imputed to the conditions of 
possibility pertaining to being and to the thought of difference in 
itself. Since this dark precursor always remains hidden, or covered
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over by its effects, under what possible conditions could a well- 
constituted subject grasp it; how could consciousness be adequate to 
perceiving it? The answer must necessarily, and by definition, be given 
in terms of 'negativity'. The question as to whether we can experience 
difference differentially has not ye t been answered satisfactorily. 
However, the dark precursor itself does not operate by means of a lack 
or poverty, but rather by an excess. It is because it is essentially 
excessive that it lacks identity, an excess, moreover, which induces 
identity and resemblance into the system as a whole. It follows from 
this analysis that we remain within a dialectic constituted by an 
excess-stasis dualism, or what Deleuze elsewhere calls the problem- 
solution dialectic.
What function could transcendence hold from the point of view of 
politics? The answer can only concern the status of law and anarchy. A 
principle is an empirical law that governs a particular field; it follows 
that the pleasure principle governs, without exception, the field of life 
in general. Whereas the compulsion to  repeat unpleasurable experiences 
owes its force to pre-egoic or rather repressed libido-energy. It is the 
purpose of psychoanalysis to bring to  consciousness such compulsive 
behaviour.2o However, for life to comply to the law of pleasure, a 
transcendental principle is necessary: this second-order principle is 
repetition. Therefore, every empirical law require a transcendental 20
20 Eros is the binding force constitutive of life, since life implies structure. As Freud Tells us in Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle: “We have decided to relate pleasure and unpleasure to the quantity of 
excitation that is present in the mind but is not in any way ‘bound’; and to relate them in such a manner 
that unpleasure corresponds to an increase in the quantity of excitation and pleasure to a diminution" 
[p. 276]. Therefore, the Death instinct corresponds to an increase in the quantity of unbound 
excitation, or what Deleuze calls repetition run wild. Pain is the process by which the constituted 
Subject is undermined by flooding the mental apparatus and thereby disturbing the functioning of the 
pleasure principle, pleasure as the principle or tendency toward constancy, with a massive input of 
unformed excitation that spells destruction. Freud's theory operates through the duality of constancy 
and dissolution; the argument is entropic and presupposes a normative Subject. For Deleuze pain 
destabilises recognition, resists representation and is ultimately in the service of transformation rather 
than destruction. The Subject cracks open, normativity collapses and the anarchic is realised.
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principle,21 since their truth lies in the ‘beyond’ of empiricism. 
Consequently, Deleuze is interested with transcendence in general in 
order to grasp the essence of freedom beyond the repressive structures 
which laws impose upon humanity. For Deleuze, subversion takes place 
through two processes: irony and humour.
In ancient Greece, the law represented the Good, in the same manner 
that the attributes represented particular aspects of God in Spinoza. 
Virtuousness consisted in complying to the laws of the land, by means 
of which the individual would partake in the Good on a secondary level. 
The Good functioned both as the authorising principle of the law, and as 
the foundation upon which civil society rested, and from which the 
citizen sought guidance through an ethical code of conduct. The irony is 
that the laws are not the Good itself, while the humour lies in the fact 
that the ethical life is achieved only through complying to the laws. 
Kant, by means of the Copernican revolution, reverses the relation 
between the good and the law. The law is now absolute, it finds in 
itself its own founding principle and upon which the good is now made 
to depend. The object of the law is indeterminate while its form is 
absolute. All stand guilty before the law. And since the law has no 
determinate object, its essence haunts the psyche, behaving in the 
manner of the 'thought police' and turning the conscience of the 
individual against himself. Paradoxically, the more virtuous the
21 The reason why Deleuze calls the transcendental a second-order principle complies with the way in 
which science separates the problem of a unifying theory into two parts. As S. Hawkins tells us in A 
Brief History of Time. “First, there are the laws that tell us how the universe changes with time.... 
Second, there is the question of the initial state of the universe. Some people feel that science 
should be concerned with only the first part; they regard the question of the initial situation as a matter 
for metaphysics or religion . . .  Yet it appears that he [God] chose to make it [the universe] evolve in a 
very regular way according to certain laws. It therefore seems equally reasonable to suppose that 
there are also laws governing the initial state" [p. 12], It should not be understood that Hawkins is 
saying that the initial state was or is stable, but rather, that evolution follows a certain regular pattern of 
behaviour to which we can ascribe laws and make hypotheses' about. The first are empirical principles, 
and the second transcendental principles.
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individual the greater the force of conscience introjected, and the more 
guilty he stands before the law. The irony now is that the law has no 
foundation, while the humour resides in the fact tha t the more we 
comply the guiltier we are. Freud resolved this paradox by showing that 
conscience is an effect of the renunciation of instinctual desires. 
Therefore, the law is repressed desire.
In order to dismantle the structures of repression the law must be 
subverted.22 Since the law in its modern form has no determinate 
object, its subversion leads us into a transcendental domain of 
indeterminacy, that is, anarchy. Two extreme models of anarchic 
practice that Deleuze articulates are sadism and masochism. “These 
two transcendent functions essentially characterise the two 
perversions, they are twin ways in which the monstrous exhibits itself 
in reflection."23 On the one hand, sadism subverts the law by means of 
an ironic practice, taking the principles of the law - the good laws 
themselves - to  the point of absurdity and thereby found a new 
transcendental principle. However, this method fails as do all methods 
which seek to  locate first principles within a transcendent domain,
22 The whole intellectual thrust behind Deleuze’s Masochism can be defined as a desire to articulate 
two forms of subversion which correspond to his understanding of the Death instinct. These two 
forms, sadism and masochism, he names perverse in order to distinguish them from the formations of 
the narcissistic ego and the superego. The latter are constituted upon conjunctions between Eros 
and Thanatos, and the former upon disjunctions between the two instincts. It is by means of this 
disjunction or crack in the structure of the constituted Subject that transcendence is possible. The 
crack testifies to the fact that the Subject is immersed within a continual process of simultaneously 
being bound and unbound; both life and death instincts in combination. The pleasure principle still 
retains its autonomy within this third formation, even though it take for itself pain as that form of 
pleasure. Pain, as the force of destruction and fragmentation, rests upon the transcendental principle 
of repetition. However, this form of repetition cannot be subordinated to a pleasure principle 
constituted as the anticipation of pleasure. "(Plain in this case has no sexual significance at all; on the 
contrary it represents a desexualization which makes repetition autonomous and gives it 
instantaneous sway over the pleasures of resexualization. Eros is desexualised and humiliated for the 
sake of a resexualised Thanatos" (M 120). Thus it is erotic without being sexual. Repetition run wild 
means taking the compulsion to repeat and multiplying it to the nth degree in order to extract a new 
value from an old habit. Metamorphosis necessitates the hyperbolization of our compulsive 
repetitions, so as to extract a surplus value.
23 Ibid, p. 23.
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since it is le ft with no option but to present its principle as 
speculative. On the other hand, masochism subverts the law by means 
of a humorous practice which, before any act or breach of the law is 
committed, takes willingly upon itself the punishment that the law 
commands, only after the punitive dispensation does the masochist 
demand the pleasure that the law forbids. As Deleuze tells us: "From 
the idea that the law should not be based on the principle of the Good 
but on its form alone, the sadist fashions a new method of ascending 
from the law to a superior principle; this principle, however, is the 
informal element of a primary nature which aims at the subversion of 
all laws. In the other modern discovery that the law increases the guilt 
of the person who submits to  it, the masochist in his turn finds a new 
way of descending from the law to its consequences: he stands guilt on 
its head be making punishment into a condition that makes possible the 
forbidden pleasure."24 Ultimately, for the masochist, the torturer 
represents the cruel mother with whom he will commit incest: by 
taking upon himself the punishment he atones for his guilt and makes 
possible the pleasure that was denied him.
3. Monod dismisses the common sensical belief tha t there exists a 
fundamental distinction between two types of object: the natural and 
the artificial. Firstly, from the perspective of form and structure, both 
kinds of objects display regularity and repetition, since they represent 
homologous structures with exact symmetries; as in the case of 
crystals and pyramids. Secondly, from the perspective of function, the 
natural and the artificial equally materialise 'purposiveness'; as 
exemplified in the function of the eye and the camera. Thirdly, from the 
perspective of origins, what or who created the each object? Is the
24 Ibid, p. 89.
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creative process the same for both objects, or can we argue that the 
artifact results from purely exogenous forces, whereas the natural 
living being is the result of purely endogenous forces, "Implying a 
virtually to ta l 'freedom ' w ith respect to  external agents or 
conditions."25 There are two main theories which assert that the 
evolutionary process is a result of purely endogenous forces: on the one 
hand, ‘vitalism’, which as we saw with respect to Bergson, is an open- 
ended creative tendency that operates only throughout the biosphere, 
but presupposes an irreducible distinction between the inanimate and 
the living. Secondly, ‘animism’ affirms a universal design principle 
operative throughout the whole of the cosmos, including the biosphere, 
guided by a divine awareness that permeates every kind of object from 
the inanimate to the human. “A universal theory” , Monod writes, “would 
obviously have to extend to include relativity, the theory of quanta, and 
the theory of elementary particles. Provided certain initial conditions 
could be formulated, it  would also contain a cosmology which would 
forecast the general evolution of the evolution. We know however . . . 
that these predictions could be no more than statistical.”26 Therefore, 
dismissing both the distinction between the inanimate and the living 
and a naive psychologism, Monod claims that the origins of both types 
of object are the same; they are macroscopic actualisations of 
microscopic processes. He names this mechanism 'morphogenesis’.
The structural stability of a living organism is maintained by the 
information constitutive of that organism. This information is written 
in the language of a genetic code and has two essential properties: the 
ability to  replicate and express itself. All teleonomic behaviour 
characteristic of a living organism is attributable to the highly
25 J. Monod, Chance and Necessity, p. 21.
26 Ibid, p. 48-9. Emphasis added.
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efficient and cybernetic manner in which it maintains its stability and 
reproduces itself. In short, the s tric t fide lity  by which the 
morphogenetic mechanism functions generates the transcendental 
illusions of vitalism and animism. For Monod, "the Darwinian idea that 
the initial appearance, evolution, and continuous refining of ever more 
intensely teleonomic structures are due to disturbances occurring in a 
structure which already possesses the property o f invariance - and 
hence is capable of preserving the effects of change and thereby 
submitting them to the play of natural selection."27 
Proteins are the essential molecular agents of teleonomic performance 
in living beings. Living beings can be considered as chemical machines 
of precise adjustment maintained by enzymes playing the role of 
specific catalysts. Every organism constitutes an integrated functional 
machine and self-constructing cybernetic system that regulates the 
organism by means of certain proteins that recognise specific chemical 
signals. “All these teleonomic performances rest, in the final analysis, 
upon the proteins’ so-called ‘stereospecific’ properties, that is to  say 
upon their ability to ‘recognise’ other molecules . . .  by their shape, this 
shape being determined by their molecular structure. There is here, 
quite literally, a microscopic discriminative ( if  not ‘cognitive’ ) 
faculty.”28 This ability tha t the regulatory proteins possess in 
teleonomically identifying the shape of other molecules defines, 
perhaps, the two most basic concepts in evolutionary theory: structure 
and function. Moreover, the chemical reactions constitutive of an 
organism’s development and performance are catalysed by enzymic 
proteins that are stereospecific to  both one kind of compound 
(structure) and one reaction (function). u[E]nzymes, at the microscopic
27 Ibid, p. 32.
28 Ibid. p. 52.
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level, exercise an order-creating function. But this creation of order . . . 
is not gratuitous; it comes about at the expense of . . . draining 
chemical potential into the processes chosen by the programme of 
which they are the executors.”29 In this way, Monod reconciles the 
seeming paradox of the ubiquitous law of entropy and the increasing 
complexity of biochemical evolution.
The regulatory proteins, whose activity is both inter- and intracellular, 
are controlled by several chemical potentials, allowing the system to 
react nonlinearly to variations in potential while simultaneously 
constituting thresholds for fine tuning. Regulation itself is executed by 
a number o f mechanisms: feedback loops, metabolite activation, 
substrate, and in some cases remote precursors (dark precursors). 
These proteins, or allosteric enzymes, are each capable of recognising 
at least two different chemical states. This ability to discriminate 
between chemical signals and to select one of a number of possible 
states, proceeds exclusively from the protein itself; that is, the 
decisions are all made locally, producing something out of nothing, 
since there is no direct genetic plan or blueprint for what will emerge. 
Therefore, there exists an essential independence between the 
chemical signals and the discriminatory functions of the protein. This 
point is of most importance, since it  illustrates the irreducible 
relation between structure and function on this very primary level. As 
Monod tells us:
The way in which allosteric interactions work hence permits a complete freedom in the 
'choice' of controls. And the controls, subject to  no chemical requirements, will be the 
more responsive to  physiological requirements, by virtue of which they will be selected 
according to  the increased coherence and the a ffin ity they confer on the cell or organism. 
In short, th e  very gratuitousness of these systems, giving molecular evolution a 
practically limitless field for exploration and experiment, enabled it to  elaborate a huge 
network o f cybernetic interconnections which makes each organism an autonomous
29 Ibid, p. 64.
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functional unit, whose performances appear to  transcend, if not to  escape, the laws of 
chem istry.3°
As we have seen, the three dimensional structure of a globular protein 
is determined by two types of chemical bond: the linear sequences of 
amino acids which are exclusively specified by the genetic code, and 
the ‘spontaneous’ and ‘autonomous’ folding of these linear sequences in 
to very complex pseudo-globular structures. Out of all the foldings 
potentially available to the linear sequences of amino acids, only one is 
selected. Moreover, the protein’s functional activity is a consequence 
of its folded structure. This chemical origami defines the epigenetic 
process at a most fundamental level. Furthermore, the information 
contained in the environment plays an essential role in determining 
which of the many potential structures is actually expressed. These 
“ [¡initial conditions” , Monod claims: “ consequently contribute to the 
items of information finally closed in the globular structure. Without 
specifying it, they contribute to the realisation of a unique shape by 
eliminating all alternative structures, in this way proposing - or 
rather, imposing - an unequivocal interpretation of a potentially 
equivocal message."30 1
All structure in the biosphere is written in the form of self-replicating 
DNA, that is translated into linear sequences of amino acids and 
expressed in the foldings of these linear sequences into globular 
proteins.32 Moreover, the translation mechanism is s tr ic tly
irreversible: that is, transformation at the level of protein structure, 
due to environmental constraints, are not transmitted to the DNA. By 
this model, information is unidirectional. Consequently the system is
30 Ibid, p. 79.
31 Ibid, p. 93.
32 In S. Kauffman, order - structure and function - is described in terms of a spontaneously emergent 
property, and is therefore not written in the form of DNA. On this we will have more to say shortly.
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completely endogenous and impervious to any changes that might occur 
in the environment. Therefore, mutations which are constantly 
occurring at the level of the genetic information code haveD two 
principal causes: the recombinations of genes through the activity of 
sex; and the effects of microscopic events, governed by the principle of 
uncertainty, during the process of replication. Both these causes 
involve radical contingency: the first in the form of a chance encounter 
between two organisms; the second as the unpredictable outcome of a 
quantum event.
Once a mutation is inscribed within the structure of DNA, it is 
replicated, translated and expressed w ith great fidelity; chance 
mutations thereby come under the law of necessity, that is, the initial 
conditions into which a chance event will enter and become subject to. 
As Monod tells us:
It is the teleonomic apparatus, as it functions when a mutation first expresses itself, 
th a t lays down th e  essential initial conditions fo r the admission, temporary or 
permanent, or rejection of the chance-bred innovative a ttem p t. It is teleonomic 
performance, the aggregate expression of the properties of the network of constructive 
and regulatory interactions, tha t is judged by selection; and th a t is why evolution itself 
seems to  be fulfilling a design, seems be be carrying out a 'project', that of perpetuating
and amplifying some ancestral 'dream.'33
Therefore, as an irreversible process, evolution defines a direction in 
time identical to the direction defined by entropy.
However, increasing complexity has a corresponding increase in 
autonomy with respect to environment. One of the cognitive functions 
in man is to analyse sensory inputs in order to obtain representations 
of the outside world geared to man's specific performances. "[Ajnalysis 
by the central nervous system of sense impressions furnishes a meagre 
and slanted image of the external world; a kind of resume where the
33 J. Monod, Chance and Necessity, p. 115.
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emphasis and focus are exclusively upon what is of special interest to 
the animal, in view of its specific behaviour."34 Monod goes on to call 
these predispositions innate frames of cognitive reference that are 
synonymous with Cartesian innate ideas. In this sense, the world as we 
perceive it is a simulated image of our hereditarily biological 
predispositions which have been passed on to us from our ancestors 
through natural selection. Simulation can even be likened to a creative 
process, since it does not adhere strictly to empirical principles, that 
is, to a s tric t objectivity. Simulation is not primarily verbal but 
imaginative, or rather image based, and thought itself is grounded in 
this process of simulation. These predispositions we may, after Kant, 
call faculties without having to restrict their functioning solely to the 
mental apparatus. Innate behaviour is genetically determined and, 
therefore, subject to the process of evolution as natural selection 
through adaptation. In effect, the faculties are like filters tuned to a 
certain prearranged frequency, a specific sonic bandwidth which they 
draw off from the white noise of their environment. Ideas are therefore 
not external but internal subjective phenomena. The outside world is a 
problematic field toward which minds and bodies, tuned to their own 
genetic, adaptive and historical characteristic, are directed: “what we 
see is what we are.” Once man evolved the faculty of simulation, he 
left the purely physical path of development and entered into a dual 
evolution: physical and ideational. In fact, the more developed the 
faculty of simulation grew, the greater the autonomy it exerted over 
man's destiny and conditions of selection. Since it is behaviour which 
orients selective pressure, this development presumable influenced the 
genetic evolution of the innate categories of the human brain.
Essentially two problems arise out of Monod’s theory of evolution. The 34
34 Ibid, p. 141.
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first which has been adequately noted by M. Eigen’s:
We should really be asking the questions: How did the programme tha t the enzymes 
execute come into being? How did enzymes become adapted to  their teleonomic function? 
It is true that Monod regarded optimisation as caused by evolution, which is connected to  
tim e’s arrow and cannot run backwards (and thus takes place far from  chemical 
equilibrium); and he saw that evolution, w ith the help of selection, ‘draws from a well of 
inexhaustible chance’. But Monod went too far In believing tha t only chance can be a 
source of creation, while necessity, physical law, must be content with the minor role of
a blind selection sieve.35
Monod presents evolution as an unintelligent process generated by 
random mutation and constrained by physical law. This constitutes yet 
another version of reductionism to material causes. The second problem 
relates to the claim that Monod makes about evolution being a purely 
endogenous process, that is, that change occurs only in one direction: 
from the genetic to the biological. However, as S. Kauffman tells us in 
relation to the emerging sciences: “Organisms are not merely tinkered- 
together contraptions, bricolage, in Jacob’s phrase. Evolution is not 
merely ‘chance caught on the wing,’ in Monod’s evocative image.”36 In 
order to pursue this hypothesis we will draw on the work of J. Piaget, 
from the perspective of both biogeneticism and psychogeneticism 
respectively.
The genius of Lamarck undoubtedly lies in his recognition of behaviour's 
importance in the determination of an organ’s structure. However, he 
went too far in proposing a purely exogenous origin of behaviour, and 
thereby overlooking the fact that all behaviour also implies the 
intervention of endogenous factors. Thus, Lamarck failed to distinguish 
between habits and instincts. Piaget defines habits and instincts in 
terms of exogenous phenotypical behaviour and endogenous genotypical 
organisation respectively. Lamarck’s mistake was to believe that the
35 M. Eigen, Steps Towards Life, p. 123.
36 S. Kauffman, At Home in the Universe, p. 25.
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habits are exclusively determined by the environment. It is quite true 
that environmental pressures give rise to transformations in behaviour, 
but these transformations must be understood in terms of an extension 
of “a process of global organisation that constitutes the internal motor 
of evolution and is the outcome of neither behaviour nor the 
environment.”37 Habits are not established solely by changes in the 
environment, to which the organism passively responds, but rather, 
imply an accommodation by the organism’s prior teleonomic behaviour 
to an environmental change. It is Piaget’s contention that these 
phenological behavioural adaptations can sometimes become so 
ingrained that a corresponding change is induced into the genotype, or 
organism’s instinctual structure. Organisms actively accommodate 
themselves to  external circumstances; an accommodation which is 
always based on earlier behavioural patterns. Thus, assimilation 
depends equally upon endogenous factors, since every system of action 
(and knowledge) presupposes an internal organisation of acquired 
characteristics - characteristics which are not stable, but rather 
metastable; dynamic internal processes endowed with a plasticity that 
provides the organism with the freedom that corresponds to  the 
autonomy it enjoys over the environment. Phenological plasticity 
therefore allows the organism, as an open system, a spectrum of 
possible 'choices' to which behaviour is a response in the form of an 
adaptational tra it that mediates between genotype and environment.
Although th is approach implies a new emphasis on the effects - or a t any rate the 
indirect e ffects - of the environment, it is very important to  note . . . that it is the 
consideration o f the internal environment and o f changes which may occur therein under 
the  influence o f new phenotypes which makes it possible fo r us to  envisage a 
simultaneous transcendence o f Lamarchianism and neo-Darwinism. For the internal 
environment clearly also plays a part in selection: changes in it are on this reading at 
once more or less direct effects o f the external world, brought about through the
37 J. Piaget, Behaviour and Evolution, p. 1.
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mediation o f the phenotype (the Lamarckian factor), and causes of the selection of 
mutations occurring at the same time more or less randomly (the Darwinian factor).38
The Darwinian factor applies only to  selective survival and 
reproduction on a quantitative genetic level, whereas the Lamarckian 
factor governs selective adequation on a qualitative teleological level. 
Under the influence of the phenotype, the organism is able to extend its 
control over and independence from its external surroundings, by means 
of the transformations engendered within an ever more optimal 
epigenetic milieu. The internal milieu, therefore, is the agent through 
which the evolutionary process operates, acting as mediator between 
geneotype and phenotype. It should be noted tha t epigenetic 
transformations can occur during both embryological and post-natal 
development.
Piaget claims that most changes in the genotype are the result of the 
genes becoming sensitised to a disequilibrium in the epigenetic milieu, 
itself the effect of changes in the phenotype as a result of adaptations 
to the external environment and natural selection. As stated above, the 
changes in the epigenesis must become well established before they 
are translated into the genetic code. This length of time is not exactly 
known, but it probably involves the persistence of epigenetic 
accommodations over a period of at least three generations. As he tells 
us: "the new genotype arising from an internal disequilibrium takes on 
the same form as the initial phenotype, for a convergence comes about 
between the adjustments which have accommodated this phenotype to 
the external environment and those which adapt genic variations to the 
epigenetic environment."39 On the one hand, organisms exploit and 
modify their environment, while the environment places conditions
38 Ibid, p. 36-7.
39 Ibid, p. 53.
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upon the organism: both coexist in a symbiotic relation, wherein the 
whole process is one of gradual mutual adjustment. This symbiosis 
defines the relationship between phenotype and natural selection. On 
the other hand, selection does not apply to the genes directly. The 
formation of new genotypes is a direct result of both chance genetic 
mutations and sexual recombinations, as well as the adjustments 
which incorporate the changes in the epigenetic landscape as a result 
of changes in the phenotype's accommodation to the external 
environment.
In Weiss's40 view, all behaviour is subordinated to the structure of 
Systems, dynamic unitary totalities, hierarchically stratified and 
capable of responding to exogenous change. A system of this nature is 
what characterises the organism. The same can be said of psychical 
systems or brain cognition; a product not of static conservations but of 
dynamic reconstructions capable of integration and orientation. The 
belief that behaviour is determined wholly by the genotype is a
logical error . . .  as though the gene were able to  introduce organisation into the 
'orderless processes in its  unorganised milieu, so as to  mould the la tter in to  the 
coordinated teamwork that is to  culminate in an accomplished organism', as though the 
'information' or 'control' emanating from the genome were unidirectional. This amounts 
to  an a priori ascription of organisational capacities to  the genome. But the existence of 
such capacities cannot be taken for granted, and to  extrapolate in the way from their 
presence in the higher systems which, in this view, the genome is supposed to  generate
on its own is a completely circular argument.41
The genes themselves are part of an organised system of dynamic 
topologies passed down from generation to generation. Such a position 
argues for the existence of a epigenetic structure, capable of being 
transmitted through heredity and constitutive of the organic matrixes 
in which the genome is housed. A virtual world of will to power in
*0 a . Weiss, Living System, In Within the Gates of Science and Beyond.
41 J. Piaget, Behaviour and Evolution, p. 63.
174
Transcendental Empiricism
which relation, interaction and coordination primarily determines the 
action of the genes and the morphological manifestations resultant 
from those actions.
The genesis of a tra it is not simply embodied in particular genes; it consists in a process 
which, though it begins w ith  these genes, also encompasses a determinate sector of the 
epigenesis with which the  genes interact. Its tra jectory thus displays a certain unity 
which distinguishes it from  others, w ith  which furthermore it may combine. A t once 
genic and epigenic in character, a new variation may therefore enshrine aspects which 
are not pre-formed in the genes but which are produced by the dynamics of the genes' 
interactions w ith  epigenesis. As fo r the innateness of specific 'behaviour', which 
necessarily consists in movements rather than morphological characteristics and 
differences between such characteristics, there is an even higher probability here that 
hereditary forms are the result of a fusion of th is  kind between genic action and the
beginnings of epigenesis.42
It follows from the above quotation that, at least for Piaget, the 
process of evolution begins with the genes; gene structure enjoys a 
certain primacy over epigenesis. The latter is merely a mediating and 
regulatory mechanism which owes its existence to the tensions that 
subsist between genotype and environment.
In relation to a psychogenesis, let us distinguish between two levels 
which are generally conflated: instinct and intelligence. Intelligence 
belongs to the psychic dimension constituted by a set of coordinating 
mechanisms which allows the individual subject the freedom to  choose 
new problems, organising patterns of sequential operations which are 
constantly open to revision in function, in order to  invent new 
solutions. Furthermore, since the method of logic is an axiomatic one, 
genetic epistemology cannot begin from the level of the observable or 
the normative in relation to natural thought, as phenomenology would 
have us do, but rather, must be characterised by the procedures of 
formalisation. Such formalisations construct structures, not from the 
point of view of the conscious subject, but from the actions the
<2 Ibid, p. 65.
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organism employs when solving new problems. This formulation is 
sufficient to make logic a transcendental instance.
Psychogenetic analysis contradicts the assumption that knowledge has 
its source in external objects which instruct the subject. As Piaget 
tells us:
On the one hand, knowledge arises neither from a self-conscious subject, nor from 
objects already constituted (from the point of view of the subject) which would impress 
themselves on him; it arises from interactions tha t take place mid-way between the two 
and thus involve both at the same time, but by reason of their complete undifferentiation 
rather than of an interplay between different kinds of things. On the other hand, if there 
exists at the start neither a subject in the epistemological sense of the word, nor objects 
conceived as such, nor invariant intermediaries, the initial problem of knowledge will 
therefore be the construction of such intermediaries: starting from the point o f contact 
between the body itself and external things, they will develop in tw o complementary 
directions given by the external and the internal, and it is on this twofold progressive 
construction that any sound elaboration of subject and objects depend.
It is not perception which initially plays the mediating role, as the rationalists have 
too readily conceded to  empiricism, but action itself w ith its  much greater plasticity. 
Perceptions do play an essential role, but they partly depend on the whole action, and 
certain perceptual mechanisms which one would have believed to  be innate or very 
prim itive . . . are only formed at a certain level of the construction of objects. In a 
general fashion every perception gives to  the perceived elements meanings which are
relative to  action . . .  and it is therefore from action that we need to  start.43
In primitive action there is a complete non-differentiation between the 
subjective and the objective, since there is no fixed boundary between 
the internal and external.44 Also there corresponds a fundamental 
centring on the body of the infant: individual actions are not 
coordinated into a unitary-whole structure, but rather form isolated 
zones that relate directly to the body; sucking, shiting, vomiting, etc.. 
Thus, the body at this primitive stage forms a topological surface of 
intensive zones. Differentiations between the subject and object arise 
from the emergent co-ordination of the subject’s actions with an
43 J. Piaget, Principles of Genetic Epistemology, p. 19-20.
44 Deleuze’s treatment of this can be found in his reading of M. Klein, in The Logic of Sense, pp. 186- 




external milieu. The subject begins to  form a network of spatio- 
temporal and causal coordinations, which paint a picture of the world 
and the subject’s place within that world as one object among others. 
This subject's awareness of this growing process allows him to 
gradually decentre all focus away from the body to a world of spatio- 
temporal and causal coordinates. This process, when combined with the 
capacity to  manipulate semiotic symbols, makes possible the 
representation of a world in thought.
The central concept of an empiricist psychology is th a t o f association which, first 
developed by Hume, is still strongly held by behaviourists and reflexologists. But this 
concept of association only refers to  an external bond between the associated elements, 
whereas the idea of assimilation . . . implies tha t of the integration of the given within a 
prior structure or even the formation of a new structure under the elementary form of a 
scheme . . . [F ]o r example, the young in fan t tries to  grasp a suspended object 
unsuccessfully but manages to  touch it, and the  subsequent rocking movement, an 
experience not previously encountered, has the interest of novelty for him. He will then 
try  to  reproduce this occurrence, and at this point we may begin to  talk of reproductive 
assimilation (reproduction of the same movement) and of the formation of the beginning 
o f a scheme. When he encounters another suspended object, he will assimilate it to  the 
same scheme, so that there is récognitive assimilation; and when he repeats the action in
this new situation, the assimilation is a generalising one.45
Three fundamental aspects emerge from this formulation: repetition, 
recognition and generalisation. On this primitive level, the scheme can 
not yet be called a concept, since it  lacks semiotic content and 
corresponds only to the internal structure of actions - what Piaget 
calls pre-concepts. These pre-concepts are situated mid-way between 
the scheme of action and the concept. The reason for the existence of 
the in-between stage is that the process of intériorisation, which will 
eventually lead to language formation, can not be simply conceived as a 
retracing of actions by means of symbols. Rather, the transformation of 
schemes into concepts takes place through a process whereby the 
internal schemes are reconstructed and elaborated by means of a set of
45 J. Piaget, Principles of Genetic Epistemology, p. 22-3.
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pre-conceptual intermediaries. These rudimentary proto-concepts are 
then reworked and further elaborated into a conceptual system. Deleuze 
will come to call these pre-concepts 'percepts', in order to emphasis 
their materiality and thereby distinguish them from the notion of 
'precepts'. On this level we locate the material source of perception and 
thought.
The biogenetic and psychogenetic levels correspond to the passive and 
active synthesis respectively. And as we saw with the analysis of 
Bergson, there correspond to the former three fundamental aspects: 
succession, anticipation and generalisation. Similarly, there correspond 
three equally fundamental aspects to the latter: repetition, recognition 
and generalisation. By generalisation we mean the power capable of 
bringing various processes under the function of a single organ or 
faculty, that is, on the level of biogenesis, the forming of composites 
capable of unifying disparate molecular units under a single function, 
and on the level of psychogenesis, the grounding of concepts upon a 
transcendental memory, or transcendental object = x.46 In both cases, 
what generalises is the epigenetic structure, since it is what mediates 
between the two extremes.
With this understanding of epigenesis it is now possible to give an 
interpretation of what Deleuze means by ‘problems’. Appropriating from 
Kant, Deleuze defines Ideas in terms of problematic structures which 
have an objective value. Furthermore, "a problem has three aspects: its 
difference in kind from solutions; its transcendence in relation to 
solutions that it engenders on the basis o f its own determinant 
conditions; and its immanence in the solutions which cover it, the
46 This theory combines both matter and memory, without radically distinguishing between the two, 
thereby locating them within a single process which rises hierarchically on the ladder of complexity. 
This corresponds to Bergson's notion of a cosmic memory, which has recently been taken up by the 




problem being the better resolved the more i t  is determined" (DR 178- 
9). These two levels or kinds constitute the true dialectic: that is, the 
dialectic not between oppositional concepts, but rather, between 
problems and their solutions.
In this sense, differential calculus is a mathematical expression of 
problems in general. Which is not to say that mathematics itself is 
problematic, since it appears only within the realm of solutions.47 The 
problem-idea constitutes a transcendence of identity, opposition, 
resemblance and analogy: it is an unrecognised non-knowledge which 
must not be understood in terms of negativity and error, but rather, as 
stupidity and something to be learnt. Modern mathematics surpasses 
differential calculus, based as it is upon population theory which 
articulates a 'progressive d iscern ib ility ' tha t is capable of 
incorporating a ideal continuity within the three levels of the calculus. 
In essence, everything is a multiplicity in so far as it actualises an 
Idea. Moreover, Ideas by this definition imply a structure of multiple, 
non-localisable connections between d iffe re n tia l elements. 
Multiplicities are virtualities which are actualised in Ideas. Hence, the 
process of genesis, Deleuze tells us:
goes from the structure  to  its incarnation, from the conditions o f the problem to  the 
cases of solution, from the differential elements and their ideal connections to  actual 
terms and diverse real relations which constitute at each moment the actuality of time. 
This is a genesis w ithout dynamism, evolving necessarily in the element o f a supra- 
historicity, a static genesis which may be understood as the correlate of the notion of 
passive synthesis. (DR 183)
The true opposition lies between the ideal event and representation; 
between learning and knowledge; between novelty and recognition; 
between the immemorial and memory; and between the virtual and the
47 For a full understanding of the manner in which Deleuze articulates problematic structures and their 
corresponding solutions in terms of differential calculus, c.f. Difference and Repetition pp. 170-82.
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actual. There is an essential difference in kind between these two 
absolute limits or thresholds which can not be synthesised within a 
'higher' resolution. Knowledge designates cases of solution which 
presuppose conscious representation in language, whereas the ideal 
event expresses the sub-representative presentation of the 
unconscious problem-instant. This unconscious nature o f Ideas, or the 
unthought in thought itself, must be conceived in terms of the ideal of 
knowledge. Thus, the problem presents itself as the ontological horizon 
of the question wherein true art and philosophical thought find their 
full force and genesis. Problems or Ideas are virtualities which, 
Deleuze informs us:
contain all the varieties o f d ifferentia l relations and all the distributions of singular 
points coexisting in diverse orders 'perplicated' in one another. When the virtual content 
of an Idea is actualised, the varieties of relation are incarnated in d istinct species while 
the singular points which correspond to  the values of one variety are incarnated in the 
distinct parts characteristic o f th is  or that species. (DR 206)
This virtual region must not be understood as the negative or 
nothingness, but rather as the non-being or (?)-being dimension of 
being in general. “We call” , Deleuze continues:
the determ ination of the v irtua l content of an Idea d ifferentia tion; we call the 
actualisation of that virtuality in to  species and distinguished parts differendation. It is 
always in relation to  a differentiated problem or to  the differentiated conditions of a 
problem th a t a d ifferendation o f species and parts is carried out, as though it 
corresponded to  the cases of solution of the problem. (DR 207)
The virtual is real w ithout being actual; its reality consists in its 
completely determined structure which doubles the object without its 
two halves resembling one another. E.g., the virtual structure of an 
organism corresponds to the set and arrangement of its chromosomes, 
while its actualisation into existence proper corresponds to the 
manifestation-determination of that species and its qualities. Between
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these two halves there is a reciprocity of determination which moves 
in both directions.
Beneath the actualisation of qualities and extensities peculiar to a 
species we find the spatio-temporal dynamisms responsible for the 
actualisation itself: a spatio-temporal dynamism or dramatism of the 
Idea. These dynamisms, which are no less temporal than spatial, are 
defined by populations of local and singular rhythms, constituting both 
the time and the space of actualisation, and thereby determining, in 
their totality, the internal milieu of any particular species. As Deleuze 
explains:
More precisely, the species gathers the time of the dynamism into a quality (lion-ness, 
frog-ness) while the parts outline its space. A quality always flashes within a space and 
endures the whole time o f that space. In short, dramatisation is the différenciation of 
différenciation, at once both qualitative and quantitative. (DR 217)
Moreover, Deleuze continues, there is another series to actualisation; 
this is consciousness, since:
[e ]very spatio-temporal dynamism is occupied by the emergence of an elementary 
consciousness which itself traces directions, doubles movements or migrations, and is 
born on the threshold of the condensed singularities o f the body or object whose 
consciousness it is. It is not enough to  say tha t consciousness is consciousness of 
something: it is the double of this something, and everything is consciousness because it 
possesses a double, even if it is far o ff and very foreign. (DR 220)
In this manner, Deleuze renders thought and perception material rather 
than purely spiritual, since Ideas are always embroiled in the 
mathematico-biological system of different/ciation.
From this analysis of Piaget’s theory on epigenesis, we must conclude 
that there arise two specific problems. Firstly, Piaget was right in 
exposing the reductionism implicit in certain genetic theories, but 
wrong, in our view, to put forward the idea of an epigenetic structure 
that equilibrates the disparity between the extremes of genotype and
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phenotype/environment by means of the gradual accrual of mutations 
along which evolution progresses. We saw this same tendency to 
reconcile the extremes of structure and function, body and mind, in 
relation to Heidegger’s notion of Being. Secondly, since the epigenetic 
milieu is put forward as a mediating structure, what comes first must 
be the genes, which express both organism and environment and 
between which the epigenesis comes to arbitrate. On the other hand, it 
is our contention that the epigenetic structure does not mediate, but 
permits the possibility of a communication between the two extremes 
which are themselves essentially irreducible. Furthermore, the 
epigenetic milieu is what is primary and therefore productive of both 
extremes. We will now pursue these points in greater detail.
4. Essentially, what’s at stake in the emerging sciences of chaos and 
complexity theory, is the idea of an irreconcilability between 
‘teleology’ and the ‘spontaneous emergence’ of orders out of chaos. 
However, we should be cautious and avoid confusing the idea of 
spontaneity with another, namely ‘ radical contingency’. The former 
necessitates the presence of certain conditions in order to actualise 
its potentials. The latter can only exist at the very beginning of the 
universe, and perhaps not even then. The idea of spontaneity may have 
removed the hand of God from evolutionary processes and refuted the 
notion of an absolute telos, nonetheless the channelling of evolution 
remains a result of initial, and subsequently derived, conditions that 
steer life. Self-organisation itself possesses principles which it is the 
aim of the emerging sciences to  uncover. To Monod’s chance and 
necessity, S. Kauffman adds spontaneity. Therefore, Kauffman 
separates spontaneity and selectivity; the latter being, for the last 
century at least, mistakenly believed to be the sole cause of evolution
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in the universe. As Kauffman tells us: “ if the forms selection chooses 
among were generated by laws of complexity, then selection has 
always had a handmaiden.” 48 Selection, then, chooses among the 
potential forms that subsist within a given system, moreover, it is 
purely “caused by internal processes, endogenous and natural.”49 That 
is to say, spontaneous generation of order can best be defined in terms 
of aleatory points: a system that simultaneously tests or passes 
through all its implicit potential possibilities and actualising only one 
by means of the pressures exerted upon it by selection. Potentially 
speaking, form is infinite and spontaneously generated, but in actuality 
it is selected by the contextual specificities within which the system 
finds itself. Form does not exist but subsists; it precedes actuality 
only potentially. We must also be cautious and avoid understanding that 
emergence ‘happens’ and is only subsequently subjected to selective 
pressure. This thinking is too linear and betrays the parallelism 
propounded by this theory. Rather, both emergence and selection are co­
present, separable only in abstract thought. Moreover, these potential 
forms are dependent upon the level of the system’s complexity; the 
quanta or differences in potential that compose it. We must at all costs 
avoid falling back into Platonism. Nonetheless, the so-called persistent 
or robust forms are what Whitehead called eternal objects, but objects 
that do not pre-subsist the systems by which they are actualised. For 
Kauffman, therefore, evolution proceeds not gradualistically, but by 
means of leaps and ruptures; or what is more accurately termed 
'punctuated equilibrium’.
As we have seen, genetics regards the organism from two quite 
distinct perspectives. On the one hand, it conceives the organism in
48 S. Kauffman, At Home in the Universe, p. 8.
4» Ibid, p. 15.
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terms of visible characteristics, morphology, functions and behaviour - 
the phenotype. On the other hand, it deals with the hidden structures of 
the organism, the state of the genes - the genotype. These are two 
quite d istinct levels. The former is concerned with the observed 
behavioural patterns of actual organisms, the latter providing the 
sufficient reason for the former in terms of preformed structures. The 
internal logic of an organism, therefore, is defined by the relations 
existing between the genetic structure and the organism’s behavioural 
orientation. Together, both the levels constitute the organism as a 
whole; they are dissociable only in abstract thought. However, the link 
between these two levels has been made precise only for very simple 
traits. It is the inability on the part of the genetic theory to explain the 
link between the two levels, purely in terms of expression of a genetic 
structure, that leads us to hypothesise that the real cause is to be 
found in a transcendental epigenetic process.
Reproduction represents both the beginning and the end, the cause and the aim. With the 
application to  heredity of the concept of programme, certain biological contradictions 
formerly summed up in a series of antitheses at last disappear: finality and mechanism, 
necessity and contingency, stability and variation. The concept of programme blends two 
notions which had always been intuitively associated with living beings: memory and 
design. By 'memory' is implied the tra its of the parents, which heredity brings out in 
the child. By 'design' is implied the plan which controls the formation of an organism
down to  the last detail.50
Biology claims that all organisms inherit their genes from ancestors 
who were capable of surviving adverse conditions long enough to 
reproduce. For this reason their descendents are equally 'f it ' in terms 
of survival and reproduction. Man, therefore, shares a common ancestor 
characterised as "the information that, in all living beings, is organised 
according to the same principle."51 This hypothesis is confirmed
50 F. Jacob, The Logic of Life and The Possible and the Actual, p. 2. Emphasis added.
51 M. Eigen, Steps Towards Life, p. 16.
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through comparative analyses of nucleic acid sequences found in the 
various independent branches of the evolutionary chain. By means of 
this historical analysis "sequences of 'proto-genes' - the very earliest 
genes - can to some extent be reconstructed. They show patterns 
indicative of a simple, primeval code."52 DNA is a highly accurate 
digital replicating machine, only by means of random mutations (errors 
in copying, radio-activity and viruses) and recombinations is variation 
introduced into the ancestral strand. The maternal and paternal sets of 
genes do not blend to form another new gene, but only combine to form 
a unique set. These sets of genes determine the characteristic features 
of future species.
Life, as a system of replication with variation, is purely a problem 
solving process emergent from the fundamental laws of physics. Since 
DNA exhibits such a high degree of design work, it is extremely unlikely 
that its four constitutive letters could have synthesised themselves by 
a series of coincidences to form a self-replicator. This discrepancy has 
lead geneticists to conclude that "there must exist a process of 
optimisation that works towards functional efficiency."53 Optimality 
is secured by means of feedback loops; once they are in place an 
exponential race toward ever greater sophistication and complexity 
ensues. This directedness attributed to evolution, by means of feedback 
loops, represents the chief difference between Darwinism and this 
present theory. Furthermore, this “guidance is provided by selection, 
which follows the value topography and thus reduces substantially the 
freedom of movement,"54 giving the appearance of teleology in Nature. 
Optimality, therefore, is a 'forced move' that governs the process of
52 Ibid, p. 7.
53 Ibid, p. 11.
54 ibid, p. 26.
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evolution throughout Nature. The constraints of environmental 
conditions aid the evolving entity by setting it limits or parameters 
with which it works in the problem solving exercise. Constrained by its 
inherent genetic information and the environmental information, both 
of which exerts a pressure on the entity, the organism is forced to 
adapt along a diagonal trajectory between the two necessities. 
Therefore, evolution is a process of the gradual accrual of chance 
mutations, functionally adapted to a particular environmental niche; 
both mutated genome and environment become the necessary 
constraints for the next phase of evolutionary development. As Jacob 
explains: “The conclusions reached by genetics required the presence in 
the chromosomes of a substance capable of very unusual actions: on the 
one hand, it had to determine the structures and functions of living 
organisms; on the other, to produce exact copies of itself, without 
excluding the possibility of rare variations.”55 This ‘functionalistic’ 
and ‘gradualistic’ model of evolutionary development based solely on 
genetic mutation, as proposed by F. Jacob (and J. Monod), presupposes 
that all the information necessary to construct the form and functions 
of an organism is contained in its DNA.
In fact, the genetic theory represents a variation upon the theme of 
‘preformation’; not the naive kind that speculated an a temporal and 
perfectly formed miniature adult within the germ cell, but rather, in 
terms of an historical structure containing all the information within 
its programme necessary for the expression of the fully developed 
organism. Furthermore, the introduction of temporality into genetics 
does not imply the idea of ‘ recapitulation’, wherein the formative 
forces propel the developing embryo to repeat earlier stages of the 
evolutionary chain, exactly as they occurred in phyletic evolution, until
55 F. Jacob, The Logic of Life and The Possible and the Actual, p. 244.
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such time as the forces themselves are arrested - that is, the greater 
the vital force, the more the embryo will recapitulate and the higher 
will be the type of species expressed. However, recapitulation does in 
fact takes place, not in the manner ju s t described. Rather, 
embryological development passes through a series of stages that bear 
a striking resemblance to earlier adult species due to the common 
ancestry of the particular phyla.
It was von Baer who brought it to our attention that the sequence of 
transformations that many developing embryos undergo do not follow a 
structural order tha t would mirror the increasing complexity and 
organisation of species found in the natural world. Some parts of higher 
organisms which should develop at a late stage appear very early on. 
Thus, for von Baer, development is not defined as recapitulation but as 
individualisation; a process which develops from the general to the 
individual. Already in the young embryo the individual is implicit; 
embryology serves to explicate and enhance the implicit form through 
a process of increasing differentiations and complexifications. "The 
type of each animal seems to fix itself in the embryo right at the 
beginning and then to govern all of development."56 57But these beginnings 
are extremely general, for example, in the early stages of embryonic 
development the limb buds of various species resemble each other: 
bird's wings, horse's hooves, human hands.
The grade of development of an animal body consists of the greater or lesser extent of 
heterogeneity in the parts that compose i t . . .  The more homogeneous the entire mass of 
the body, the lower the stage of development. We have reached a higher stage of nerve and 
muscle, blood, and cell-material are sharply differentiated. The more different they are,
the more developed the animal.5 7
56 K.E. von Baer, Entwicklungsgeschichte der Thiere: Beobachtung und Reflexion, Borntrager, 
Königsberg, 1828, p. 220
57 ibid. p. 207.
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Therefore, the criterion of embryology is increasing differentiation in 
structure and organisation. The animal kingdom must not be understood 
as a hierarchical order of ascending forms built on a single theme, but 
as a collection of individual groups that evolve and differentiate alone 
different phyletic lines of descent. We must distinguish type of 
organisation from degree of differentiation within each type. More 
importantly, there can be no transformation between types, since each 
type constitutes an independent lineage. "Type is to be understood 
through its mode of development . . . Different conditions or building 
forces must work upon the germ [which is originally similar in all 
animals] in order to create this d iversity."58 This development or 
process of differentiation is not motivated in a mechanical fashion, 
since young embryos are more variable than older embryos: if each step 
controlled the next (mechanism) variability would increase with age. 
We cannot agree with von Baer’s claim that all germ cell are originally 
alike, but we do affirm a universal tendency of evolutionary 
development, which takes place during the embryonic phase (and as we 
shall see the post-natal phase) from the homogeneous, general and 
potential to the heterogeneous, specific and actual.
This brings us to Deleuze’s position which articulates the 
embryological in terms of an implicate order of enveloped depth. What 
is enveloped, or folded, is the whole of the past, heredity and memory 
which, as we saw in relation with the second synthesis of time, enjoys 
in its totality a contemporaneity and coexistence with the present. 
This original depth is space as a whole, but space as an intensive 
quantity. Sensation or perception, Deleuze tells us,
has an ontological aspect: precisely in the syntheses which are peculiar to  it, confronted by 
that which can only be sensed or . . . perceived. Now, it appears that depth is essentially
58 ibid, p. 258.
188
Transcendental Empiricism
implicated in the perception of extensity . . .  It also appears that depth and distances, in this 
state of implication, are fundamentally linked to  the intensity of the sensation . . . Intensity 
is simultaneously the imperceptible and that which can only be sensed. How could it be sense 
fo r itself, independently of the qualities which cover it and the extensity in which it is 
distributed? (DR 230)
Intensive quantity, as a transcendental principle, has three essential 
characteristics: 1. It represents difference in quantity, that which 
cannot be cancelled in difference in quantity or tha t which is 
unequalisable in quantity itself: it is therefore the quality which 
belongs to quantity. 2. Intensity a ffirm s  difference. It makes difference 
an object of affirmation. And negation - which appears with extensity 
and quality - is only an inverted image of difference. This inversion 
takes place firs t by the requirements of representation which 
subordinate it to identity, then by the shadow of problems which give 
rise to the illusion of the negative, and finally, by the extensity and 
quality which cover or explicate intensity. Thus the being o f the 
sensible is intensity or difference in intensity which constitutes the 
peculiar limit of the sensible. It has a paradoxical character: it is 
imperceptible, and that which can only be sensed - transcendental 
exercise of sensibility - because it gives to be sensed, thereby 
awakening memory and forcing thought. 3. Intensity is an implicated, 
enveloped or ’embryonized' quantity. Intensity is primarily implicated 
in itself: implicating and implicated. We must conceive of implication 
as a perfectly determined form of being. Within intensity, we call that 
which is implicating and enveloping difference; and tha t which is 
implicated or enveloped distance. For this reason, intensity is neither 
divisible, like extensive quantity, nor indivisible, like quality. The 
philosophy of difference confirms the double genesis of quality and 
extensity. That is to say, intensity is essentially temporal.
Time is not an absolute form, but merely an abstraction from movement
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and becoming, and becoming is an irreversible process measured in 
terms of increasing entropy. Three elements are required for a concept 
of time: i) Repetition which establishes the measure of time, ii) An 
irreversible process, iii) And a memory. As D. Bohm tells us:
The conscious content of the moment is therefore that which is past and gone. The future 
is not yet. The present is, but it cannot be specified in words or in thoughts, w ithout its 
slipping into the past. When a future moment comes, a similar situation will prevail. 
Therefore, from the past of the present we may be able to  predict, at most, the past of
the future. The actual immediate present is always the unknown. 5 9
Therefore, the extension or duration of each moment is in general 
determined in the broader context in which they find themselves 
embedded. This embeddedness constitutes an implicate order of time. 
Furthermore, it is by means of these extended moments that a whole 
past may be enfolded in a single moment. This is the meaning of 
'horizontal implicate order', since it corresponds to one single level. 
Each moment is not extrinsic to all the other moments, but rather, is 
intrinsically related through extended structures and processes.
It follows from the above that becoming is not merely a relationship of the present to  the 
past tha t is gone. Rather, it is a relationship o f enfoldments tha t actually are in the 
present moment. Becoming is an actuality. We may enunciate th is as a principle, the 
being of becoming. Becoming is being first because in any given moment it is grounded on 
what is at tha t moment. Second, it is ‘being’ because the same general structure
continues in all succeeding moments. 60
This model is further complicated when the whole of reality is taken 
into account, since the totality is determined by a ‘vertical implicate 
order’. That is, there corresponds to the whole of reality an hierarchy 
of levels more or less comprehensive and fundamental. We must not 
infer from this the existence of an altogether fundamental level that 59*
59 D. Bohm, Time, the Implicate Order, and Pre-Space, p. 182.
6° Ibid, p. 185.
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would define reality in absolute terms, but only an infinity of levels 
that defies comprehension. For this reason the ‘descriptive’ method is 
employed, since it eliminates that element of finality and origins. 
Systems, whether organic or inorganic, Jacob writes, "are arranged 
according to a hierarchy of discontinuous units. At each level, units of 
relatively well defined size and almost identical structure associate to 
form a unit of the level above. Each of these units formed by the 
integration of sub-units may be given the general name 'integron'. An 
integron is formed by assembling integrons of the level below it; it 
takes part in the construction of the integron of the level above."61 
These integrons are values of implication and centres of envelopment 
which function in a number of ways:
1. the individuating factors form a kind of noumenon of the phenomenon. 2. to  the extent 
tha t sense is tied to  the Ideas which are incarnated and to  the individuations which 
determine tha t incarnation, the centres are expressive, tha t is, they reveal sense. 3. to 
the extent tha t every phenomenon finds its reason in a difference o f intensity which 
frames it, as though th is constituted the boundaries between which it flashes, we claim 
tha t complex systems increasingly tend to  interiorize their constitutive differences: the 
centres of envelopment carry out this intériorisation of the individuating factors. (DR 
256)
In short, these centres are noumenal, expressive and interiorising - 
they are also the ‘dark precursors’ of the eternal return; the non-sense 
constitutive of sense.62 Therefore, every physical and biological object 
is constituted by a system of systems; determining an integration of 
lower level systems, as well as being a part of a higher level system. 
Each system, therefore, must be considered with reference to its
61 F. Jacob, The Logic of Life and The Possible and the Actual, p. 302.
62 Perhaps it is reasonable to interpret the notion of ‘dark precursor’ in terms of ‘dark matter’. The 
bright or baryonic matter - protons, neutrons and electrons - detectable in the universe is not sufficient 
to account for all the gravitational influence observed: some estimates venture that only 10% of the 
mass of the universe is in the form of baryons. Thus, dark matter, or WIMP’s - Weakly Interacting 
Massive Particles - could provide both the key to the Unifying Theory, and the manner in which 
galaxies and stars were formed from the collapsing clouds of gas released by the Big Bang.
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adjacent levels. Through the principle of implicated enfoldment, 
distinct and distant moments are brought under a single resonance. 
Vast stretches of time are condensed into a single moment, that bursts 
with creative potential in an act of becoming. This timeless unground 
is the basis of the creative act, the principle of the differend and the 
third synthesis of time.
The essentially disparate nature of the transcendental field implies 
that the constituted individual cannot be a given, but rather requires an 
ontogenic principle capable of demonstrating the manner in which it is 
constituted. The process of individuation is itself the principle of 
individuation. During this process other things, besides the individual, 
are produced. In fact, far from being the end toward which the process 
aims, the individual is merely a partial and relative resolution of a 
process possessed of a multitude of potentials, dynamisms and 
dimensions, not all of which are actualised or compatible with one 
another. As Simondon tells us: "we would try to grasp the entire 
unfolding of ontogenesis in all its variety, and to understand the 
individual from the perspective o f the process o f individuation rather 
than the process o f individuation by means o f the individual.” 63 The 
process, therefore, as a whole is primordial in relation to the 
individual, within which the individual occupies only a relative reality. 
This process must therefore be understood as being a pre-individual 
implicate order out of which the individual is explicated by means of a 
series of developmental steps.
For Simondon, the organism is not conceived in terms of an explicated 
functional entity that is the result of a purely genetic manufacturing 
process, but rather, is the consequence of an implicate resonant 
epigenetic structure capable of processing information from both
63 G. Simondon, The Genesis of the Individual, p. 300.
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genome and environment. Only through this dynamic structure is it 
possible for the organism to creatively resolve its problematic. "The 
living individual is a system o f individuation, an individuating system 
and also a system that individuates itself. The internal resonance and 
the translation of its relation to itself into information are all 
contained in the living being's system."64 The psyche therefore 
represents a genuine interiority whose function it is to solve its own 
problematic: the solution will always be the result of a communication 
between individual and environment. Knowledge therefore is not an 
abstraction from sensation, but the organism’s biological orientation 
toward its milieu; an orientation constituted by innate structure or a 
priori forms that predispose it toward representing the world in a 
specific manner and grounded in action. The implication here is an 
holistic one. In order for the individual to solve the problems that 
confront it, it must take itself as a Whole entity that is both co­
present and contemporary with all its past; since the latter constitutes 
the very structures of its behavioural orientation. "The same method 
outlined above can be used to explore the affectivity and the emotivity 
that constitute the resonance of the being in relation to itself, and that 
connect the individuated being to the preindividual reality associated 
with it in the same way that the tropistic unity and perception put it in 
relation with its milieu."64 5
Simondon's conception of information must not be understood as a set 
of definite instructions, as the geneticists would have us believe, but 
rather, as we saw in the previous chapter in relation the language, 
sense is a presupposition that entertains a co-presence with nonsense. 
Language is primarily a nonsensical structure out of which sense­
64 Ibid, p. 305.
65 Ibid. p. 310.
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meaning is an emergent property effectuated by means of a subjective 
process. The same holds for information on a material basis: 
structurally it is dispersed throughout the entire system, becoming 
individuated into a definite form only through a biochemical process. It 
is the process itself that determines the indeterminate. "If this is the 
case," Simondon writes,
then the piece of information acts in fact as an instigation to  information, a necessity to 
individuate; it is never something tha t is jus t given. Unity and identity are not inherent 
in the information because the information is itse lf not a term. For there to  be 
information presupposes tha t there is a tension in the system of the being: the 
information must be inherent in the problematic, since it represents that by which the 
incompatibility within the unresolved system becomes an organising dimension in its 
resolution,66
Thus, the nonsense or informational structure is a relational being and 
not something that exists between two substantial terms whose 
purpose it is to pacify, but rather, a preexisting relational being 
capable of generating the two substantial terms: a primordial being 
whose being is essentially relational and in which the substantial is 
grounded. Understanding being in terms of a pure relationism allows for 
a conception of being that does not succumb to identity thinking. Every 
relational quanta is thereby given a positive value within a disparate 
system, the resolution of which is sought within the structure of 
tensions themselves through the invention of new objects and concepts. 
This relational being from which informational units are abstracted 
echoes M. Mcluhan’s famous slogan: The Medium is  the Message” . As he 
tells us: “ It is only too typical that the ‘content’ of any medium blinds 
us to the character of the medium.”67 That is, the content represents an 
abstracted unit from an essentially dispersed and nonsensical field of
66 Ibid, p. 311.
67 m . Mcluhan, Understanding Media, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968, p. 9.
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differential relations: the message is the explication of the medium, 
but by which the medium or difference in itself is cancelled. Cubism 
attempted to overcome this process of cancellation by eliminating 
perspective and striving for an awareness of the whole. The effects of 
the medium do not occur at the level of ideas and beliefs, but transform 
our imperceptibly sensible relations.
Therefore, the implicate order is essentially the potential memory of 
the individual, that becomes explicated during the embryogenetic 
process. This ‘mnemic theme’ 68 is not primarily a property of bodies, 
but rather, bodies themselves are the property of memory. Quite clearly 
we are not referring to the empirical memory of a constituted subject, 
but to a cosmic memory in the Bergsonian sense. In its totality this 
cosmic memory constitutes the massive epigenetic structure within 
which every individual’s epigenetic structure is a part. Moreover, this 
structure must be understood as occupying a pre-space, that is neither 
composed of matter nor extended: it is the implicate order that space- 
time will come to limit. Since this order is a mnemic potential, it must 
be temporally determined; not empirically in terms of the linear first 
synthesis of time, but in the manner of the second synthesis in which 
the whole of time past, being the present, is folded, co-present and 
contemporary with itself: not Chronic time but Aionic time. Thus the 
reduction of structure and function to  a genetic code is not only 
materialistic and reductionist, but it  is essentially erroneous: a 
product of the transcendental illusion. Hence, the Bergsonian concept of 
‘duration’ finds its basis in epigenesis.
Speeds in temporal regularity are responsible for embryological 
recapitulations and metamorphosis. The accelerations or retardations -
®8 This notion is taken from R. Ruyer’s, There is no Subconscious: Embryogenesis and Memory.
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heterochrony69 - of developmental stages is the main cause of 
morphological and functional transformations in the adult species. 
Group theory has revealed the importance of population size, timing of 
sexual maturation and reproduction, longevity and turnover rates for 
the life  histories and strategies of individuals. Moreover, 
environmental change influences these strategies.70 L.C. Cole defines 
these variables in terms of r and k selection parameters, where r 
represents the natural rate of reproduction for a species, and k 
corresponds to the population capacity of the environment. As 
environmental conditions are constantly changing, the hererochronic 
structure of the organism must be able to respond rapidly if it is to  
survive. Endocrine balance and hormonal control are the causes of 
metamorphosis in ontogeny. The hormonal levels themselves are 
controlled by certain sets of genes during various stages o f 
development. It is claimed71 that normal development is controlled by 
gradually decreasing concentrations of a hormone level at specific 
times and places within the regulatory system. Acceleration occurs by 
reducing hormone level, and retardation by the continuation of their 
high levels - that is, the genes control the endocrine balance, which in 
turn are regulated by the epigenetic structure switching the relevant 
sets "on" and "off" at the correct time and in a specific zone of the 
developing embryo. In short, progenesis is defined as paedomorphosis 
due to precocious sexual maturation. Neoteny is defined as 
paedomorphosis due to retardation of somatic development. The former 
corresponds to r  selection parameters, the latter to  k selection
69 I owe this theory of heterochrony to S.J. Gould's, Ontogeny and Phytogeny, Harvard University 
Press, 1977, in which he presents an exceptional historical synthesis of the many ideas concerning 
biological evolution and embryogenesis.
70 Cf. L.C. Cole, The population consequences of life history phenomena, pp. 103-137.




parameters. Both, however, are dependent on environmental 
constraints, as exemplified by the neotenic metamorphosis of
sedentary solitary grasshoppers into nomadic swarming locusts, 
triggered by the saturation of environmental resources; and progenetic 
precocious sexual maturation and reproduction in insect colonies, 
productive o f population explosions, in environments with
superabundant resources. Experimentally, heterochrony and 
metamorphosis in ontogeny can be induced by altering the endocrine 
mechanism in organisms, proving tha t paedomorphosis is not 
necessarily genetically fixed. In the words of L. Bolk: “ What is 
essential in man as an organism? The obvious answer is: the slow 
progress of his life’s course.”72
Therefore, the motor of evolution is located within a ‘surniaterial’ 
epigenetic process. This transcendental process is the sufficient 
reason for the diversity we observe in the natural world: from
homogeneity to heterogeneity; from simplicity to complexity; from
matter to reflection. However, this process is not a simple linear 
development, since it  is constituted by two irreducibly distinct 
aspects: structure and function; evolution and behaviour; body and 
language. This pre-individual being is subject to the wave/particle 
duality and is, therefore, capable of being manifested in both forms. 
However:
Neither mechanism nor energetism, both theories o f identity, can account for this 
rea lity in a comprehensive manner. Field theory, when combined w ith  the theory of 
corpuscles, and even the theory o f the interaction between fields and corpuscles, is still 
partially dualist, but is well on the way to  formulating a theory of the preindividual. By 
another route, the theory of quanta has perceived the existence o f th is preindividual 
regime, which goes beyond unity: an exchange of energy is brought about in elementary 
quantities, as if there had been an individuation of energy in the relation between the
72 L. Bolk, On the Problem of Anthropogenesis, p. 470.
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particles, which one can consider to be physical individuals in a sense.73
Energy and matter, structure and function are simultaneously 
actualised through an epigenetic process that develops by means of 
successive amplifications and projections. Nonetheless, there is a 
qualitative distinction between the two: what is said of things are not 
the things themselves. We must not understand by this that the 
transcendental comes to  mediate and reconcile this qualitative 
distinction: this was Heidegger’s and Merleau Ponty’s error. Rather, the 
only mediation that exists between the two domains is the “event” , and 
this must be appreciated from its two constitutive faces. The event is 
essentially indeterminable with respect to words and objects which 
are determinable. As I. Prigogine tells us:
The law-event duality is at the heart of the conflicts which run through the history o f ideas 
in the Western world, starting with the pre-Socratic speculations and continuing right up to 
our own time through quantum mechanics and relativity. Laws are associated to  a continuous 
unfolding, to  intelligibility, to  deterministic predictions and ultim ately to  the very negation 
of time. Events imply an element of arbitrariness as th e y  involve discontinuities, 
probabilities and evolution. We have to  face the fact that we live in a dual universe, whose 
descriptions involves both laws and events, certitudes and probabilities. Obviously the most 
decisive events we know are related to  the birth of our universe and to  the emergence of
life .74
To these two decisive events we should add a third: the emergence of 
reflexive thought. Simply because by means o f this property the 
evolutionary process has been inverted; man is no longer subject to 
evolution but determines it; he is capable of freeing himself from his 
material ground; from the perspective of the constituted subject the 
“ I” is more primordial, as exemplified in Husserlean phenomenology; 
the triumph of superstition wherein the Word takes on a mystical 
power over the forces of Nature. It is through the gradual increase in
73 G. Simondon, The Genesis of the Individual, p. 302.
74 P. Coveney & R. Highfield, The Arrow of Time, p. 16.
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the autonomy that subjectivity enjoys over nature and its material 
origins that the world has become an inverted image of itself. “How the 
‘Real World’ at last Became a Myth” 7  ^ should not be understood so 
much as an ‘history of an error’, but as a natural consequence of an 
evolutionary tendency that pursues its own ends and autonomy. 
However, there does exist an affinity between the field of implication 
and the realm of explication, an affinity but not a resemblance. The 
former remains a potentiality within the latter, but through the 
sensible it is possible to access this power in order to transform and 
invent Ideas.
One final point needs to be made. In psychic systems the I and the Self 
are figures of différenciation: the I is the quality of the human being as 
a species (qualitative), and the Self designates the properly psychic 
organism-organisation (extensive). The individual is divisible and 
expresses Ideas in the form of internal multiplicities that are 
fundamentally determined by pre-individual singularities. Nor is it an I 
with regard to its expressive character, since it forms a multiplicity 
of actualisation, as though it were a condensation of distinctive points 
or an open collection of intensities. However, this indétermination does 
not indicate something incomplete in individuality, rather it expresses 
the positive power of the individual and the manner in which it is 
distinguished in nature from both the I and the Self. Thus, death is 
inscribed in the I and the Self - the "death instinct" as internal power 
which frees the individuating elements from the form of the I or the 
matter of the Self in which they are imprisoned. "There must 
nonetheless be values of implication in psychic systems in the process 
of being explicated; in other words, there must be centres of 
envelopment which testify to the presence of individuating factors. 75
75 F. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, p. 40.
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These centres are clearly constituted neither by the I nor by the Self, 
but by a completely different structure belonging to the 1-Self system. 
This structure should be designated by the name 'other'. It refers only 
to the self for the other I and the other I for the self" (DR 260). This 
Other functions as a centre of envelopment. It is the representative of 
the individuating factors.
Death is a condition of evolution. "Not death from without, as the result 
of some accident; but death imposed from within, as a necessity 
prescribed from the egg onward by the genetic programme itself. For 
evolution is the result of a struggle between what was and what is to 
be, between the conservative and the revolutionary, between the 
sameness of reproduction and the newness of variation."76 The death 
instinct cannot be represented, whereas the Other is the representation 
of it. The former corresponds to the individuating factors immanent to 
biological and psychical systems, that is, the differential relations and 
pre-individual singularities tha t constitu te  the organism in a 
metastable state. The epigenetic structure cannot be represented, since 
it is wholly other to systems of representation which function through 
stasis. Moreover, the Other as the representative of the process of 
becoming individuated, determines the dialectical indeterminacy 
intrinsic to the 1-Self structure. Thus, we locate the Other primarily 
within our own psychic system; it is first and foremost immanent, only 
subsequently do we find it reflected in the face or eyes of the other 
person (Levinas). This immanent Otherness is what Deleuze refers to as 
the radicality of a lte rity, and what constitutes his notion of the 
altrucide-suicide couple.
In summing up we claim that the primary cause of evolutionary change 
is not due to mutations in the genetic information structure, but
76 F. Jacob, The Logic ol Life and The Possible and the Actual, p. 309-10.
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These centres are clearly constituted neither by the I nor by the Self, 
but by a completely different structure belonging to the 1-Self system. 
This structure should be designated by the name 'other'. It refers only 
to the self for the other I and the other I for the self" (DR 260). This 
Other functions as a centre of envelopment. It is the representative of 
the individuating factors.
Death is a condition of evolution. "Not death from without, as the result 
of some accident; but death imposed from within, as a necessity 
prescribed from the egg onward by the genetic programme itself. For 
evolution is the result of a struggle between what was and what is to 
be, between the conservative and the revolutionary, between the 
sameness of reproduction and the newness of variation."76 The death 
instinct cannot be represented, whereas the Other is the representation 
of it. The former corresponds to the individuating factors immanent to 
biological and psychical systems, that is, the differential relations and 
pre-individual singularities tha t constitute the organism in a 
metastable state. The epigenetic structure cannot be represented, since 
it is wholly other to systems of representation which function through 
stasis. Moreover, the Other as the representative of the process of 
becoming individuated, determines the dialectical indeterminacy 
intrinsic to the 1-Self structure. Thus, we locate the Other primarily 
within our own psychic system; it is first and foremost immanent, only 
subsequently do we find it reflected in the face or eyes of the other 
person (Levinas). This immanent Otherness is what Deleuze refers to as 
the radicality of alterity, and what constitutes his notion of the 
altrucide-suicide couple.
In summing up we claim that the primary cause of evolutionary change 
is not due to mutations in the genetic information structure, but 76
76 F. Jacob, The Logic of Life and The Possible and the Actual, p. 309-10.
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rather, is engendered by changes in environmental conditions that 
effect the epigenetic structure, producing heterochronic variations in 
embryological and post-natal processes. If the environmental changes 
are sustained, the effects engendered in the epigenesis can 
permanently alter or transform the DNA structure itself. Furthermore, 
prior to permanently restructuring the genetic information system, the 
changes that the epigenesis undergoes due to environmental effects are 
hereditary, for at least two or three generations.77 Evolutionary change 
therefore occurs during the embryological and post-natal phases of 
development under the influence of heterochronic timings in the 
epigenesis. There are changes that are the result of genetic mutation 
and recombination, but these are purely homeostatic variations, 
certainly not enough to account for the widespread diversity found in 
the natural world. As Lewin tells us mouthing Goodwin: “The genes set 
the parameter values . . . they produce component parts of the system, 
within a range of values. [But t]he morphological transitions . . .  are 
consequences of the cycle of dynamics generating geometry and 
geometry modifying dynamics.” 78 We have also shown the biological 
beginnings of thought which are grounded in the organism’s action. This 
description of the psychic processes in terms of action, removed from 
thought the idealistic baggage and reinstates its material, or rather 
surmaterial primordiality. This argument is identical to the one we 
articulated in the previous chapter, concerning Foucault and the 
critique of the form-content dualism. Quantity is presented as having 
both content and expression (structure), and quality possesses both
77 Evidence of this has been published in New Scientist, There is more to Heredity than DNA, 19 April 
‘97. Even though this idea is only tentatively proposed, in the above article, through the auxiliary 
‘‘could", it nonetheless highlights a growing tendency in the sciences concerned with evolution and 
heredity to go beyond a merely genetic explanation.
78 r. Lewin, Complexity, p. 36.
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form and expression (behaviour). The expressive or relational order that 
subsists and is implicit within the two extremes of the single process 
is that out of which evolutionary order is emergent. This double aspect 
corresponding to expression is fundamentally irreducible; an affinity is 
the only bridge connecting ontogeny with phylogeny.
The implicate order is given to sensibility in the form of an intensity. 
Hence, the answer to the question: “ can difference in itself be 
experienced?” is found in the idea of intensity. Like the Bergsonian idea 
of the past in general79 which is given all at once in its entirety, 
which is not unlike the Kantian ‘ manifold’ , we find difference 
implicated. This experience is essentially nonsensical; only after 
expressing a limited portion of the manifold is sense produced and 
difference in itself cancelled. Therefore, in the experience of intensity 
itself, nothing has yet been synthesised into linear sequences and 
logical forms graspable through the intellectual faculties. “We call 
this ability to perceive everything at once intensity. For years we had 
found it impossible to examine the separate constituent parts of those 
chunks of experience; we had been unable to synthesise those parts into 
a sequence that would make sense to the intellect. Since we were 
incapable of those syntheses, we could not remember . . . The 
experiences were available to us, but at the same time they were 
impossible to retrieve, for they were blocked by a wall of intensity.” 60
79 H. Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. 171. 




If ethics presupposes both action and knowledge, then, every ethical 
system must be grounded in a specific historical activity. In the 
Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle distinguishes between ‘man as he 
actually is’ and ‘man as he could potentially be’. The former is man's 
actual state; the latter his potentiality for becoming his essence. For 
Aristotle, life consists in the pursuit of ends, or more specifically the 
ends toward which humanity ought aim. The purpose of the precepts are 
to guide man from the untutored state in which he is thrown in the 
world to the realisation of his true nature, while true nature itself is 
indicated by well-being. Well-being is an activity desirable for its own 
sake, and things that are desired for their own sake are good activities. 
Aristotle makes a further distinction between intellectual and 
practical activity, favouring the former over the latter, and thus 
concluding that contemplation is the essential part of well-being by 
virtue of the fact that it employs the best part of man: that is, reason. 
Virtue, as a state of character is defined in terms of the rule of the 
‘mean’, wherein activities are guided by the intellectual operation of 
mediating between two possible extremes’ - e.g., the mean between 
confidence and cowardice is courage. On the one hand, liberated from 
the dangers of the extremes, virtue is experienced as a single 
unchanging pleasure that issues from the contemplative life. On the 
other hand, the pleasures corresponding to the extremes lead away 
from the rule of reason, causing the individual to  lose his equilibrium 
and are thus considered bad. However, we must guard against 
conceiving pleasure as being in some sense primary, and therefore the 
end toward which man must strive: Aristotle is not Epicurean. Rather, 
intellectual pleasure indicates that we are on the right path.
Ethics
Aristotle therefore attributes a functional value to the domain of 
activity, since it is only through action that man’s potential being 
becomes actual. This value is that of living ‘well’ . Well-being is not a 
feeling, but a practice in which actions are expertly performed. 
Aristotle tells us that the relation between "man" and "living well" is 
analogous to that of a lyre-player that plays the lyre well. But playing 
well does not mean to necessarily play in accordance with a fixed set 
of rules. An object or act has a function, if it fulfills that task well it 
can be said to  be good. However, the notion of doing something w ell 
implies some conception of both a practice and a standard that are 
given in advance. The practice - and the striving toward an excellence 
in that practice - cannot constitute an ethic, since activity is what 
produces practices. To put the practice before the activity is to put the 
cart before the horse, to presuppose modes of behaviour and the 
authority of a standard for those activities. Moreover, in order to avoid 
the repressive power of increasing institutionalisation, a theory of 
excellence must resort to the use of concepts like 'justice', 'honesty', 
'temperance', 'patience', 'charity', etc.. Every one being a worthy 
sentiment, but these are primarily effects of action and are incapable, 
therefore, of representing the foundation of action itself.
Our time is contemporary with the knowledge of the failure of 
justifying morality. This is our nihilism, a nihilism that need not be 
angst ridden but rather liberating. Morality is essentially a belief in a 
set of ethical prescriptives that are definable only in terms of a set of 
rationalisations tha t conceal the fundamentally non-rational 
phenomena of the will. Therefore we substitute the notion of will fo r 
reason; not the Schopenhauerian idealistic will, but rather in terms of 
the Nietzschean 'will to power' and the Deleuzean idea of a ‘plane of 
immanence’. To affirm that the good life resides in pursuing a
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particular practice to the degree of excellence, involves a sleight of 
hand that inverts the natural direction in which desire flows. The very 
idea of virtue versus vice invokes a transcendent law that would 
subordinate our desires: the “Thou shalt not.” However, understanding 
ethics, in terms of the primacy of desire operative within the plane of 
immanence, has the advantage of founding an ethics capable of 
liberating man from a slavish subordination to established practices 
and the standards they impose.
It is the purpose of this chapter to pursue a line of inquiry that deals 
with ethics in terms of liberating  desire from the repressive 
structures of overt institutionalisation. To this end, it will be 
necessary to locate the point at which this overturning can be 
accomplished, which we will immediately identify as the lacuna 
represented by the phenomenon of recognition. The fragmentary 
references that have been selected to fulfil this aim approach this 
problematic from the points of view of philosophy, Buddhism, 
psychoanalysis, literature, and finally returning to philosophy. 1
1. The task set before a philosophy which aims toward overcoming both 
objective and subjective presupposition, finds its  inspiration in 
‘Difference in itself’ as foundation and ‘Repetition for itse lf as ground. 
Objective presupposition defines a logical reciprocality between 
concepts; subjective presupposition defines a pre-conceptual 
understanding of Being by virtue of a natural and innocent capacity for 
thought. The natural image of thought presupposes an affinity between 
thought and truth, a good will and a natural capacity for thought on the 
part of the thinker, and a common sense shared by all upright men. 
However, what is really given by means of this natural image of 
thought is merely the form of recognition in general. Thus, the true
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philosopher is without presupposition, an untimely individual far 
removed from the generalities of his time, and equipped with an ill will 
which undermines the morality implicit within the natural image of 
thought, in the sense of the creation of novel possibilities in the 
outpouring of becoming. A philosophy without presupposition
would find  its difference or its  true beginning, not in an agreement w ith the pre-  
philosophical image but in a rigorous struggle against th is image, which it would 
denounce as non-philosophical. As a result, it  would discover its  own authentic 
repetition in a thought without image, even at the cost of the greatest destructions and the 
greatest demoralisations, and a philosophical obstinacy with no ally but paradox, one 
which would have to  renounce both the form of representation and the element of common 
sense. (DR 1 32)
The a ffin ity  between thought and tru th finds its image in a 
transcendental model of recognition. Recognition rests on the belief 
that thought is not a single faculty, but rather the unifying principle of 
all the faculties - “ perception, memory, imagination, understanding . . . 
together relate their given and relate themselves to a form of identity 
in the object . . . while simultaneously . . . the form of identity in 
objects relies upon a ground in the unity of a thinking subject” (DR 
133). Thus it is the unity of thought in the ‘I think’ that harmonises all 
the faculties and brings about the recognition of the same object: by 
relating perception to memory, memory to imagination, imagination to 
understanding, and understanding back to perception, thus completing a 
a closed loop in the exercise of all the faculties, the faculties are 
brought into agreement with each other. “This is the meaning of the 
Cogito as beginning: it expresses the unity of all the faculties in the 
subject; it  thereby expresses the possibility that all the faculties will 
relate to a form of object which reflects the subjective identity; it 
provides a philosophical concept for the presupposition of a common 
sense” (Ibid). However, the object is always encountered in its
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singularity or particularity, and not as a universal object: this instance 
of green; this particular tree. Thus a good sense is a necessary 
complement of a common sense in its capacity of distributing, in space 
and time, the determinate contributions from the faculties within the 
universal form of the Same. Thereby bringing about the homogenisation 
of each particular instance within an universal distribution. “ [Cjommon 
sense is the norm of identity from the point of view of the pure Self 
and the form of the unspecified object which corresponds to it, good 
sense is the norm of the distribution from the point of view of the 
empirical selves and the objects qualified as this or that kind of thing” 
(DR 133-34). Thus, along with the pure Self the World is grasped as a 
unity. But, by the imperatives of logic it becomes necessary to 
postulate a foundation for these unities, at which point man creates for 
himself a transcendent God capable of justifying the primacy of 
homogeneity over heterogeneity, which constitutes the good and upright 
nature of thought in general. What the true philosopher seeks is the 
beyond of this transcendental model of recognition, in order to discover 
a new value, or rather, a revaluation of established values. Therefore, 
philosophy must begin with a collapse of the harmonious exercise of all 
the faculties, a veritable disorganised and dissipated functioning not 
unlike that which we find in the hero of Knut Hamsun's Hunger, whose 
tortured 'inwardness' traces a line in which subjective and objective 
presupposition is rigorously questioned, culminating in an overturning 
of 'psychologism'.
Thought without image must therefore begin with non-recognition, that 
is, with an active forgetting within a transcendental memory. 
“ Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object 
not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter . . .  its primary 
characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In this sense it is opposed
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to recognition” (DR 139). Sensibility takes on a primacy, since that 
which can only be sensed constitutes an 'imperceptibility' in relation to 
the cognitive faculties. The unrecognised sensible object of encounter 
shatters the mirror which reflects the image of Sameness and provokes 
thought to think. Non-recognition is a disjunctive use of the faculties 
and corresponds to a transcendental exercise wherein each faculty is 
taken to the limit of its singularity and power. "Each faculty must be 
born to the extreme point of its dissolution, at which it falls prey to 
triple violence: the violence of that which forces it to be exercised, of 
that which it is forced to grasp and which it alone is able to grasp, yet 
also that of the ungraspable (from the point of view of its empirical 
exercise)" (DR 143). At the extreme limit of its transcendental 
exercise each faculty discovers its Difference and its Repetition. This 
encounter has four transcendental aspects or cardinal points: the being 
of the sensible with respect to sensibility; the phantasm with respect 
to the imagination; the immemorial with respect to memory; and the 
aleatory point with respect to thought. Each of these four aspects 
internalises a dissimilarity that undermines the four-fold yoke of 
representation, and which correspond respectively to: "difference in 
intensity, disparity in the phantasm, dissemblance in the form of time, 
the differential in thought" (DR 145). Between the four faculties there 
is communication, however what is communicated is not sameness but 
difference: the difference that perpetuates the violence which awakens 
each faculty. In this sense, there exists a disjunctive operation of the 
faculties which establishes, paradoxically, a discordant harmony. The 
encounter wherein the object is not recognised is articulated by 
Deleuze in terms of 'stupidity'; not a stupidity in which the false is 
taken for the true, but rather, a stupidity that opens onto the space of 




In short, Deleuze aims to free difference and repetition from the 
subjugation imposed upon it by the natural image of thought and the 
transcendental model of recognition. He wishes to show difference 
differing in the movement of the eternal return, where what repeats is 
not the Same but the Different. The task is to go beyond the form of 
representation, to uncover or rather experience the transcendental 
conditions which give rise to representation as such, and to witness 
first-hand difference in itself. Good sense arranges things in the order 
of time and space, going from past to future as though from particular 
to  general, thereby revealing the ‘ right’ direction tha t grounds 
prediction. Common sense supplies good sense with two qualities: the 
subjective form of a universal Self, and the objective recognition of a 
universal and indeterminate object. The experience of difference in 
itself frees us from the repressive structures which hold us subjugated 
to  orthodoxy. By means of this liberation something absolutely new is 
allowed to  emerge. We could even define this 'something new’ as a 
means of resistance to political oppression, moral enslavement, and 
the monotonous boredom of existence. Thus, resistance is always a 
question of ethics. The means by which we attain this transcendence is 
by situating 'ourselves' in the space between conceptual opposites, and 
affirm not the opposite of a given concept but the difference itself 
between the opposites themselves. The aim of true thought is to think 
this delirium - to think the impossible at the heart of thought. What is 
experienced in this encounter is the unrecognised object, lacking in 
self-identity, perceptually differing from past resemblances, and from 
which no analogy is forthcoming. The absolutely new experience 
constitutive of a state of 'stupidity' rather than error, and from which 
we learn rather than attain knowledge: knowledge as a product of the
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learning process. The world may well be illusory in essence, but truth 
is the void which lies beyond recognition. A void which is intensive, 
phantasmagoric, immemorial and aleatory; a monstrous truth which 
paradoxically lacks truth since, nothing or no-thing is recognised. Every 
moment and presentation constitutes an immediacy or repetition of the 
absolutely different and new. From such a monstrous perspective we 
perform the revaluation as eternal task and to which only the overman 
is equal. Therefore, the revaluation cannot be the establishment of 
'new' values which at some future date will require overturning, but 
rather, what the revaluation inaugurates is a production of newness in 
itself: unilateral and asymmetrical difference. But the question arises: 
“ How is it possible to draw off something new from that which is 
essentially disparate?” Such phenomena we call events; spatio- 
temporal dynamisms which explode within the domain of absolute 
disparity; flashes of insight that come to  us in the form of 'epiphanies'. 
Let us illustrate further this notion of epiphany by means of an 
example.
2. There exists an intimate relation between paradox and truth, since 
all truths that relate to the transcendental domain are essentially 
paradoxical. A transcendental tru th  can not be written in the 
propositional form: ‘ If p then r \  but rather: 'If p then r and s’. On the 
plane of immanence a thing is both what it is and what it is not; it is 
where it isn't and isn't where it is. This seeming nonsense must not be 
understood as anything negative, but rather, as the excess that belongs 
to the paradoxical entity and the power by which the essence-event is 
released. The use of paradox finds a supreme illustration in Zen 
practise, wherein it is employed to drive a wedge into the rational 
mind in order to release the essences which subsist between the
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identities imposed by dialectical thought. Zen is a practice of 
meditative concentration represented by two essential schools: Soto 
and Rinzai. The former seeks enlightenment within the quietitude of 
monastic life; the latter in the activity of the outside world. Zen is not 
a tantra employing the physical energies of breath and semen to 
develop vigour, but only one of the four schools of the Mahayana, of 
which the Tantra is another. SAMADHI-PRAJNA is the enlightened 
realisation - a direct experience transcending words and things - in a 
voidness immanent within all phenomenal existence. In most cases 
enlightenment is indicated or suggested through the use of ‘koans’, in 
other cases concurrent causes are employed, such as a sudden shout, a 
roar of laughter, a gesture, or even a blow with a staff. These 'koans' 
are nonsense problems that the novice strives to solve, or rather enact 
its quasi-cause. Since Reason is transcended, the solution itself is 
formulated not in intellectual terms, but rather through an intuitive 
contemplation productive of a mimeticism. By simulating an event one 
becomes the solution. To be immersed in the void means to become 
equally mind and body, to abandon oneself to the intoxication of a pure 
intensive affectivity.
Plurality and singularity are irresolvable, nonetheless they form a 
composite like two sides of the same coin. Zen philosophy affirms an 
experience known as 'enlightenment', wherein all dualities are 
dissolved. In reality, time and space are one, it is only in our minds 
that we create the idea of a time separate from an actual place, and by 
which we give ourselves the idea of free choice. But this idea of free 
choice is an illusion which generates the added confusion of a morality, 
since it is always a choice between 'good' and 'bad' alternatives. For Zen 
it is only a question of doing or not-doing, and since not-doing is also a 
doing, there is only a doing something in the living moment. ‘‘Doing" is
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an action that belongs to  the surface, lacking in a circumspect 
consciousness that would judge the exigency from a position of 
detachment - a pure unconfused instant in which the act is 
spontaneously and indifferently performed.
Enlightenment should not be understood as a unique state of mind 
attained after years of arduous apprenticeship, but rather in terms of 
the mind of a novice, who practising for the first time can afford to 
take nothing for granted, in whom familiarity has not degenerated into 
contempt, and who thereby applies diligence and awareness at all times 
and to the minutest detail - conscientious, assiduous and constant 
attention to the fundamental prerequisites: ‘posture’ and ‘breathing’. 
Enlightenment is attained very early on in practising Buddhism, the 
difficulty is to not to allow oneself to be seduced by success and 
fam iliarity. Enlightenment dwells within the universal or Buddha 
nature which all things possess. Enlightenment is the universal 
coexistence between all things experienced as infinite empathy, 
wherein the Self finds its dissolution in a relation that is both 
dependent and independent. It is a virtual domain in which all things 
subsist: not mind and not body, but both mind and body; the surface at 
the limit of bodies and the surface at the limit of words. An Event, or 
in the words of Whitehead, an eternal idea. As Suzuki tells us:
To live in the realm of Buddha nature means to  die as a small being, moment after 
moment. When we lose our balance we die, but at the same time we also develop 
ourselves, we grow. Whatever we see is changing, losing its balance. The reason why 
everything looks beautiful is because it is out of balance, but its background is always in 
perfect harmony. This is how everything exists in the realm of Buddha nature, losing its 
balance against a background o f perfect balance. So if you see things without realising the 
background o f Buddha nature, everything appears to  be in the form of suffering. But if 
you understand the background of existence, you realise that suffering itself is how we 
live, and how we extend our life. * 1
1 Shunryu Suzuki, Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind, p. 32.
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It is not that the background universal corresponds to truth and 
individuality to illusion, but rather both universal and particular are 
complementary levels, each having reference to the other and existing 
by virtue of the other. Pure becoming slips in between the folds or 
invaginations of these two levels, tracing a line of flight upon a 
surface, and from which enlightenment (the epiphany) is discharged 
like “spores from a pod.” Dying from moment to moment as a little ego, 
in order to rebirth on the virtual plane against a background of 
universal being. Zen is neither Platonic Form nor Aristotelian category, 
but rather Stoic and Zen paradox.
The practice of Zen teaches the student to maintain an awareness of 
each passing moment, to grasp the essence of each moment and to 
allow it to pass without disturbing the flow of data. To impersonally 
and indifferently experience and recognise the contents of one’s own 
psyche and thereby liberate the desire that is held repressed in the 
unconscious. "The true purpose [of Zen] is to see things as they are, to 
observe things as they are."2 This, as we have seen, is the task set 
philosophy by Deleuze: the overcoming of both objective and subjective 
presupposition. It is no surprise to hear Suzuki tell his students: "In 
this realm there is no subjectivity nor objectivity."3 
By overcoming our self-centered ideas and dualistic thought processes 
we attain a dynamism of mind, whose centre is paradoxically calm - 
amidst the flux of activity there resides a centre of stillness. It is only 
by letting go that we actually begin to do something real. Only by 
ceasing to have purposes and ulterior motive for gain do we begin to 
practice Zen, and thereby become Buddha nature through expressing our 
true nature beyond the subjective-objective duality. To efface our
2 Ibid, p. 33.
3 Ibid, p. 37.
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little egos by losing ourselves completely in whatever we are doing. In 
this manner we become non-attached and impersonal, renouncing our 
individuality, presuppositions and prejudices in order to experience 
things in a completely new light. "When we sit we are nothing, we do 
not even realise what we are; we just sit. But when we stand up, we 
are there! That is the first step in creation. When you are there, 
everything else is there; everything is created all at once. When we 
emerge from nothing, when everything emerges from nothing, we see it 
all as a fresh new creation. This is non-attachment."4 It is also the 
‘ lightening flash’ .
At the heart of Zen practice there resides a supreme affirmation - 
which is, paradoxically, neither an affirmation nor a negation - to 
penetrate reality as a direct experience. The direct experience of 
reality is not attained through intellectual effort, but rather by means 
of intuitive contemplation. For this reason emphasis is given on 
practice and not intellectual appreciation. Zen is not a faith but a 
practice; a practice that focuses on each passing moment without an 
ulterior motive or project - this describes a fundamental paradox: to 
attain enlightenment one must give up seeking enlightenment. 
Essentially, Buddhism affirms the notion that reality is in essence pure 
becoming.
We should always live in the dark empty sky. The sky is always the sky. Even though 
clouds and lightening come, the sky is not disturbed. Even if the flashing of enlightenment 
comes, our practice forgets all about It. Then it is ready for another enlightenment. It is 
necessary for us to  have enlightenments one after another, if possible, moment after
moment. This is what is called enlightenment before you attain it and after you attain it .5 
By adopting the attitude of non-attachment we allow the lightening
4 Ibid, p. 67.
5 Ibid, p. 86.
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flash of enlightenment to pass and, by passing, allow the next to come. 
The impassive dark sky, unperturbed from one moment to the next, 
dwells in complete emptiness and observes the procession of inhuman 
thunder claps: epiphany.
"Something which comes out of nothingness is naturalness, like a seed 
or plant coming out of the ground. The seed has no idea of being some 
particular plant, but it has its own form and is in perfect harmony with 
the ground . . .  As it grows, in the course of time it expresses its 
nature."6 In this sense, 'nothingness' corresponds to the virtual plane 
of immanence. That true natural being comes out of nothingness, 
moment after moment, corresponds to the active forgetting that 
liberates sensibility from its subjugation to the autonomy of Reason. 
Paradoxically, man must work at being natural. Thus, "[t]he Buddhist 
understanding of life includes both existence and non-existence. The 
bird both exists and does not exist at the same time."7 However, the 
notion of non-existence is an effect of the power of the Negative, in its 
place we substitute the notion of subsistence or inherence. The bird 
both exists and subsists, in this manner its substantiality, identity and 
permanence is problematized - that is, it can be grasped as a real bird 
and as a virtual bird. The real is constituted by concrete things and 
ideas while the virtual is conceived in terms of a potentiality out of 
which both things and ideas are actualised. The state in which both 
things and ideas are absent is known as 'emptiness; thus truth is 
emergent from emptiness. “ Before we understand the idea of 
emptiness, everything seems to exist substantially. But after we 
realise the emptiness of things, everything becomes real - not
e Ibid, p. 108.
7 Ibid, p. 110.
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substantial.”8 We find the same affirmation in Deleuze: that the virtual 
is real without be actual (substantial), ideal without being abstract. 
The void therefore is not a non-existence but a virtuality out of which 
things and ideas are actualised.
Since things and words are the actualisations of a virtual Reality, 
Buddhism, like Deleuze, inverts the orthodoxical image of thought. As 
Suzuki tells us:
we should begin with enlightenment and proceed to  practice, and then to  thinking. Usually 
thinking is rather self-centered . . . But if enlightenment comes first, before thinking, 
before practice, your thinking and your practice will not be self-centered. By 
enlightenment I mean believing in nothing, believing in something which has no form or 
no colour, which is ready to  take on form or colour. This enlightenment is the immutable 
tru th .9
The kind of thinking which proceeds from enlightenment Deleuze names 
'stupidity'. Only through stupidity do we experience difference in itself. 
In short, Zen is called the ‘middle path’, since it slips in between and 
beyond the extremes of happiness and unhappiness, pleasure and pain, 
Good and Evil. Furthermore its goal resides neither in language nor the 
body, but rather in the attainment of a personal experience of Absolute 
Mind - lacking in both subjective form and objective content - that lies 
beyond the faculties: the Buddhist name for the Body without Organs. 
This Absolute Mind is reality; is the plane of immanence. However, by 
defining enlightenment in terms of immutable truth Buddhism betrays 
its ultimate aspiration; to reconcile the two extremes constitutive of 
an unity wherein all disparity and polytheism is brought into the fold of 
originary Being. Moreover, Zen interprets the attachment to Good and 
Evil, pain and pleasure, in terms of desire: they arise as an effect of 
desiring, or clinging, to  things in the world. The argument is
8 Ibid, p. 113. Emphasis added.
9 Ibid, p. 118.
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syllogistic: the world is an illusion; the world is born of desire; 
therefore cease to desire. For this reason, Zen rejects the Tantra and 
prioritises an intuitive contemplation which renders this practice 
idealistic. The idea of intuition affirms that the truth is given to the 
mind directly. But the coexistence of truth with non-truth on the plane 
of immanence implies that an intuition can never be true in the 
absolute sense. Therefore the only true intuition can be the one that 
directly experiences the essential Voidness in all phenomena - 
intuition can be true only as an experience of Univocal Being. Like 
Socrates, Zen’s wisdom resides in knowing that it does not know. It 
thereby tends toward the Socratic rather than the Aristotelian; toward 
mind rather than body; toward rationalism rather than nominalism. It 
should come as no surprise that the Buddha, like Socrates (and Christ), 
taught orally. Aristotle wrote, he was an experimenter who introduced 
a scientific system of logical classification; the anal retentive. A third 
system - possessing neither a surfe it of intu itionism  nor 
intellectualism - is therefore necessary that would correspond to the 
genital stage: perhaps the Stoic sage.
In order to remain in Samadhi - the continued experience of 
Enlightenment - it is necessary to lead a monastic life. However, this 
withdrawal from activity does not suit the tendencies of many people, 
since they are inclined toward a practical truth that would bring about 
social change; a politician, an intellectual, or an activist, for example. 
This type of individual will have a tentative grasp of Enlightenment, 
but possess great strength in seeing into the true nature of things: this 
is called wisdom. One can thus be active in the everyday world and 
employ this power o f wisdom, whose source is Samadhi, w ithout 
necessarily retreating from physical life. Seeing into the true nature of 
things is grasping them in their virtual state; intuiting a complete and
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overall knowledge within the particular activity in which he is engaged: 
wisdom. Let us pursue this notion of an ethics of impersonality by 
grounding it within a psychoanalytic model of desire; this has the 
advantage of combining Zen with the Tantra: dynamism with kineticism.
3. Ethics is a measure of action from the point of view of a judgment: 
an action is judged, but it also bears within it the mark of some 
implicit judgment, since that action and no other was undertaken. How 
do we bring the two faces of judgment into conformity? We will take 
as a preliminary guide the title of a seminar that Jacques Lacan gave in 
1960: “ Have you acted in conformity with your desire.” 10 1 If we are to 
uncover the true meaning of ethics, it will be necessary to examine the 
actual structure of action and the desire that subsists within action. 
Lacan uses a distinction between tragedy and comedy in order to open a 
space in which the relationship between action and desire would show 
itself. The tragic, we are told, is characterised by a being-for-death 
that negates a natural exuberency implicit in life, by imposing upon it 
prescriptions that serve only to lim it desire and the scope of action. 
This limiting tendency is the product of both fear and pity. The comic, 
on the other hand, corresponds to  a different relationship between 
action and desire, one which does not regulate the latter, but sees in it 
an essential failure: the impossibility of action to ever catch up with 
the desire that precedes it. It follows, then, that comedy embraces an 
essential futility towards life. As Lacan writes:
One must simply remember that the element in comedy that satisfies us, the element that 
makes us laugh, tha t makes us appreciate it in its full human dimension, not excluding 
the unconscious, is not so much the trium ph of life as its flight, the fact tha t life slips 
away, runs off, escapes all those barriers tha t oppose it, including precisely those tha t 
are the most essential, those that are constituted by the agency o f the signifier.' '
10 J. Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960.
11 Ibid, p. 314.
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Lacan, of course, identifies the signifier of this line of flight with the 
phallus. This flight, or nonsense structure, defines the nature of real 
desire and the comic fu tility  at the heart of human action and 
experience.
Therefore, the foundation of ethics can reside only in desire, or more 
correctly, in the judgment: Have you acted in conformity with your 
desire. "It is insofar as the subject is situated and is constituted with 
relation to the signifier that the break, splitting or ambivalence is 
produced in him at the point where the tension of desire is located."12 
This essentially open and nonsensical structure of desire Lacan calls 
jouissance. And since it is fundamentally open, no prescriptive could 
correspond to its structural non-structurality. In this sense, ethics 
could only condemn an action that gives ground relative to desire, fails 
to push itself to its limit and excel itself in an exuberant movement. 
The price to be payed for access to real desire is jouissance itself - 
that is, "crossing [the] . . . limits tha t we call fear and p ity ."13 
However, the paradoxes that constitute ethics are not resolved with 
the liberation of desire, but rather the flush of exuberance must be 
tempered with "prudence"14 if our experimenter is to avoid the dangers 
of a too risky path ending in premature failure due to rashness. In this 
operation one must not identify with the overcoming of fear and pity, 
since they will be overcome as and when jouissance is attained. 
Identifying with fear and pity places an obstacle in the path of the 
attainment of jouissance-desire by constraining the operation to the 
tragic mode. The fu tility  and excess essential to comedy implies
12 Ibid, p. 317.
13 Ibid, p. 323.
14 Ibid, p. 323.
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'letting go' of the hegemonic rationality characteristic of everyday life. 
Thus, we celebrate a certain irrationality and intoxication that no 
intentional project could define.
The lim it-experience - Bataille names it Inner Experience 
corresponds to a thought which is both extreme and free, and is the 
response to man placing himself radically in question. This radical 
thought, or radicality at the heart of thought, corresponds to a 
perpetual movement without reconciliation: what has come to be known 
as the impossibility at the heart of possibility. It also represents the 
passion associated with the death drive - a passion that undermines all 
knowledge and purposive activity and reveals an essential fluidity that 
"belongs" to man's essence. This belonging is what makes the movement 
and the desire for this movement possible in the first place, or rather, 
renders the desire for the limit-experience possible-impossible. The 
limit experience is the excess intrinsic to  the death drive, a pure 
affirmation in which what is affirmed is affirmation itself: a Yes to 
everything and at the same time to nothing at all. Within this region we 
locate real desire. In fact, life is always experienced on two planes 
because it is constituted by a paradox and double bind: that is, the level 
of possibility, knowledge and empirical memory; and the level of 
impossibility and active forgetting. The latter is not external to the 
former, but is rather immanent within it and constitutes its most 
intimate heart. For which reason it is called the thought from the 
outside. The outside of thought which can never be thought without 
betraying its essence, hence it is the impossible which thought aims to 
think. It can never culminate in a totalising experience that would turn 
it into an object, since it is "the mode of relating, of holding oneself in 
relation."15 Within this experience the mode of recognition collapses,
15 M. Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, p. 208.
220
Ethics
everything is experienced as though it were 'for the first time'. It is 
not a product of reason, nor is it dialectical, but rather, a pure 
affirmation of affirmation and thought thinking that which will not let 
itself be thought: ecstasy. This pure affirmation introduces chance into 
thought, it puts thought into play while giving itself over to the sole 
thought that perpetuates yet another throw o f the dice. However, an 
ontological affirmation of this kind, which is both eternal restlessness 
and indifference, cannot be sustained and risks falling, or rather 
eternally falls into the service of reason, self and the "I". Indifference 
therefore constitutes the element of real desire.
Hegel, in his Philosophy of Law, articulates the foundations of the 
bourgeois state and human organisation through a relation between 
need and reason. However, this relation is inadequate to account for the 
process of self-realization expressed in Freud’s Civilisa tion and Its 
Discontents. Reason, which organises the unconscious in a logical 
manner, is present in the very beginnings of human experience, and in 
relation to which man must position his needs. But this relation 
between reason and need incorporates a crack in which the functioning 
of desire is located. Desire therefore takes on a primary role in the 
articulation of human development, since it is located in the 
interstices and the intervals between the structural elements, giving 
rise to the organisation of those elements. Thus, Jouissance is not the 
satisfaction of a need, but the impetus of a drive that is not a purely 
biological instinct, but incorporates an historical dimension since it 
refers back to something that is memorable, or rather immemorial. 
Jouissance must not be understood as a straight forward phenomenon 
that we capture by focusing an intentional gaze upon it, but rather it 
constitutes a paradox defined in terms of the dialectic between 
happiness and Law, Self and Other. In fact, the Law is founded on the
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Other, the respect and responsibility toward the Other. This respect 
mediates between Self and Other and defines what is commonly called 
universal human rights: altruism is founded primarily on the image of 
the Other. However, this image of the Other is also the image on which 
we are formed as ego - that is, the ego and the Other are 
simultaneously formed, the one does not exist without the other, since 
both together form a natural whole. On the one hand, this dialectic 
forms the basis of fear (the respect for God). The prescriptive of the 
Law that comes from God: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." On 
the other hand, the fact that both Self and Other constitute a single 
structure allows the "I" to identify with the Other, allows it to see 
itself in the Other. Hence the horror at witnessing the suffering of the 
Other: this forms the basis of all pity.
But could there exist a language capable of escaping violence, and a 
thought of the impossible which would be a kind of reserve in thought 
itself, eluding any appropriative or commanding gesture? Such a 
thought would be purely other, a relation to the other as other, and not 
ordered to a reduction of the Same. Thus, impossibility must 
necessarily be a non-power in which time has lost its hold and wherein 
we are delivered over to another time, a time as other, as absence and 
neutrality w ithout possibility, project and redemption. A pure 
immediacy, the impossible, not as a privileged experience, but as that 
which hides behind every experience: an other dimension, 
"[im possib ility  is relation with the outside; and since this relation 
without relation is the passion that does not allow itself to be 
mastered through patience, impossibility is the passion of the outside 
itse lf."16 Possibility is merely the power of the No, whereas 
impossibility is being itself, and which is neither negation nor
16 Ibid, p. 46.
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affirmation but immediacy. Desire is the relation to impossibility; the 
relation to naked presence: "communication." Poetry, as well as every 
essential speech, is not there in order to articulate impossibility; it 
merely responds to  it. Every beginning speech begins by responding, an 
attentive response in which the impatient waiting for the unknown and 
the desiring hope fo r presence are affirmed.
By showing that Self and Other are the products of a single structure, 
the foundation o f this structure cannot be established on either 
element. Therefore, an appeal must be made to a more profound process 
of individuation capable of supporting both poles of the dialectic. We 
experience this process through jouissance; but the latter contains an 
unconscious aggression derived from the good object that the superego 
turns back upon the ego. Herein, the Law and, therefore, altruism is 
lacking, the limit has been shattered wherein the "death of God' is 
enacted. This experience Lacan names "perversion." By following 
perversion we are drawn along the line of flight that constitutes real 
desire and wherein the distinction between Self and Other can no longer 
be made. The perversion is genital; that is to say, for Lacan at least, 
perversion is constituted by a specifically erogenous content that he 
derives from Sade's writings. The genital aggressivity is a partial 
object independent from the Self-Other structure, but an independent 
object that desires reintegration into that whole object-structure. 
This is what gives desire its directedness and defines it as the 
fundamental law or death drive, since both Self and Other are 
pulverised in the fligh t for the satisfaction it  will never attain. The 
works of Sade and Lautreamont trace this flight, and for which reason 
Lacan names them 'experimental literature'. As he tells us: "The work of 
art in this case is an experiment that through its action cuts the 
subject loose from his psychosocial moorings - or to  be more precise,
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from all psychosocial appreciation of the sublimation involved."17 The 
suicide and altrucide implied in the death drive corresponds to the 
state of absolute zero or the Body Without Organs: a purely erogenous 
intoxication, the subject's most intimate content determined as a 
topology of genital zones.
Turning now to Deleuze’s reading of psychoanalysis in The Logic of 
Sense, where he defines the developmental process in terms of a 
dynamic genesis with three distinct stages: the formation of erogenous 
zones, the phallic stage, and the castration complex. Let us look at each 
of these stages in turn. The firs t stage constitutes a pre-individual 
"abominable mixture" of bottomless depth, wherein fragments are 
introjected, injuring the body, inciting anger and aggression, which is 
subsequently projected onto these fragments-objects, or bad objects. 
This is the paranoid-schizoid position and represents to the activity of 
the Id during the first year of the child's life. Secondly, along with the 
introjection-projection process of the bad objects there is an 
identification with the good object; primarily the breast. The child 
strives to attain and identify himself with the good object, but the 
identification is never complete and leads into the depressed and 
frustrated position represented by the superego. The good object is in 
essence a lost object; from the very beginning it reveals itself as lost 
and as preexistent. As Deleuze writes;
Coming about in the course of the schizoid position, the good object posits itself as having 
always preexisted in this other dimension which now interferes with depth. This is why, 
higher than the movement through which it confers love and blows, there  is the essence 
through which and into which it withdraws and frustrates us. It withdraws covered with 
its wounds, but it  also withdraws into its  love and its hate. It gives its  love only as a love
which was given before.....as a pardoning; it confers its hate only as a recalling of threats
and warnings which did not take place. It is therefore as a result of frustration, tha t the 
good object, as a lost object, distributes love and hatred. (LS 191)
17 J. Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960, p. 201.
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In order to bring about an equilibrium between these two distinct 
dimensions, it is necessary to posit a third position as represented by 
the ego. What is opposed to the bad partial objects is not a good object, 
but rather a body without organs: a perfectly fluid mixture of solid 
fragments. The BwO equilibrates between the schizoid and depressed 
positions, extracting a voice in the form of “words-passions,” which 
constitute the beginnings of a purely denotative language, but lacking 
the organising principle that would make it function as a signifying 
whole.
But how is the surface as equilibrator-pacifier between the depths and 
heights constituted? As we have seen, the surface takes the form of a 
topological structure: pieces connected to one another along a thin 
membrane of "skin". In order to understand this process let us return to 
the concept of partial objects as Deleuze describes them:
The word "partial" has two senses. First it designates the state of introjected objects and 
the corresponding state of the drives attached to  these objects. It also designates elective 
bodily zones and the state of the drives which find in them a "source".. .  But the essential 
difference is that zones are facts of the surface, and th a t their organisation implies the 
constitution, the discovery, and the investment of a th ird dimension which is no longer 
either depth or height. (LS 196-7)
We now begin to appreciate why Deleuze characterises the surface not 
as subversive nor conversive, but as perversive. The perverse position 
constitutes a double liberation of the libidinal drives: a liberation from 
both the preservative drives of oral absorption and the destructive 
drives of internal sensibility, directly linking sexuality to the surface. 
According to the Freudian theory of erogenous zones, the surface is 
given a wholly originary sexual orientation. However, this orientation 
must be understood as an impersonal sexuality, and not the polarised 
sexual orientation witnessed between so-called ‘normal’ adults. To 
these erogenous zones there corresponds a cause which constitutes
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them, these being the secreting orifices and membranes.
Each erogenous zone is inseparable from  one or several singular points, from a serial 
development articulated around the singularity and from a drive investing this territory. 
It is inseparable from a partial object "projected" onto the te rrito ry  as an object of 
satisfaction (image), from an observer or an ego bound to  the territory and experiencing 
satisfaction, and from a mode of joining up from other zones. The entire surface is the 
product o f this connection. (LS 197)
Therefore, the Oedipal complex is not an originary and irreducible 
position, but the tertiary stage in the process of development, and 
corresponds, strictly speaking, to  genital organisation.
The surface is the liberating organisation which, rather than 
constituting the desires for murder and incest, invokes them in order to 
pacify them. In the capacity of pacifier, it is the phallus of the genital 
stage that heals the wounds of the aggressive depths while maintaining 
contact with the frustrated heights. It binds all the zones into one 
surface bringing about integration. The phallus therefore is not the 
penic instrument of copulation, but rather the paradoxical entity which 
ensures the connection between all zones as well as the communication 
between all events in one and the same Event. But the fragility 
characteristic of the surface has two causes: Firstly, the fact that the 
Oedipal complex is perpetually threatened by the possibility of being 
consumed by the pre-Oedipal depths. Secondly, the desire for incest 
that emanates from the heights instils guilt. And as we saw in 
connection with Lacan, these two dangers correspond to the price paid 
for the attainment of jouissance: that is, the overcoming of fear and 
pity.
The castration complex comes about at the stage of genital integration 
when the good object is cleaved into two parts, represented by the 
separation of the two parents in the mind of the child and causing the 




from the tw o disjunctions subsumed under the good o b jec t (unharmed-wounded, 
present-absent) the child begins by extracting the negative and makes use of it in order 
to  qualify a mother image and a father image. (LS 204)
Thus, in its unconscious the child strives to heal the wounded body of 
the mother while recalling the withdrawn father. These two aspects 
constitute the child's ‘good intentions’. But why does it all turn out so 
badly? In the dual process of healing and recalling, the child suddenly 
realises that the maternal body is not only wounded by the internal 
penises, but more essentially, it is now experienced as a castrated 
body. As Deleuze writes:
It becomes therefore true, at th is moment, tha t by wishing to  restore the mother, the 
child has in fact castrated and eventrated her; and th a t by wishing to  bring back the 
father, the child has betrayed and killed him, transform ed him in to  a cadaver. 
Castration, death by castration, becomes the child’s destiny, reflected by the mother in 
this anguish he now experiences, and inflicted by the father in this culpability he now 
submits to  as a sign of vengeance. (LS 206)
Thus, the penis, as property of the father, comes to condemn the 
libidinal drives of the child.
However, an essential distinction arises between the intention and the 
accomplished action. The entire action is projected onto a double 
screen: Firstly as intention on the sexual and physical surface which 
corresponds to the healing and recalling desire. Secondly, as an 
accomplished action it  is projected onto a cerebral surface which 
corresponds to murder and incest. Hence, the passage from one surface 
to the other essentially bears upon the formation o f thought. That is, 
"the transformation of the phallic line into the trace of castration on 
the physical surface . . . corresponds to [the] . . . crack of thought" (LS 
208) and the pure line of Aion.
The phantasm has its beginnings in this result. However, castration is
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concerned w ith physical surfaces and the corresponding dissipation of 
images (mother, father), whereas the phantasm is projected onto 
another surface, the double of the physical surface which we call 
cerebral. As Deleuze tells us:
There is thus  a leap. The trace of castration as a deadly furrow becomes this crack of 
thought, which marks the powerless to  think, but also the line and the point from which 
thought invests its new surface. And precisely because castration is somehow between 
two surfaces, it does not submit to  th is transmutation without carrying along its share of 
appurtenance, w ithout folding in a certain manner and projecting the entire corporeal 
surface of sexuality over the metaphysical surface of thought. (LS 218)
Sublimation is the operation whereby the trace of castration becomes 
the line of thought. Symbolisation is the operation whereby thought 
reinvests w ith its own energy all that occurs on the cerebral surface. 
Thus the phantasm, as constitutive of the incorporeal, is a machine for 
the production of thought by bringing the inner and the outer into 
contact on a single side or Mobius strip. This process of the birth of 
thought is continual: the eternal return in the guise of the non- 
actualizable Event which can only be accomplished by thought and in 
thought. There is, then, something unique which transcends physical 
surfaces, addressing itself only to thought - this is extra-Being. This 
process constitutes the liberation of a non-existent entity from states 
of affairs, the event as noematic attribute which expresses an eternal 
truth.
The phantasm recovers everything on this new plane of the pure event, and in th is 
symbolic and sublimated part o f th a t which cannot be actualised; similarly, it draws 
from this part the strength to  orient its actualisations, to  duplicate it, and to  conduct its 
concrete counter-actualization. (LS 221)
Let us call the initial resonance brought about upon the physical 
surface by the phallus, Eros, and the forced movement brought about by 
the desexualised libido which operates between original depth (good
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and bad objects) and the cerebral surface, Thanatos. In this dual 
structure we perceive the perpetual threat of collapse as well as the 
promise of an extendedness beyond the limits of the physical surface: 
“We can therefore name the entire forced movement ‘death instinct’, 
and name its full amplitude ‘metaphysical [or cerebral] surface’” (LS 
240). If collapse is avoided and the cerebral surface dominates over 
original depth, then, “ a glorious event enters a symbolic relation with a 
state of affairs” (Ibid), and a verb is inscribed which projects depth 
onto the cerebral surface, thereby sketching out thought.
The phantasm therefore is the product of the dual process of sexual 
beginnings and of desexualization, and to  this process there 
corresponds a perpetual resexualizing of new objects. Language and 
sexuality are therefore co-present systems, this is the meaning of 
perversion. But this language is unable to capture the purity of its 
sexual originations, since the former represents a reinvestment and 
transformation of the primary developmental processes. In short, 
ethics corresponds to the desexualised castrated line of thought, which 
is subsequently resexualised upon the equilibrating cerebral surface. 
The process of resexualization frees thought from the hegemony of 
reason and from the destructive impulses of schizophrenic mania, 
thereby liberating it from the repressive model o f recognition through 
a perpetual reinvestment. Ethics represents the pacified and ‘prudent’ 
movement of real desire; of jouissance and the overcoming of fear and 
pity/guilt. Real desire is constituted in the interstices between the 
two levels of depth and height; its foundation is, therefore, essentially 
ambivalent and paradoxical. This desire does not correspond to the 
speculative death drive of Freud, but rather the psychic or cerebral 
death drive of Lacan. Let us now consider this model with respect to 
the “neuter” in the writings of Blanchot.
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4. The neuter is not a third gender; it is a non-generic and non­
particular something that neither belongs to subject nor to object. "And 
this does not simply mean that it is still undetermined and as though 
hesitating between the two, but rather that the neuter supposes 
another relation depending neither on objective conditions nor on 
subjective dispositions."18 Moreover, "one can recognise in the entire 
history of philosophy an effort either to acclimatise or to domesticate 
the neuter by substituting for it the law of the impersonal and the 
reign of the universal, or an effort to challenge it by affirming the 
ethical primacy of the Self-Subject."19 Therefore, the neuter is 
essentially unknown and unknowable, but not as something absolutely 
unknowable nor the 'yet to be known'; neither transcendent noumenon 
nor empirical phenomenon. Rather the unknown is disclosed as the 
unknown and indicated in a manner that keeps it unknown. This 
experience excludes perspective and critique, since it is neither 
positive nor negative. The neuter is aliquid  and bestows value without 
signalling itself: it  frees meaning as a phantasm. Neither affirmation 
nor negation, but having the closure of an aliquid  to which no question 
corresponds, and toward which one may approach only by a series of 
interrogatives: sorites. Moreover, the neutral is given in advance in 
memory's immobile present. Memory is the muse that continually 
repeats herself under the exigency of repetition, each time a first time. 
Man abides in a great impersonal memory that constitutes the reserve 
to which no individual has access. Forgetting is the primordial divinity 
Mnemosyne, mother of the muses. Active forgetting is the vigilance of 
memory to which the hidden of things is preserved. The most profound
18 ibid, p. 299.
19 Ibid. p. 299.
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effacement where the site o f metamorphoses is found and the model of 
recognition shattered. The relation to active forgetting is not 
dialectical but one of an indifferent difference. The poet returns to 
presence from his journey of active forgetting and expresses the 
experience in the most simple of words. Thus, simplicity and clarity 
are the watchwords of all artistic expression; the simplest of 
responses to what was experienced as strangeness.
Aion corresponds to a vertiginous turning wherein time itself turns. 
The future expresses the necessity of failure; we are cast back into a 
past from which we derive a supreme affirmation. Everything is 
organised around two essential notions: invention and harmony; flight 
and resonance; fragment and whole. For Blanchot, poetry represents the 
power to compress a spatial and temporal multiplicity into a unique 
'site' or focal point, where in the lightening flash of illum ination  is 
given. This affirmation therefore is simultaneously a turning toward 
and a turning away; attraction and repulsion. Hence, the poet's duty is 
to transform lack into resource. In the words of Nietzsche: “To impose 
upon becoming the character of being - tha t is the supreme will to 
power.”20 The poet's concern therefore is not with his individual 
person, but with thought itself. A veritable "combat between thought as 
lack and the impossibility of bearing this lack, between thought as 
nothingness and the plenitude of upsurgence that hides in thought, 
between thought as separation and life as inseparable from thought."21 
Poetry is an exigency that can never be satisfied, a drive never fully 
fulfilled, constantly tracing a line of pure becoming that remains 
virtual, a relational being more real than any presence, an absence that 
is starkly before us, and a difference  that is prior to all representation.
20 F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §617.
21 M. Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, p. 294.
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The sacred is the experience of a violent communication that comes to 
us as both multiplicity and unity; the gods of return and decline; 
Dionysus and the Crucified. However, what matters is the direction that 
thought assumes. Bataille experienced the sacred in thought as a 
decline from the summit of unity toward the depravities o f 
multiplicity. Blanchot and Deleuze, on the other hand, emphasise the 
fact that the true direction of thought, or thinking, begins from the 
heterogeneous and tends toward the homogeneous.
On the one hand, allegory and symbol relate respectively to the duality 
of a meaning that is manifest, and a meaning that is latent. The image, 
on the other hand, is a sudden and explosive flash: epiphany. The very 
space of the image, the 'reverberation' proper to it, summons us to  
leave ourselves and traverse its trembling immobility. Herein, man is 
silent; it is the image that speaks. This space of the image is the most 
interior exterior, a cruel inside-outside tha t “ is also entire ly 
imageless, an imaginary speech rather than a speech of the 
imagination, where the imaginary speaks without speaking either of or 
through images.”22 This notion of the image is complicated by Deleuze 
who sees in it two corresponding aspects. The image has a problem- 
solution structure and corresponds to the physical surface; whereas the 
phantasm has a question-answer structure and corresponds to the 
cerebral surface.
Blanchot informs us that “ every language has a structure about which 
we can say nothing in this language, but there must be another language 
that treats the structure of the first and possesses a new structure 
about which we cannot say anything, except in a third language - and so 
forth .”23 The language we use constantly gives rise to enigmas that
22 Ibid. p. 324.
23 Ibid, p. 337.
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must firstly be described and then explained with reference to another 
language. This is the power of the descriptive: an infinite displacement 
without place which sets and keeps in motion a redoubling without 
duplication. To write is to pass from “ I” to “ he” - and as we saw in 
relation to Deleuze, from the “ he” to the “ they” - an uncharacterizable 
“ they. The “ they” is the neuter of narrative, no longer anchored in life, 
but an anonymous speech behind language tha t constitutes the 
singularity of narrative. This outside is the centre that is also the 
absence of centre. This outside is the distance that language takes 
from its own lack as its limit. This anonymous speech "is the expanse 
where, in the presence of a remembrance, there comes to speech the 
event that takes place there; memory, muse and mother of muses, holds 
truth within itself."24 25The descriptive speech of commentary belongs to 
the movement of the neutral; freed from the hegemony of value it 
repeats the  Work. Within this lack of value only repetition can 
establish the Work as unique. Thus, descriptive commentary is a 
process o f translation through which the neutral is given form by a 
series of interrogations. Moreover, the exigency to which “ he” responds 
is not a transcendent force but an immanent power. But immanence 
itself must be grasped in terms of neutrality. As Blanchot cautions us 
in relation to  Kafka's Castle:
it constitu tes an immanent force. But th is can only be an approximate way of putting 
things. One o f the essential tra its o f the neutral, in fact, is tha t it does not allow itself to  
be grasped either in terms of immanence or in terms of transcendence, drawing us into 
an entirely different sort o f relation .2 s
For Blanchot, then, ethics is a kind of writing tha t responds to the 
exigency o f the neuter, the indifferent and impersonal drives which 
subsist in the active forgetting that is Mnemosyne. What is important
24 Ibid, p. 381.
25 Ibid, p. 463 n5.
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is the non-subjective and non-objective character of this domain of 
indifferent difference, hence the name ‘neuter’. But perhaps Blanchot’ 
neutralisation goes too far, since the drives which have undergone a 
desexualization, fail to  find in their subsequent reinvestments a 
resexualization that would restore to them a portion of their erogenous 
beginnings. For this reason, Blanchot articulates the movement of the 
neutral in a wholly cerebral style. Thus, he speaks of the reinvestments 
taking the form of “ simple words” that capture the essence of 
strangeness. There is no talk of a continual process of reinvesting new 
objects - and every object is a new object, even the old object, because 
the objects are experienced in the active forgetting that shatters 
recognition - with desire, albeit an impersonal desire, but one which 
does not draw any lines or limits except the line of its own 
disappearance in an eternal flight for satisfaction. One finds in 
Blanchot an ethics of disembodiedness and cerebral essence, which 
constitutes his work as a veritable writing machine. But we wish to go 
beyond this, or rather add to it a supplementary and equally valid level: 
that is, the body.
5. According to Deleuze,26 three essential themes characterise the 
radicality of Spinozist thought: i). A critique o f consciousness that 
places the body at the centre of his philosophical system, ii). A 
philosophy of values capable of overturning morality, iii). And a 
revaluation of life in terms of the "joyful" passions that arise from a 
philosophy of affirmation. We will deal with each of these in turn.
A). According to the first theme, Spinoza’s philosophy is 'materialist'
26 The reading of Spinoza that follows owes its interpretation to the specific Deleuzean slant, which in 
many ways is incommensurate with the more traditional interpretations of Spinoza - that is to say, as an 




insofar as it takes the body, rather than conscious thought, as the 
paradigm upon which to  model the Ethics. Against Rationalist 
dogmatism Spinoza, and Nietzsche after him, affirmed that the greater 
and more important part of activity in general is unconscious. As 
Deleuze writes; “ the model of the body, according to Spinoza, does not 
imply any devaluation of thought in relation to extension, but, much 
more important, a devaluation of consciousness in relation to thought: a 
discovery of the unconscious, of an unconscious o f thought jus t as 
profound as the unknown o f the body’ (SP 18-9).
The argument takes its stand from the perspective of causality: 
consciousness, it  is claimed, knows nothing of causes only their 
effects. On a causal level, the body and the unconscious of thought are 
defined in terms of a dynamic field populated by a multiplicity of 
intensive forces, which when taken as a whole constitute a metastable 
Being. There are two essential aspects that correspond to bodies. On 
the one hand, a body is composed of a multiplicity of parts which 
belong to it only in terms of a certain relation that characterises it. In 
essence this relation is singular, but this singularity is itself 
reducible to a multiplicity of relations, orderings amongst parts that 
are structured upon a hierarchy of levels, which when taken 
collectively constitute one dominant relation or form. These relations, 
orders, and levels define the numerous ways in which a body can be 
affected. On the other hand, a Body enters into relations with other 
bodies; these relations can be either attractive or repulsive to its 
essence. Joy arises from attractive relations, wherein an enhancement 
of power is experienced. Sadness arises from repulsive relations in 
which a decrease of power is the result. Therefore, the relations which 
constitute a single body are kinetic, while those that exist between the 
bodies themselves are dynamic. By essence (eternal truth or idea) we
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mean the dominant relation that is realised by the parts. Essence is the 
state of being of the individual and its capacity, as a whole, to be 
affected. A body's affective capacity is expressed as a quantity of 
power that varies between joy and sadness. "But this variation does not 
pertain, as such, to essence; it only pertains to existence or duration, 
and concerns only the genesis of the state in existence" (SP 40). 
Consciousness knows nothing of these dynamic polarities which take 
place on a purely unconscious level. "In short, the conditions under 
which we know things and are conscious of ourselves condemn us to 
have only inadequate ideas" (SP 19). Consciousness is a process of 
identification, of fixing sites and erecting boundaries: it calls a halt to 
the schizophrenic becomings in the name of unity, identity and telos 
(being). Since consciousness experiences only effects and not causes, it 
will take these effects as causes, and thereby invert the world through 
the power of its autonomy. It is at this moment that the transcendental 
illusion locates identity within the plane of immanence.
The greater part of activity involves an unconscious becoming in which 
the drives continually extend themselves to the point at which a 
resistance is met. The actual result of the encounter - that is, whether 
the resistive force is appropriated by the becoming or the becoming by 
the resistive force - is determined immanently. As Deleuze explains:
But because th is e ffo rt prom pts us to  act d ifferently according to  the objects 
encountered, we should say tha t it is, at every moment, determined by the affections that 
come from the objects. These determinative affections are necessarily the cause of the 
consciousness of the conatus. And since the affections are not separable from a movement 
by which they cause us to  go to  a greater or lesser perfection (joy and sadness) . . . 
Consciousness appears as the continual awareness of this passage from greater to  lesser, 
or from lesser to  greater, as a witness o f the variations and determinations o f the 
conatus functioning in relation to  other bodies or other ideas. (SP 21)
B). The second theme relates to the system of valuation defined in
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terms of 'good' and "bad", rather than "Good" and "Evil". There are two 
distinct levels on which a system of valuation must be conceived. On 
the objective level, good is any relation that compounds with our own 
and results in an increase in the feeling of power; bad is any relation 
that decomposes our essence and decreases our feeling of power. On 
the subjective level of an individual, good is that which strives toward 
extending its system of organisation, bringing under its command other 
relations that add to its own power; bad is that which tends toward 
dissolution, wastage and ultimately impotence. "The opposition of 
values (Good-Evil) is supplanted by a qualitative difference of modes of 
existence (good-bad)" (SP 23). On the one hand, morality is the law 
before which man is obedient; it  is a transcendent instance that 
commands obedience, as illustrated in the relationship between tyrant 
and slave. On the other hand, ethics implies knowledge, toward which 
man strives by extending his power, and which is re la tive ly  and 
pa rtia lly  determined by the qualitative difference of modes of 
existence or phyla: immanent rather than transcendent.
C). The third theme, which distinguishes between the sad and the joyful 
passions, must not be understood in terms of two interpretations of a 
single thesis, but rather in terms of a discrimination between two 
fundamental kinds of complex. On the one hand, the "sad passions" 
manifest both a hatred of life (ressentiment) and a loathing o f self 
(guilt). This complex separates a body from what it can do, and 
worships the righteous impotence that poisons the affirmative essence 
of life. On the other hand, the "joyful passions" affirm the singular 
essence that is one's power and being. This essence which manifests 
itself as a capacity for being affected has two primary modes: action 
and passion. The former corresponds to  the power of acting; the latter 
to the power of being acted upon which separates us from our actions.
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The capacity for being affected remains constant while the relation 
between the two modes is inversely proportionate. Deleuze further 
differentiates between two types of passion: when our body enters into 
a relation with another body, that body's relation can either compound 
or attract our own body or it can decompose or repel it. The former 
relation gives rise to joy, the latter to sadness. Actions are wholly 
unconscious, but the passions enter into the activity of consciousness. 
The essential problem for the Ethics is to show how and in what 
capacity we may arrive at the power of acting, given that 
consciousness has access only to the passions. Therefore, how could 
one ever know what acting in a truly affirmative way is? Relations 
which are attractive give rise to joy through the feeling of enhanced 
power. But
[t]h is  joy is still a passion, since it has an external cause; we still remain separated 
from our power of acting, possessing it only in a formal sense. This power of acting is 
nonetheless increased proportionally; we "approach" the point of conversion, the point of 
transmutation tha t will establish our dominion, tha t will make us worthy o f action, of 
active joys. (SP 28)
Deleuze's Spinoza articulates a thesis on power relations; relations 
tha t are constitutive of bodies and their parts, and the polarities that 
exist between bodies within a social milieu. The goal of the ethic is to 
restore to bodies the power, and the joy in power, that is their’s by 
nature in order to overcome the reactive interpretation that has been 
imposed upon life. "The entire Ethics is a voyage in immanence; but 
immanence is the unconscious itself, and the conquest of the 
unconscious. Ethical jo y  is the correlate of speculative affirmation" 
(SP 29). Ethics is grounded in immanence, but what does this mean for 
the individual? Spinoza distinguishes between two matricides: the 
killing of Clytemnestra by Orestes; and the killing of Agrippina by Nero.
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By means of these examples Spinoza illustrates the difference between 
vice and virtue. However, as Deleuze tells us; "what matters is knowing 
whether the act is associated with the image of a thing insofar as that 
thing can compound with it, or, on the contrary, insofar as it is 
decomposed by it" (SP 36). By compound we mean a force that extends 
outward and forms alliances with other forces, entering into 
sociabilities with them, and appropriating them under the command of 
a single centre. By decomposition we mean any act that wilfully 
annihilates a characteristic relation or eternal truth; it does not form 
alliances but destroys them. "[T]his distinction does not bear on the act 
itself or its image . . . nor does it bear on the intention. It only concerns 
the determination . . . the relating of two relations, the image of the 
act in its own relation and the image of the thing in its relation" (SP 
36). Therefore, the murder committed by Orestes is good, while the one 
committed by Nero is bad. The former acts in the name of a supreme 
affirmation, the latter a negation. This represents a "hard" ethics, 
since we detect no redolence of a Christian forgiveness, only a Roman 
Stoicism which knows nothing of self-negation.
Essentially this process involves conceiving the univocity of being in 
terms of a common plane of immanence on which all bodies, minds and 
individuals are distributed as upon a ‘diagram’. The plane of immanence 
distributes affects; an assemblage of affects defines a body. It is a 
question of finding out through experimentation what a body can do, 
since we do not know this beforehand. On the plane of immanence there 
is no inside and outside, only a single surface. Inside and outside are 
constituted through a number o f foldings, invaginations and 
envelopments of certain affects that essentially characterise that 
individual body: there is no real distinction between inside and outside 
- the inside is simply a kinetic act of appropriation. Dynamically it is a
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question of 'extensive' relations between individual bodies, and the 
formation of a social milieu that would constitute a more 'intense' 
capacity and higher individuality: a socius. Thus a body is not defined by 
its structure or functions, but by its immanent capacity to be affected. 
As Deleuze writes:
A body can be anything; it can be an animal, a body of sounds, a mind or an idea; it can be 
a linguistic corpus, a social body, a collectivity. We call longitude o f a body the set of 
relations of speed and slowness, of motion and rest, between particles that compose it 
from this point of view, tha t is, between unformed elements. We call latitude the set of 
affects tha t occupy a body at each moment, that is, the intensive states of an anonymous 
force. . .  In this way we construct the map of a body. The longitudes and latitudes together 
constitute Nature, the plane of immanence or consistency, which is always variable and 
is constantly being altered, composed and recomposed, by individuals and collectivities. 
(SP 127 -28)
In short, Deleuze articulates two kinds of relation: a transcendent 
relation that is fixed between subject and object, sign and signified, 
gene and function; and an immanent relation that defines an historical 
desire in terms of a movement infinitely traversing the structure 
relating subject to object, sign to signified, gene to function. On the 
plane of immanence there is no supplementary dimension, only a 
relation of speeds between elements and fragments of elements 
becoming individuated by means of an anonymous drive that traverses 
the whole of the structure instantaneously. In its natural state desire 
constitutes a perpetual process of pure becomings, or what we called 
in relation to  psychoanalysis: reinvestment as a continual process of 
sublimation and resublimation. Ethics, then, if such a thing exists, can 
only be situated in an affirmation of real desire. But what Deleuze 
gives with one hand he takes away with the other. At the point where 
desire is liberated on to the plane of immanence, he cautions us to 
experiment with “prudence” (SP 125). No doubt, in this manner Deleuze 
avoids falling into the black hole that claimed J-F Lyotard during his
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Libidinal Economy phase, but it also reveals him, perhaps, to be quite 
conservative at heart: at least not as radical as some are prone to read 
him.
6. In Foucault, Knowledge is constitu ted on an irreducible 
correspondence between the two forms of visibility and articulation. 
These formalised strata trace lines of light and articulable curves 
through quasi-transcendental 'points' or meeting places between forces 
whose relations define power. These relations of power which are 
mapped out on 'diagrams' are irreducible to  forms of knowledge. 
Moreover, there is the relation with the 'outside' from which the 
diagram flows, "but where the outside does not merge with the 
diagram, but continues instead to 'draw' new ones" (FU 89). A problem 
arises: it is the impasse in which power situates us. Since, if power is 
productive o f truth, where or how may we locate a truth which would 
resist power and, in turn, give rise to metamorphoses. "This could be 
resolved only if the outside were caught up in a movement that would 
snatch it away from the void and pull it back from death" (FU 96). This 
condition is in fact provided by the outside whose movement is one of 
spontaneous folding, unfolding, and refolding.
In what way can this movement overcome the impasse? By producing an 
inside which is not a subjective interiority, but rather, "the inside of 
the outside" (FU 97) as the process of subjectivation which is 
independent from the relations of power and the forms of knowledge. 
"It is not a reproduction of the Same, but a repetition of the Different" 
(FU 98). By folding back the outside upon itself by means of a series of 
practical exercises, the Greeks produced a relation to oneself; "a 
relation which force has with itself, a power to affect itself, an affect 
o f self on self" (FU 101).
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This dimension is the site of resistance as a 'principle of internal 
regulation'. The subject is neither a pre-given nor a fixed centre within 
the transcendental field, but rather, a process of perpetual constitution 
and reconstitution. "The struggle for subjectivity presents itself, 
therefore, as the right to difference, variation and metamorphoses" (FU 
106). It is this dimension of folding or doubling which constitutes the 
independent relation to oneself that Foucault named 'absolute memory'; 
a memory beyond that which is inscribed in strata, archives and 
diagrams. This "absolute memory . . .  is one with forgetting, since it is 
itself endlessly forgotten and reconstituted" (FU 107). Thus: "(t)ime 
becomes a subject because it is the folding of the outside and, as such, 
forces every present into forgetting, but preserves the whole of the 
past within memory: forgetting is the impossibility of return, and 
memory is the necessity of renewal" (FU 108).
By affirming an irreducible disjunction between the form of visibility 
and the form of articulation, Foucault distances himself from the likes 
of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty; the latter carry out a critique of 
intentionality (being) in order to uncover the ontological fold (being). 
However, they situate this fold in a dimension which resolves the 
disjunction between what is seen and what is said. Whereas for 
Foucault this cannot be the case, since knowledge is constituted by two 
forms which are irreducible to each other, and where each form has its 
own object as well as its own subject: there is no possibility of a 
reduction to  the original experience or true object. Intentionality, 
therefore, as the belief that "consciousness is directed towards the 
thing and gains significance in the world" (FU 108), collapses in the 
face of an irreducible problematic. Rather, the objects of knowledge 
necessarily become a certain phantasmic phenomenon. There is no 
correspondence between the two forms, only an interlacing which
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resembles a perpetual combat within a space where the visible and 
articulable intertwine and constitute knowledge-Being. Knowledge 
flows from an informal element constituted by a relation between 
forces: "This is the strategic domain of power, as opposed to the 
strategic domain of knowledge" (FU 112). However, neither of these 
Beings are the true Fold, such a dimension comes about only when the 
outside forms a coextensive inside. "But as a force among forces man 
does not fold the forces that compose him without the outside folding 
itself, and creating a Self within man. It is this fold of Being which 
makes up the third figure when the forms are already interlocked and 
battle has already been joined" (FU 114).
It is the conditions and not the conditioned which interest Foucault. 
Therefore, the true object of our research is the ontological historicity 
of thought itself, since there are no real objects out there that would 
constitute history. The real question is: What is the process that is 
called thinking? In relation to knowledge, thinking is carried out in the 
disjunction between seeing and speaking, that is, thought produces an 
interlacing between the two forms by pushing them both to their 
"individual limits such that the two are the common limit that both 
separates and links them" (FU 117). In relation to power "thinking 
involves the transmission of particular features: it is a dice-throw. 
What the dice-throw represents is that thinking always comes from the 
outside . . . Thinking is neither innate nor acquired" (FU 117). Finally, in 
relation to the self, thinking folds the outside into a coexisting inside. 
It is in this manner that thinking is an affect of self on self, a 
veritable auto-affection tha t constructs an inside space wherein it 
finds the outside from which it arises as its own unthought element.
On the lim it o f the strata, the whole of the inside finds itse lf actively present on the
inside. The inside condenses the past (a long period of tim e) in ways that are not at all
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continuous but instead confront it with the future tha t comes from outside, exchange it 
and recreate it. To think means to  be embedded in the present-time stratum that serves 
as a limit: what can I see and what can I say today? But this involves thinking of the past 
as it is condensed in the inside, in relation to  oneself (there is a Greek in me, or a 
Christian, and so on). We w ill then think the past against the present and resist the 
latter, not in favour of a return but 'in favour, I hope, of a time to  come' (Nietzsche). 
That is, by making the past active and present to  the outside so that something new will 
finally come about, so that thinking, always, may reach thought. Thought thinks its own 
history (the past), but in order to  free itself from what it thinks (the present) and be 
able finally to  'think otherwise' (the future). (FU 119)
This temporalized self we will call the ethical subject. Only a 
forgetting of the present recovers what has been folded in the past, and 
in turn allows for the emergence of a future wherein we may 'think 
otherwise'. Only in this sense is Foucault's ethical subject atonal: 
purged that is of all moralisms. Herein we uncover its logical cruelty, 
which is one with an horrific apersonal microphysics, to which there 
corresponds "the centre o f the cyclone, where one can live and in fact 
where life exists par excellence" (FU 122): the ethical process of 
subjectivation.
In summary, ethics is not deducible from a set of preestablished 
practices, the aim of the individual being to attain excellence therein. 
Rather, to uncover the element of ethics it is necessary to go beyond 
the model of recognition and the form of the same; this is effected by 
postulating a difference in itself as foundation and repetition for itself 
ground of action in general. Only in this manner, through the 
affirmation of an active forgetting, are objective and subjective 
presupposition circumvented. Novelty, which is the g ift of disparity, 
announces itself in the thunderclap of epiphany in the form of 
simplicity and clarity. This disparate domain - the void - constitutes a 
virtual plane of immanence that subsists between the two extremes of 
objective and subjective presupposition. Moreover, it  is on this plane 
tha t real desire is situated, and the possibility o f overcoming
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repression is realised within an act of ‘resistance’. A resistance which, 
paradoxically, is a ‘ le tting go’ , the consummation of which 
necessitates the overcoming of a double obstacle: fear and pity. By 
means of such a leap into the ontological plane of immanence is it 
possible to act in conform ity w ith one’s desires, and thereby 
experience what Lacan named jouissance. Even though jouissance 
corresponds to the phallus, it is nonetheless essentially a desexualised 
energy, or neutrality, traced by the line of flight of the castration 
complex, which is only subsequently resexualised. Herein, in conformity 
w ith Spinoza, a devaluation of consciousness in favour of a 
materialism is realised. The body becomes the focus of the unconscious 
passions grounded in immanence, wherein good and bad are understood 
not in terms of value, but modes of existence. However, the ethical 
procedure, defined as a resistance to repression, necessitates another 
process capable of freeing itself from the impasse of power. This 
requirement finds its design in the process of subjectivation itself: the 
self-invention of the ethical subject by the folding of force back upon 




At every step we have been at pains to reveal a domain that is 
irreducible to either realism or idealism, materialism or rationalism, 
structure or behaviour, thing or word. This domain is constituted by an 
in trins ic  incom m ensurability tha t defines Univocal being: 
heterogeneous rather than homogeneous. It is neither a question of 
mediating from the position of a mean in order to actualise a 
reconciliation, nor is not a question of excluding each perspective as an 
extreme case, but rather of including them all within a disjunctive 
synthesis: a virtualism. The contribution made by each extreme in each 
case is always unequal: it is always inequality in life which impels it 
to progress. There is no tightrope walker who balances himself in the 
middle between the extremes, but rather a constant ‘falling-down’ 
which is simultaneously a ‘raising-up’. Man requires both idealism with 
which he creates a world and a realism with which he faces the truth 
about his world. This virtualism constitutes the real becoming of the 
world and wherein we locate the potential for creation, invention and 
metamorphoses that displaces the notions of identity, unity and telos. 
In fact, the two extremes mark the lim its of the pure becoming, 
without which there would only be chaos. They correspond to the 
boundaries that define a particular body, a body moreover whose Will, 
or will to power, is continually excelling itself and overcoming those 
limits. We have applied this instrument to  the sciences of linguistics 
and biology and found in each case that the foundation for each practice 
could be located only within a virtual plane of immanence populated by 
pre-individual and impersonal singularities.
To begin with, we located an essential lacking in identity that rumbles 
below the concept, an irrepressible carnivalesque tha t subsists 
between thing and word, denotation and signification, and which it was
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the aspiration of the Modern world to  reify through the strict 
correspondences of an empirical science grounded in reason. Within the 
postmodern world difference in itself is shown to be the foundation, 
the ground of which is neither the linear nor cyclical temporality, but 
rather the eternal return of a wild and pure becoming that 
representation aims to pacify. This domain is essentially a relational 
field unpresentable through the medium of representation. In relation 
to language, which we articulated in terms of a critique of Husserlean 
phenomenology, it was found that not sight but the voice is directly 
linked to consciousness. Thereby the hegemony of the phenomenon is 
smashed. The eye and the ear are two irreducible organs. By means of 
the latter a meaningful world is constructed out of phonetic fragments 
into the morphemes which provide sense and signification. By means of 
the former a world picture is constructed out o f all the partial 
visibilities into an identical and unified ocular world. Between the two 
there exists not absolute reconciliation, but only an unequal 
communication. Thus, from the point of view of psychism, we inhabit 
two worlds constituted by the separate faculties of sight and hearing. 
In relation to the body, which was presented as a critique of scientific 
reductionism within the field of evolutionary biology, it was found that 
two distinct aspects characterise any organ(ism): structure and 
function. The former comes under the rubric of behaviour and evolution, 
that is, the functions of organisms are determined by the purpose for 
which they evolved. However, there is no strict relation between the 
two, but rather a continual adaptation to new environments and 
situations with the organs provided, and in some cases leading to the 
evolution of new ones. The latter is defined by the biology-knowledge 
disjunction. Knowledge of the world - which includes any organism’s 
awareness of its immediate environment, not jus t the human - is
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conditional upon the structure and nature of the faculties of that 
organism. Again, this relation is not reducible to  a single 
correspondence. Take, for example, the world of an organism which is 
constituted by the two faculties of sight and smell (canine). In this 
case the disjunction is constitu ted  around v is ib ilities and 
olfactibilities, there is no complex linguistic network but a highly 
elaborated meaningful world constructed around scent. For a dog, scent 
is a morpheme. From the point of view of materialism, then, we inhabit 
two distinct worlds composed by the biological structure (faculties) of 
the organism and its knowledge of the world based upon these 
faculties. This, when applied to the realm of an ethic, articulated in 
terms of a theory of affectivity founded in real desire, was alone 
capable of grounding the notions of good and bad. The verb 'found' is 
especially pertinent here, since it  itself implies a paradoxical 
movement: to build and to melt. It is only by losing oneself that one's 
Self is found: the Not-Self or ?-Self.
The extremes must not be understood as representing a dialectic 
between a thesis (being) and an antithesis (non-being) that find their 
reconciliation within a higher synthesis (becoming). This does not 
correspond to an Hegelianism, but rather represents its immanent 
overturning. This overturning has at least three aspects: Firstly, from 
the point of view of Hegel’s anthropomorphism, the unending process of 
becoming moves toward the ultim ate reality o f to ta l self- 
consciousness; what he called the Absolute Idea. This prioritisation of 
self-consciousness defines Hegel’s humanism, to which Deleuze applies 
the Nietzschean unconscious, thereby showing consciousness to be a 
mere effect of the more primary forces. Within the domain of anti­
humanism, qualities such as self-consciousness are adaptational 
features which the evolutionary motor of Life produces as a local
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solution to a given problem. All adaptational features are just so many 
responses to  environmental conditions, the lim its of which are 
represented by the extremes. The Earth - and the cosmos of which it is 
a part - is a highly complex and sophisticated holistic machine, in 
which every single element is as important as the next in the 
contribution it makes in the production of life. Hence, the second 
aspect of the overturning corresponds to the rejection of the notion of 
a teleological power which tirelessly drives onward and upward into 
higher and higher forms of organisation which ultimately culminates in 
the absolute aim of the Spirit. The history of this process is defined as 
Spirit’s increasing purification from its material envelope: Spirit is 
Reason. Here we locate the importance of Nietzschean pessimism and 
the necessity for an amor fati in the face of an inhuman process lacking 
in ‘ends’ . Thirdly, the réévaluation of non-being in terms not of a 
nothingness, but a virtuality teeming with unactualized potential. In 
fact, being and non-being are not so much dialectically opposed, rather 
non-being, or what Deleuze names (?)-being in order to emphasis its 
problematic nature, constitutes the foundation of all being. (?)-being is 
the potential within every actualised form of being, composing both the 
source from which it is emergent, as well as the evolutionary drive for 
metamorphosis. Hence, the disparity at the origins of identity and the 
impossibility of actualising the Concept or Absolute Idea.
However, another aspect deserves consideration - that is, the relation 
of ethics to  Law. This relation we will articulate in terms of the 
duality between anarchism and constitutionalism. The constitution, 
whether defined in terms of mediaeval Pontiff, nation state King, or 
democratic Law, all extort the same exigency from its subjects: that 
is, the despotic demand for duty and obedience. These three systems of 
constitutional law define the developmental progress - at least in
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Europe - of the need for stability and order. Law is beneficial, not only 
for those who wield its power, but also for the individual subjects who 
make up the individual elements of the body politic. The reason for this 
mutual benefit lies in the fact that increasing complexity is emergent 
not from absolute chaos, but a lower level order poised on the edge of 
chaos. The direction of evolution in the cosmos flows from simplicity 
to complexity on all levels of existence: mineral, vegetative, and 
animal. The explanation for this movement can be given, and has been 
given since Schopenhauer, in terms of an inhuman Will  of life that 
constitutes the motor of the evolution. Moreover, the higher the level of 
complexity tha t a system is capable of incorporating, the more 
extensive is the sphere of behaviour open to that system: that is, with 
every increase in complexity there is a corresponding increase in 
freedom. Life desires increasing complexity, since each stage in the 
development of a system represents an overcoming of its previous 
constraints. This argument justifies, we believe, the necessity for 
laws (axioms) not in the service of a morality, but for an ethic of 
continual creation in the service of life itself. A réévaluation ad 
perpetuus. We do not imply the “ art for art’s sake” of the Russian 
nihilists, but an experimentation tied to both an idealism and a realism. 
However, the dangers of law come about when their decrees become so 
established and their utility so popular amongst the largest group of 
the population - the middle classes - that they come to be seen as 
immutable. Through its relation with absolute right, the law takes upon 
itself the mantle of the despot, bigot, hypocrite and glutton; in this 
manner the crimes against life are perpetrated in the name of truth. 
This identification of the law with a moral conduct sanctioned from 
above through the dispensations of the Pontiff, reveal the allegiance 
between Church and State and their common enmity against the process
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of invention which threatens their own security. In this capacity 
Church and State express a paranoiac repulsion and denial of life. Thus 
they become inaugurators of the Holy Lie, which they surround with a 
wall of fire that only a hero, wholly lacking in fear and pity, is capable 
of penetrating.1 This penetration has a double signification; on the one 
hand, it corresponds to  the liberation of the Valkyrie Brynhild who 
represents the pure thought and will of Godhead, on the other hand, by 
taking her as his consort, the hero breeds a race of beings who are 
themselves capable o f free-thought; thereby unleashing upon the 
surface of the Earth the force of anarchy. Laws are necessary, but we 
must learn to discard them as soon as they cease to have value in the 
service of life. This is what is meant by How to Philosophise with a 
Hammer:1 2 not to smash but tap gently against the icons of our value 
systems in order to ascertain whether they are hollow.
This rapping is neither a revisionism nor a reactionism. There is no 
Critique on the plane o f immanence: we neither revise established 
values which would continue to exist even after the revision; nor do we 
enter into a dialectical relation - the negation of their affirmation - 
with the values to be overturned. Rather, the function of the anarchist 
is to combat the dogmatism of institutionalisation by pushing the 
systems of valuation beyond their limits, causing them to  ‘found’, in 
order to create something other: a metamorphosis into a new individual. 
Only in this manner can we escape the impasse of critique which 
always already implies a perspective and presupposed truth - that is, 
its own dogmatism. As we have said, the overman-anarchist is one who 
is both fearless and pitiless, a wholly unmoral individual, guided not by 
law but his own innocent passions and desires. This falling-back on
1 The reference is to the Siegfried of Wagner's Ring Cycle.
2 The reference is to F. Nietzsche’s Twighlight of the Idols.
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desire does not lead to a malign chaos and moral depravity, but rather 
finds therein an ethic far more disciplined than any mechanical 
obedience to law. There can be no liberation without limit, no anarchy 
without constitution. The anarchist therefore clears the ground not for 
the sake of clearing, but only in order to create; this is his own 
obligation to his highest self. (S)he is primarily a creator; destruction 
is a mere effect of the affirmative will to life situated on the plane of 
immanence. Furthermore, one must be prudent and know the right time 
when to exercise convention and when it is wise to break it. This 
implies a necessity for becoming skilled in using the rules of the 
constitution in order to turn them against the very body that they 
constitute, rather than attempting to overcome them all at once - to 
become a veritable virus in the system. In the words of Nietzsche:
It is necessary fo r these men of incomprehensible loneliness to  wrap themselves 
vigorously and boldly in the cloak of external, spatial solitude, too: tha t is part o f their 
prudence. Even cunning and disguise are needed today if such a man is to  preserve 
himself, to  keep himself aloft, in the midst of the dangerous, down-dragging currents of 
the age. Every a ttem pt to  endure in the present, to  endure the present, every approach to 
the men and aims of today, he will have to  atone as if it were his own special sin; and he 
may marvel at the concealed wisdom of his nature that, after every such attempt, at once
draws him back to  himself by means of sickness and bad accidents.3
The anarchist must wear the mask of that which is to be overturned, 
and from this position of immanence introduces a schism into the 
system. Unity is thereby shown to be composed of an assemblage of 
mutually contradictory or inconsistent elements and attributes. This 
definition characterises schizophrenia, in exactly the same way as the 
anarchist is himself characterised as a schizophrenic. However, by 
schism we do not refer to the medical condition, but to an essential 
lacking in unity, identity and telos characteristic of every system and




It remains to define our understanding of Anarchism and the domain to 
which it properly belongs in its purest expression. As we have seen, 
axioms are not simply repressive structures imposed upon the masses 
by a ruling class, but rather compose an essential structuration of the 
chaotic substratum, without which there would only be a disorder and 
simplicity wholly lacking in organisation and development, rendering 
the constitution of a social milieu impossible. Nonetheless, the axioms 
themselves must not be understood in terms of immutability, rather 
the necessity to violate their authority must be continually affirmed if 
progress is to  be realised. States impose laws, individual must obey 
these laws; there therefore arises an incompatibility between State 
and individual. One cannot resolve this controversy through an appeal to 
morality, since we have been at pains to deny its authenticity 
throughout this thesis. Only an ethics of decentralised desire can serve 
as a model of the State (politics) and its productive forces 
(economics). The incompatibility resides therefore between the desire 
of the individual and the laws imposed by the State which inhibit the 
free-flow of desire. Is it possible therefore that anarchism, on the 
material level of the productive forces constitutive of a social 
organisation, would facilitate the productivity and empowerment of the 
individual? That is, if everybody were to do their own thing, unhindered 
by any political regulation, would this solve the problem of 
exploitation and repression? It is extremely doubtful, since the 
individual would very soon form partnerships and collectivities as his 
needs dictate. Those who have little or nothing by way of buying into 
these cooperatives will become isolated and eventually vanish. Some 
collectivities will increasingly expand, and before too long, there will 
exist the same inequalities anarchism proposed to  abolish. Quite
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clearly, a pure anarchism released upon the material forces of 
production - the production and distribution of food, clothing, and 
housing - will fail to realise the empowerment so dearly sought by the 
anarchic individual. Therefore, the to ta l abolition of the State is 
unjustified, what must be limited is its power of intruding upon the 
privacy of the individual and of imposing on its members an absolute 
control. State and individual constitute the two extreme limits of a 
social assemblage which is in the continual process of becoming. It is 
true that with democracy the majority decide, thus the individual can 
easily find himself on the outside of society. Nonetheless, the 
individual will not be excluded on all issues voted through the 
democratic process, with some he will be in full accord and in this 
case the individual will constitute one element within that majority he 
derided on other issues. Thus, the Rule of Law is probably the best 
means of distributing the maximum equality and empowerment to every 
member constitutive of the social milieu, bearing in mind that as long 
as these rules are subject to continual renewal as and when 
circumstances dictate. It follows tha t pure anarchism can only be 
realised within thought, or what Deleuze calls thinking. For this reason 
anarchism encapsulates the spirit of the “ internet” as an unregulated 
system of communication and information distribution; but that is its 
limit. And even there it fails to find its perfect expression.
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